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Development
The JAT was conceptualized to fulfill an international void of scholarly publications in this
area as identified by the primary organizers. It is envisioned that aviation leaders will utilize the
JAT as a key decision-making tool. Scholarly rigor and standards will be uncompromised with
regular evaluation by the Editorial Board and Panel of Reviewers.
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Scope
The JAT will accept manuscripts on all topics that relate to air transportation, both technical
and non-technical. The Panel of Reviewers represents the interdisciplinary nature of air
transportation to ensure review by recognized experts. Broad categories of appropriate topics
include, but are not limited to:
•Aviation Administration, Management, Economics, Education, Policy, Engineering, Technology,
and Science
• Intermodal Transportation
• Aerospace Education and Flight
• Airports and Air Traffic Control
• Air Transportation Systems: Domestic, International, Comparative
• Aviation/Aerospace Psychology, Human Factors, Safety, and Human Resources
• Avionics, Computing, and Simulation
• Space Transportation Safety, Communication, and the Future
• Other areas of air and space transportation research, policy, theory, case study, practice, and
issues
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Dissemination
The JAT is catalogued at key research libraries world wide, including the U.S. Library of
Congress. It is also indexed in Aviation Tradescan, EBSCO On-line, the National Research
Council TRIS Index, and ERIC Resources in Education. In addition, the JAT is available
through interlibrary loan at the University of Nebraska at Omaha Library and the Transport and
Telecommunications Institute in Latvia via accessing the global OCLC inter-library loan network.
A permanent archive is maintained at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. Annual subscriptions
are available for U.S. $35 for individuals and U.S. $68 for institutions. For subscriptions outside
the U.S. add $20. Payments may be made by check or purchase order payable to the UNO
Aviation Institute.
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Organizations
Host Organizations:
University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO) - Nancy Belck, Chancellor; Derek Hodgson, Vice-
Chancellor for Academic Affairs.
Co-Sponsor Organizations:
American Society for Public Administration - Transportation Section - Jeremy Plant, Chair,
Transportation Section
Air Transport Research Society - Tae Oum, Chair
NASA Kansas Space Grant Consortium - David Downing, Director
NASA Nebraska Space Grant Consortium - Brent Bowen, Director
NASA Space Grant and Fellowship Program, Aerospace Working Group – Diane DeTroye, Interim
Program Director
Transport and Telecommunications Institute, Latvia - Eugenye Kopitov, Rector
World Aerospace Education Organization - Kamal Naguib, Chairman
Supporting Organizations:
Aviation Institute, UNO - Brent Bowen, Director
Center for Public Affairs Research, UNO - Jerome Deichert, Director
College of Public Affairs and Community Service, UNO - B.J. Reed, Dean
School of Public Administration, UNO - Russell Smith, Chair
University Library, UNO - Janice Boyer, Dean
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Editors
Brent D. Bowen
Dr. Brent Bowen is Director and Distinguished Professor, Aviation Institute, School of Public Administration, University of Nebraska at 
Omaha, and the University’s Director of Aviation and Transportation Policy and Research. Bowen attained his doctorate in Higher 
Education and Aviation from Oklahoma State University and a Master of Business Administration degree from Oklahoma City University. 
His Federal Aviation Administration certifications include Airline Transport Pilot, Certified Flight Instructor (Gold Seal), Advanced 
Instrument Ground Instructor, Aviation Safety Counselor, and Aerospace Education Counselor. Dr. Bowen’s research on the development of 
the national Airline Quality Rating is regularly featured in numerous national and international media, as well as refereed academic
publications. Dr. Bowen has in excess of 250 publications, papers, and program appearances to his credit. His research interests focus on 
aviation applications of public productivity enhancement and marketing in the areas of service quality evaluation, forecasting, and student 
recruitment/retention in collegiate aviation programs. He is also well published in areas related to effective teaching and has pioneered new 
pedagogical techniques. Dr. Bowen has been recognized with awards of achievement and commendation from the American Marketing
Association, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Federal Aviation Administration, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 
W. Frank Barton School of Business, Travel and Transportation Research Association, World Aerospace Education Association, and others.
Igor Kabashkin
Dr. Igor Kabashkin is Vice Rector of the Transport and Telecommunications Institute, Latvia, and a Professor in the Aviation Maintenance 
Department and member of the Technical Committee on Transport of the European Commission for Cooperation in the Field of Scientific 
and Technical Research. Kabashkin received his Doctor Degree in Aviation from Moscow Civil Engineering Institute, a High Doctor 
Degree in Aviation from Moscow Aviation Institute, and a Doctor Habilitus Degree in Engineering from Riga Aviation University and 
Latvian Academy of Science. His research interests include analysis and modeling of complex technical systems, information technology 
applications, reliability of technical systems, radio and telecommunication systems, and information and quality control systems. Dr. 
Kabashkin has published over 274 scientific papers, 19 scientific and teaching books, and holds 67 patents and certificates of invention.
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JAT Personnel
Editor: Brent Bowen, Aviation Institute, UNO
Co-Editor: Igor Kabashkin, Transport and Telecommunications Institute, Latvia
Former Managing Editor: Nanette Scarpellini-Metz, Aviation Institute, UNO
Managing Editor: Jocelyn Nickerson, Aviation Institute, UNO
Manager, Technology-Based Educational Systems: Scott Vlasek, Aviation Institute, UNO
Library Liaisons/Advisors: John Reidelbach, University Library, UNO
Publications Specialists: Joyce Carson, Layout; Melanie Kiper, Copy Editor, Center for
Public Affairs Research, UNO; Michaela Schaaf, Stylistic Reviewer, NASA Nebraska Space 
Grant Consortium, UNO
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Editorial Board
Membership on the JAT Editorial Board is by invitation and approval of the board. This appointment should be viewed as professional recognition of significant 
career achievement and high academic/industry distinction. Applicants will generally be senior faculty members (graduate faculty standing where applicable), or 
persons who have attained substantial industry or public service achievement in the case of practitioner members. Term of appointment is three years with opportunity 
to request renewal. For membership consideration, submit a curriculum vita or industry resume and statement of interest to: Dr. Brent Bowen, Executive Editor.
Members:
R. I. R. Abeyratne -- ICAO Air Transport Bureau, Canada
Ballard Barker -- Florida Institute of Technology
Brent Bowen -- University of Nebraska at Omaha
Tim Brady -- Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Thomas Carney -- Purdue University
Larry Carstenson -- University of Nebraska at Kearney
Thomas Connolly -- Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Nader A. Dahabi -- Ministry of Transport, Jordan
E. Julius Dasch -- NASA, Washington, D.C.
David Downing -- Kansas Space Grant Consortium University of Kansas
Gerry Fairbairn -- Daniel Webster College
John Fitzpatrick -- College of Aeronautics
Triant Flouris – Auburn University
Atef Ghobrial -- Georgia State University
Sveinn Gudmundsson -- Toulouse Business School, France
Vishwa Bandhu Gupta -- Bandhu Aerospace Pvt., Ltd., India
M. M. Hamed -- Jordan University of Science and Technology, Jordan
Dean Headley -- Wichita State University
Momdauh Muhammed Heshmat -- Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority, Egypt
William Hiscock -- Montana Space Grant Consortium Montana State University
Lofti Kaabi -- Institute Regional des Sciences Informatiques et des Telecommunications, Tunisia
Igor Kabashkin -- Transport and Telecommunications Institute, Latvia
Gary Kiteley -- Council on Aviation Accreditation
Hart Langer -- United Airlines
Mike Lavelle -- The Boeing Company
Henry Lehrer -- Rossford, Ohio
Keith Mason -- Cranfield University, England
Robert Matthews -- FAA, Washington, D.C.
H. C. McClure -- Mac Air Consulting
Graeme McDowal -- Air New Zealand, New Zealand
Frank Mitchell -- University of Oklahoma
Phillip Moore -- Hong Kong Institute of Technology, China
Kamal Naguib -- World Aerospace Education Organization, Egypt
Isaac Nettey -- Kent State University
David NewMyer -- Southern Illinois University
Gary Northam -- Parks College of Engineering and Aviation; Saint Louis 
University
Tae Oum -- University of British Columbia, Canada
Korham Oyman -- Anadolu University, Turkey
Kent Penney -- Nebraska Department of Aeronautics
Aisling Reynolds-Feighan -- University College, Ireland
William Shea -- SHEA Aviation Associates
N. Thomas Stephens -- Florida Institute of Technology
Scott Tarry -- University of Nebraska at Omaha
Abdul Wahab Teffaha -- Arab Air Carriers Organization, Lebanon
Alexander Wells -- Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Kenneth Wiggins -- Oklahoma State University
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Panel of Reviewers
John M. C. King -- Aviation & Tourism Management, Australia
Valery Kutev -- Transport and Telecommunications Institute, Latvia
Mike Larson -- University of Nebraska at Omaha
Thomas Lawton -- Imperial College, University of London, England
Kyung-Sup Lee -- Transportation & Logistics Institute, Korea
Chien-Tsung Lu -- Central  Missouri State University
Jacqueline Luedtke -- Daniel Webster College
Rebecca Lutte -- The Woodlands, Texas
William McCurry -- Arizona State University
J. Patrick McKinzie -- Minnesota State University
Juan Merkt -- Ohio University
A. Keith Mew -- California State University–Los Angeles
Terry Michmerhuizen -- Duncan Aviation
Boris Misnevs -- Transport and Telecommunications Institute, Latvia
Massoum Moussavi --University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Y. S. Park -- Korean Air, Korea
Manoj Patankar -- San Jose State University
Michael Pearson -- Arizona State University
Anthony Perl -- CUNY Aviation Institute at York College
Stephen Quilty -- Bowling Green State University
Thomas Reilly -- Safety Harbor, Florida
Dawna Rhoades -- Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Robert Ripley -- Auburn University
Ryan Rogers -- Southern Illinois University, Carbondale
Jose Ruiz -- Southern Illinois University, Carbondale
Stephen Rutner -- Georgia Southern University
Respicio A. Espírito Santos, Jr. -- Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Michael Schukert -- Palm Coast, FL
Mary Sandy -- Old Dominion University—Virginia Space Grant
Michaela Schaaf -- University of Nebraska at Omaha
Kim Jeffrey Stevens -- Aeronautics Division of ADOT
Vadim Stroitlev -- Air Navigation Service, Latvia
Yoshinon Suzuki -- Iowa State University
Mary Ann Turney -- Arizona State University
Victor Ujimoto -- University of Guelph, Canada
Bijan Vasigh -- Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Timothy Vowles Victoria – University of Wellington, New Zealand
Elizabeth Ward -- NASA Langley Research Center
Thomas Weitzel -- Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
David Widauf -- Utah State University
Marc Wilson -- AMES Consulting, Inc.
Irina Yatskir -- Transport and Telecommunications Institute, Latvia
Malcolm Yeo -- Edith Cowan University, Australia
Jule Zumwalt -- World Aerospace Education Organization
International Members
Ahmed Abdelghany -- United Airlines
Densel Acheson -- University of Nebraska at Omaha
Anthony Adamski-- Eastern Michigan University
Julio Aguilar -- Solvciones en Regulaciones y Mercados,Mexico
Fariba Alamdari -- Cranfield University, England
Herbert Armstrong -- College of Aeronautics
Andreas Antoniou -- Commonwealth Secretariat, England
Kenneth Barnard -- Kansas State University
Jon Bryan -- Bridgewater State College
Gerald Chubb -- The Ohio State University
David Conway -- Southeastern Oklahoma State University
Gerald Cook -- Spirit Airlines
Milford Coor -- International Aviation Law Consultant
James Crehan -- South Dakota State University
Khalid Durani -- Karachi, Pakistan
Steve Erb -- U.S. Department of Transportation
Jay Evans -- National Business Aircraft Association
E. Terence Foster -- University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Terry Gibbs -- University of Nebraska at Kearney
Mavis Green -- Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Allen Hamilton -- Federal Express
Fred Hansen -- Oklahoma State University
William Herrick -- Middle Tennessee State University
Jos Heyman -- Tiros Space Information, Australia
John Horine -- Central Missouri State University
Matteo Ignaccolo -- University of Catania, Italy
Sajjad Jasimuddin -- King Abdulaziz University, Saudi Arabia
Randy Johnson -- Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Alexander Kalmykov -- The SABRE Group, Texas
Craig Kanske -- Sky Views, Oklahoma
Reviewers are appointed by the Editor to represent all elements of aviation
and space transportation scholarship and practice. An appointment to the Panel
of Reviewers recognizes professional and academic achievement. Appointments
are for a three-year term with the option of renewal. For membership consideration,
submit a curriculum vita or industry resumé to Dr. Brent Bowen, Executive Editor.
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ACHIEVING RECOGNITION AS A
WORLD CLASS AIRPORT THROUGH
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Stephen M. Quilty
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, Ohio
ABSTRACT
The need and requirement exists for the implementation of proper safety oversight
systems by airport operators and management. The ability to achieve world-class
airport operations can occur only if airport personnel receive the proper education and
training to manage safe operations and increase operating efficiency. This paper
addresses the current requirements of the International Civil Aviation Organization
for the certification of airports and means by which to obtain a proper safety oversight
system, provides examples of airports making progress toward meeting world class
standards, and describes a program for certifying airport personnel as a means to
achieve world class airport operations.
INTRODUCTION
The management and operation of airports is becoming more
complicated and sophisticated due to advancing technology and user
demands. Outside forces such as airport users, tenants, customers, and
government agencies exert additional demands requiring change and
growth on the part of airport management and employees to meet those
requirements. These demands require a more highly skilled and
knowledgeable work force. A safety conscious society also requires airport
operation and maintenance personnel to be qualified in their respective
areas. Though education and training have always been integral to effective
airport operations, its significance has certainly increased in recent years
due to global competition for passenger, cargo and economic development.
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If the goal of an airport is to improve safety and security, meet
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International
Organization of Standards (ISO 9000), or state government standards, or be
competitive in the global marketplace, then airport management and their
employees must keep pace with changes in society and the industry if they
expect to meet customer demands for a world class airport. World class is a
term that is defined as an organization’s ability to provide a product and/or
service as good as, or better than, any other competitor in the world through
some competitive advantage (Dessler, 1995).
Recently, ICAO adopted new Standard and Recommended Practices
(SARPs) governing the operation and management of airports. Compliance
with the SARPs will require both increased education and training of
personnel. Amendment 4 to the ICAO Annex 14 Volume I Aerodromes
spells out the requirements for the certification of airports serving
international air carrier operations (Rao, 2002). It recommends that all
public use airports and not just international ones be certified as well.
To accomplish these goals, it is important to remember that airport
organizations are made up of people and they exist to fulfill the mission or
goal of the airport. It is an airport’s mission statement that forms the basis
for all activities at the airport, including training. Education and training
efforts must be directed in such a manner that the airport organization can
accomplish its mission and goals. This focus on the purpose of the
organization entails looking at what an airport does and then describing the
types of things the organization should be doing.
ICAO, through its SARPs, identifies training and record keeping as a
means of demonstrating compliance with agreed upon regulations and
satisfactory operation. Together, they reflect the safety oversight system in
place at the airport. Additionally, labor contracts will often contain a clause
for the employer to provide educational opportunities or training of labor
members.
Education and training are often viewed as one and the same. However,
scholars will point out a distinction between the two. Training is a response
to a need and should stem from gaps in knowledge or performance.
Training is performed as a short term focused response to organizational
and individual job task needs. A training need will exist when an
employee’s performance differs from what the situation or task requires.
More specifically, a training need exists when a current employee’s
knowledge, skills, or attitudes should be changed to help bring about
desired performance. In general, training prepares individuals to do their
current jobs.
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In contrast to training, education provides a broader, more generalized
acquisition of knowledge and development that prepares an individual for a
future job or position. Education also enhances the ability of an individual
to understand and appreciate the larger perspective of how things work in
their organization and in the world. It is educational development that
allows a person to understand how they fit into the broader context and
meaning of airport operations and it promotes overall intelligence about
how things and people work and function. For customer service oriented
airports, both education and training are necessary.
EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE AIRPORT ENVIRONMENT
From an organizational standpoint, the environment in which airports
operate is one of turbulence and uncertainty. Additionally, airport
management constantly faces pressures and demands from the government,
traveling public and users of the airport. To cope with this environment of
political, social, regulatory and economic forces, airport staff must
maintain a high degree of flexibility and productivity. Education and
training help to provide the means by which airport personnel can optimize
operations. It has been found that a better-trained work force will be more
productive (Cocheu, 1990; Wexley & Latham, 1981) and provide higher
quality services (Gilbert & Parhizgari, 2000).
Other studies have shown that the more training and education an
individual receives related to his or her job, the more satisfied and
motivated he or she is (Rush, 1987). Lawler observed that a highly
motivated and satisfied work force tends to be more stable and better able to
adapt to changes (Lawler, 1987). Employees also want to feel in control of
their work. When their skills and knowledge are increased and alternatives
for doing things differently or better are known, employees have an
increased ability to cope with the pressures and demands of the workplace
(Duncan & Weiss, 1979).
The environment in which an airport operates lends itself to many
training and educational opportunities. For instance, the Hartsfield Atlanta
International Airport provides more than 100 development and training
opportunities annually to its employees and tenant service providers to
enhance their professional, personal and organizational development. The
airport environment also presents many challenges and problems.
Questions to answer include: What kind of training and education should
we do? When should we train? How should we carry out training? In many
respects, airports are no different in their general training requirements than
other organizations in business and industry. However, airports have
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specific needs and skills requirements that cannot be provided by regular
training organizations.
For instance, specialized training would focus on areas such as airfield
inspections, pavement maintenance, ground vehicle operation, airfield
lighting and maintenance, tower control and operations, hazard awareness,
construction monitoring, security, fueling, fire and emergency response,
snow removal, wildlife mitigation, terminal operations, and baggage
system handling, to name a few. Each of these would have specialized
application to an airport and require specialized training.
The airport operating environment also requires administrators,
managers, maintenance and operations personnel to have an overall
understanding of many different aspects of airport operation, to include
how all their specialized area fits into the larger frame of operating a world
class airport. This larger understanding comes from having education
sessions that provide a broad perspective of how an airport system is
interdependent and interrelated to the aviation system. Achieving
understanding of how each area of an airport impacts the other and how the
airport then impacts other businesses and the community is the goal of
broad education.
Determining and analyzing training needs is the starting point for all
training efforts. Needs analysis is the collection of information to
determine whether there is a gap between current performance and
expected performance (Rummler, 1987). There are different ways to
determine the performance or need gap. This information can be culled
through five primary methods: interviews, documents, surveys,
observations, or focus groups (Wexley & Latham, 1981). Analyzing and
identifying the gap that may exist between what the airport organization is
supposed to be doing and what it is doing points toward areas for education
or training.
Unfortunately, airports do not generally have the luxury of skilled
trainers or resources to conduct or fulfill all the airport’s training needs and
requirements. As a result, personnel within the organization who frequently
do not have a background in education or training methods conduct much
of the required training on a piecemeal or as needed basis. This
circumstance may result in a poor or ineffective training process because
successfully proven training and education procedures are not used. The
improper or nonexistent training and education of airport personnel is often
identified as one of the major factors that contribute to the shortcomings of
airport operations.
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ICAO emphasizes the importance of civil aviation training by initiating
projects that support the training activities of its Contracting States.
ICAO’s Aviation Training Program assists Contracting States in
establishing and/or developing their own civil aviation training capability
by providing training opportunities abroad and by providing guidance on
training curriculum. Other organizations, such as the International
Association of Airport Executives (IAAE), International Air Transport
Association (IATA), universities, and private organizations or individuals
can provide primary assistance as well.
One important principle under which the ICAO training program
functions at an airport is that aviation training is the responsibility of the
Contracting States. It is because many States are now starting to privatize
their operations that ICAO believes the safety oversight responsibility of
the airport organization may be compromised. For this reason, Amendment
4 was adopted to ensure that safety management systems continue to
remain in place and are upheld. As a note, airports in the United States of
America (U.S.A.) serving domestic and international air carrier operations
have been required to be certificated since 1976.
EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR WORLD CLASS AIRPORTS
During the 1990s, several new international airports opened around the
world. In particular, two were beset with major opening day snafus that
otherwise spoiled the accomplishments of having the airports constructed.
Other airports, both new and old, have experienced increases in operational
errors or delays in responding to customer service requests.
The Incheon International Airport Corporation (IIAC), the organization
charged with building and operating the new airport that superseded the
aging Gimpo Airport in Seoul, Korea, was one airport that was keenly
aware of the problems that can beset new airports. They had studied the
earlier snafus and startup problems at other airports and were determined to
avoid similar startup problems.
In conducting analyses as to why previous airports experienced the
difficulties they did, IIAC officials concluded it was because of two basic
underlying reasons: a) the various operational systems of the airports were
not adequately tested before opening, and b) the personnel were not
properly trained to manage the operations or handle problems that did arise
(H.J. Kim, personal communication, April 13, 2000). IIAC sought to
address the later issue by engaging several internal and outside training
institutions to better prepare their employees for the opening. They did this
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because their goal was (and continues to be) to operate a world-class
airport.
IIAC had a successful opening in May of 2001 and is off to a good start
toward meeting its goal (Hiscock, 2002). Their success had been due in
large part to senior management supporting the initial training and
education of all of its employees in every discipline. Broad educational
sessions coupled with specific system and operational training were
conducted using several means. After the opening, IIAC officials continued
to provide the educational and training experiences necessary to maintain
their opening day success (Quilty, 2001).
IIAC understood the value of education and training in order to achieve
world-class status. Other airports attempting to remain or increase
competitive advantages on the global playing field are recognizing the
same. In April of 2002, the Indian government came under world scrutiny
for the way in which their airports were managed. In response to that
criticism, Civil Aviation Secretary K. Roy Paul announced the preparation
of a strategic master plan for developing and modernizing all airports in the
country in order to reduce political interference. To do so, however, he said
the skills of the Airports Authority of India would have to be upgraded so as
to equip it for overall management of world-class airports (NDTV, 2002).
The Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport has as its mission statement
to become the world’s best airport by exceeding customer expectations. In
accomplishing this mission, the airport recognized the need to have people
demonstrate the skills, knowledge, abilities, and motivation necessary for
achieving recognition as a world-class airport. They do so by expending
approximately $18,500 per employee annually in training, either through
onsite training and education or by outside tuition reimbursement (C.
Alston, personal communication, June 20, 2002). The programs offered
cover management development and education topics as well as specific
skill training. The end result is that Atlanta was rated best in overall
passenger satisfaction by the IATA for 2001 for mega airports handling
more than 40 million passengers a year (Hiscock, 2002).
Throughout the U.S.A., training and education is a legal requirement at
airports. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) places emphasis
on the subject of training in federal regulation 14 CFR Part 139 under Sec.
139.303: “Each certificate holder (airport) shall maintain sufficient
qualified personnel to comply with the requirements of its airport
certification manual or airport certification specifications and the
applicable rules of this part” (FAA, 1988).
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There are specific sections within the FAA regulation that address
training, such as rescue and fire fighting, basic emergency medical care,
handling and storing of hazardous substances and materials, fueling, snow
removal, low visibility operations, emergency plan implementation and
wildlife hazard management. To strengthen its emphasis on training and
education, the FAA issued in 2000 a notice of proposed rule making
(NPRM) for modifying Part 139 that upon enactment will require the
specific training and education of inspection personnel (FAA, 2000).
Throughout the current and proposed FAA regulations, the words shall
include procedures are found. Procedures must be communicated and
explained to individuals to ensure compliance. Under the terminology,
airport procedures can be viewed as the framework or infrastructure that
brings together personnel, equipment and facilities to accomplish airport
organizational goals. Airport policies and procedures form the basis for the
development of a training program. Together, policies and procedures
represent the safety management system of an airport and are indicative of
what ICAO seeks to have its members implement.
Poor employee or organizational performance can often be attributed to
employees not following proper procedures, or by not having the proper
tools, materials or equipment available to adequately perform the job. If
airport management is not prepared to consider changes in the work
environment to support training, or fails to provide a commitment to
training and education due to budget constraints or other factors, then
management cannot expect to meet the world-class standards or goals of
the organization. There has to be an organizational and resource
commitment to conduct education and training for an organization to be
successful (Cresswell, 1989). Training and education are not one-time
activities that organizations do, but rather must be part of an ongoing
process that has management commitment and emphasis.
CERTIFICATION OF AIRPORT PERSONNEL
As noted previously, education and training were important
considerations for the IIAC. IIAC also was looking to achieve possible
certification of its personnel as a means for demonstrating its airport would
be operated by trained individuals and as a means for continual
improvement and implementation of ISO processes. Certification, by
definition, is the voluntary process instituted by a non-governmental
agency in which individuals are recognized for advanced sets of skill or
knowledge (Shenenberg & Smith, 1999). The purpose of certification is to
inform the public that selected individuals have demonstrated a particular
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degree of competency. IIAC’s search for certification led it to the American
Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) as having the only program that
offers the accreditation and certification of airport employees globally.
AAAE is the largest professional organization for airport executives in
the world, representing thousands of airport management personnel at
airports in the U.S.A. and internationally. AAAE’s goal is to help airport
executives fulfill their responsibilities to the airports and communities that
they serve.
There is an International Association of Airport Executives (IAAE), an
affiliated AAAE organization, which exists to advance airport management
education and professional development across the globe. In carrying out
its mission, AAAE and IAAE conduct numerous seminars, conferences,
and training workshops in the U.S.A. and the world.
AAAE conducts two key education and training sessions for airport
operations personnel. They are known as Airport Operations and Safety
Schools (ASOS), which are either Basic (B-ASOS) or advanced (A-
ASOS). The basic course is an instructional classroom approach to the
dissemination of safety related material, while the advanced course uses
more group activities and case studies in the classroom environment as an
approach to improving airport problem solving.
AAAE is also the largest organization that has an accrediting and
certifying process for airport personnel which attests that they have met a
recognized skill and/or knowledge standard. There is both an American and
an International process. For accreditation, the process involves a
management thesis paper, a comprehensive written exam, and a final oral
exam before a panel of accredited executives. A person passing the full
accreditation process is recognized as an Accredited Airport Executive
(A.A.E.).
The U.S.A. written and oral exams utilize a set of fifteen different
modules which cover a wide range of airport-related topics and represent
the body of knowledge reasonably expected of an airport executive to
manage an airport (Quilty, 1999).
Both the U.S.A. and international accreditation processes are available
only to those individuals actively engaged in the management of airports.
For individuals who do not meet the basic airport employment experience
requirements or who may be engaged in airport-related activities such as
consulting, engineering, or service provider, those individuals can
demonstrate their knowledge and affiliation to the industry through the
Certified Member (C.M.) program. To become a C.M., an individual must
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pass the same comprehensive written exam, as an accredited member must
pass.
For the international certification, a set of 10 individual modules were
developed that reflect a similar body of knowledge as the 15 modules in the
U.S.A. version, but which incorporate ICAO requirements (Quilty, 2000).
A listing of the module topics for comparison purposes is provided in tables
1 and 2.
The difference between the two sets of modules lies in the more evolved
aspect of aviation legislation and regulatory requirements in the U.S.A. as
compared to other nations. For that reason, an international certified
member course and the 10 related modules are customized to the individual
airport for the specific country.
Table 1. AAAE U.S.A. Accreditation and Certified Member Modules
1. Introduction to Airports and the Federal Aviation Administration
2. The Management Functions
3. Management Roles, Theories, Motivation, and Communication
4. Airport Capacity and Delay
5. Air Traffic Control, Airspace and Navigational Aids
6. Environmental Regulations
7. Airport Noise and Land Use Compatibility
8. Financial Management and Accounting
9. Airport Fees, Rates, and Charges
10. Airport Capital Development and Funding
11. Airport System Planning and Airport Master Planning
12. Airport Layout Plans
13. Terminal Planning, Design and Operation
14. Airport Operations and Federal Aviation Regulation Part 139
15. Response to Emergencies and Airport Security
Table 2. AAAE International Accreditation and Certified Member Modules
1. Introduction to Airports and Management
2. Airport Capacity and Delay
3. Airports and the Environment
4. Airport System and Master Planning
5. Air Traffic Services, Airspace and Navigational Aids
6. Airport Finance and Economics
7. Airport Design and Layout
8. Airport Terminal Planning, Design and Operation
9. Airport Operations
10. Airport Emergency Response
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The module format for the exam and reference material was developed
because of the need for material that could be readily updated to reflect
changing airport regulations and operations. The format also allows for
easy dissemination or training of a single subject. It should be noted that the
AAAE and IAAE certified member process is restricted to defined subject
area knowledge as demonstrated by a written exam. Airport experience
does help considerably in successful attainment of the credential. Full
accreditation through AAAE or IAAE balances the academic knowledge
exposure of the certification process with the application of that knowledge
and skill through experience.
There are many different education and training methods in existence
for airport personnel. Without a needs assessment, there is no simple way to
decide which method is best in any one situation. An individual or
organization versed in providing a structured learning environment can be
of value. And in keeping with efforts to be considered a world-class airport,
many airports strive to become ISO 9000 certified for their processes and
procedures. Integral to such certification is the continual training and
education of its employees in order to provide quality management services
and continuous process improvement to ensure that its products and
services conform to the customer's requirements. Therefore, an education
and training program that leads to the certification of airport personnel can
be of particular importance to an airport, whether or not they are pursuing
ICAO or ISO 9000 certification. The certification can represent to the
world that the airport values and encourages a world-class operation.
CONCLUSION
Airports are becoming more complicated and sophisticated due to
advancing technology and user demands. The environment in which
airports operate is one of turbulence and uncertainty. To cope with this
environment of political, social, regulatory and economic forces, airport
staff must maintain a high degree of flexibility and productivity. These
qualities are achieved through the continual education and training of
employees and customers.
The objectives of education and training programs are to improve
individual and organizational performance. Education and training are
planned efforts to improve individual and organizational behavior and
knowledge. Professional competence is attained when knowledge is
acquired through training and education efforts, skills are developed
through practice and experience, and there is a continuous application and
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evaluation of these knowledge and skills as they apply to the work
environment.
For organizational effectiveness, the airport organization must be
committed to having and conducting education and training programs and
to providing the necessary resources to accomplish its mission and goals. In
carrying out initiatives to have a world-class airport, airport administration
should consider as a necessity the establishment of educational and training
programs that will support their processes and procedures. Certification of
airport personnel is one means to obtain a more knowledgeable workforce
to accomplish that end. Certification of airport personnel brings together
the knowledge and experience of the whole airport industry for the benefit
of the individual, the airport organization, and the community in
conducting safe airport operations.
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ETHICS EDUCATION IN UNIVERSITY AVIATION
MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS IN THE U.S.:
PART TWO A—THE CURRENT STATUS
Dale B. Oderman
Purdue University
West Lafayette, Indiana
ABSTRACT
This three-part study examines how four-year universities in the United States with
baccalaureate programs in aviation management include ethics instruction in their
curricula. Part One justified the need for ethics education and developed hypotheses
to evaluate the current status of ethics instruction. Part Two of the study continues
with an extensive survey conducted in 2000 of all collegiate aviation management
department heads. Part Two A, the first of two reports on the results of the survey,
describes the current status of teaching ethics in the nation’s aviation management
education programs. It was found that ethics is not widely included in collegiate
aviation programs at levels expected in light of current industry problems.
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, many news
stories have been published about the sorry state of U.S. aviation security.
However, problems in airport security existed long before September 11.
And if the long list of problems had been carefully analyzed for
commonalities from one instance to another, a recurring item that would
certainly surface would be the lack of ethics on the part of individuals and
whole organizations in dealing with airport security.
Within the past few years the security problem first became prominent
as a result of drug smuggling operations involving airline and contractor
employees. These employees used their insider status and restricted area
access badges to aid and abet drug smuggling operations at a number of
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airports, most prominently Miami (Loney, 1999). Such incidents certainly
indicate ethical problems with individual employees, but they are also
indicative of organizational problems. Organizations like airlines and
airports “are very vulnerable because they dont want to spend the money it
takes to screen the people that work at their facilities” (Loney, 1999 ). The
government sting operation that netted 58 suspects at Miami is just one of a
number of similar incidents (Airline Worker Admits, 2000; Anderson,
2000; Loney, 1999). And obviously, a major worry is that if employees can
be bribed for drug smuggling, they can be bribed for other security related
issues.
Other security problems related to poor ethical standards existed prior to
September 11. For example, Argenbright Holdings Ltd. was fined $1.6M
on October 20, 2000, for falsifying training and background investigation
checks on employees who manned security checkpoints at 68 U.S. and
European airports (Slobodzian, 2000). Personnel employed by Argenbright
included people with criminal records. AirJet Airline World News (2000)
reported that Aviation Safeguards of Florida, Inc., pled guilty to similar
charges, and that Delta Air Lines, in an effort to hire workers for low paying
security jobs, coached prospective applicants on what to include and not
include on their job applications. This included altered addresses so
background checking firms would not discover criminal activity on their
records. Evidence of employer-altered application forms was also found
(AirJet Airline World News).
Following September 11, many more similar stories appeared in the
media, and once again, although the term ethics never appears in the news
reports, lack of ethics was foundational to the events discussed in every
news report. Even after the fine against Argenbright Holdings mentioned
earlier, Argenbright was charged again in October 2001 with improper
employment application screening and falsified records at 14 airports
(Levin, 2001). In December 2001, the Department of Transportation
indicted 69 workers at Salt Lake City International Airport for falsifying
applications for airport security screening positions (Barnes, 2001). In
January 2002 another company responsible for security screening at Miami
International Airport pled guilty to similar charges (Yanez, 2002). Finally, a
February 2002 report cited more of the same at Boston’s Logan Airport and
Las Vegas’ McCarran Airport (Mehren, 2002).
As if report after report of falsified employment applications and
intentional duping of the security background investigation system were
not enough, new reports of deliberate government suppression of
information about the poor state of airport security hit the media in
February 2002 (Morrison, 2002). It seems that the Federal Aviation
Administration’s (FAA) Red Team, an undercover government team
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formed to inspect airport and airline security systems for vulnerabilities,
was able to routinely penetrate existing security screening systems in 1998
and 1999. When the team reported the results of their activities, they were
ordered not to make reports, they were ordered to provide advance notice of
their inspections, and their data was manipulated “in order to protect the
airline industry” (Morrison, 2002). It is especially interesting that these
reports are surfacing again after September 11, because they were
originally published in late 1999 (Associated Press, 1999; Levin, 1999).
All of these reports over the past couple years serve as an indicator that
organizations and individual supervisors and employees are willing to
sacrifice ethical principles in the interest of financial well-being. Part One
of this study (Oderman, 2002) investigated ethics education in aviation
management programs at the university level. Due to the lack of any
published articles in this area, the assumption was made that little was
being done to discuss ethics with students in such programs. Part One
established the need for and justified ethics education at the higher
education level. Through an extensive literature review, the author
developed a series of hypotheses based on what other curricular areas have
done to bring ethics education to their programs and also based on some
general education principles dealing with educational change. The author
went on to study these hypotheses in relation to collegiate aviation
management programs in the U.S. The following reports on that study. Due
to the volume of data gleaned, this part of the study will be reported in two
separate articles. Part Two A will describe a survey conducted by the author
and will report on responses received in an effort to describe current
practices used by collegiate aviation management programs to teach ethics.
Part Two B (in an article to be published) will cover the statistical analysis
of the data reported in Part Two A.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
An author-designed survey instrument was sent to department heads of
all colleges and universities that offer baccalaureate degrees with aviation
administration as an academic major. Data was collected regarding
departmental and department head demographics, departmental
methodology for including ethics in the curriculum (if any), and
department head opinions about ethics and its incorporation in aviation
administration programs. Additionally, each department head responded to
questions about obstacles faced in establishing ethics instruction and about
his or her department’s organizational culture as related to ethics.
Independently derived data on funding and sponsorship categories of the
colleges and universities in the study and about their Carnegie
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classification were added to the database for statistical analysis as well. The
responses to this instrument were statistically analyzed to describe current
practices used to incorporate ethics in aviation management curricula.
Peterson’s Guide to Four-Year Colleges—2000 (1999) lists a number of
colleges and universities in the U.S. that offer baccalaureate programs in
aviation administration, aviation technology, or both for undergraduate
students. By crosschecking this list with another more detailed list in the
Collegiate Aviation Guide (Kiteley, 1999) and with information found for
schools on their Internet web sites, a list of 62 higher education institutions
that offer four-year aviation administration programs was generated. Each
of the schools was categorized in two ways for use in statistical analysis.
First, each school was classified by funding or sponsorship source as
public, private-secular, or private-religious. Second, the author determined
the Carnegie classification for each school using the millennial edition of
the Carnegie Foundation’s typology (Carnegie Foundation, 2000).
Survey Instrument
The survey instrument was sent with a cover letter and a participant
consent form to department heads at all 62 colleges and universities. The
survey instrument was developed based on: (a) information gained from a
literature review concerning the incorporation of ethics instruction in non-
aviation academic programs, and (b) educational change concepts
described by Fullan and Stiegelbauer (1991). The instrument has 52
multiple-choice or short answer questions plus two open-ended questions.
The survey was designed to obtain information about the inclusion of ethics
education in the undergraduate aviation management programs of all
universities in the U.S. offering them. If ethics is part of the curriculum, the
survey asks whether it is taught from inside or outside the department, the
degree of faculty participation in teaching ethics, and whether it is a
required or elective course(s) or both. The questionnaire also asks for the
department heads’ opinions related to offering ethics as part of the
curriculum. Survey questions also sought evidence of other artifacts of an
ethical organizational culture, such as ethical codes, seminars and
educational meetings on the subject, curriculum development, faculty
research in the area, guest speaker presentations, and departmental ethics
committees.
The author pre-tested the survey instrument with department heads from
eight departments in the School of Technology at Purdue University.
Although the survey specifically addresses aviation, a similar study
concerning ethics inclusion could be made in the disciplines represented by
these eight technology departments because they have a similar association
between their educational goals and the industries to which they provide
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students. In a cover letter, test participants were asked to substitute their
academic disciplines each time the term “aviation administration”
appeared on the survey instrument. Seven of eight department heads
responded to the test survey instrument. Their responses led to correction of
some minor wording problems in a few of the questions on the instrument,
and also provided an estimate of the time needed to complete the survey.
In addition to relying on the survey responses, the author conducted
searches of college catalogs of four-year institutions with an aviation
management major. The searches were done using an on-line database of
college catalogs that is maintained by the Career Guidance Foundation
(2000). All catalogs in this database were current as of the 2000 academic
year except for five; for these five schools the author used current catalogs
available on their individual Internet sites to conduct the searches. The
searches were conducted on two groups of institutions. First, a search was
made of schools that responded that they either require students to take an
ethics course, that they allow elective credit for ethics courses, or that they
teach aviation courses that have ethics as a planned topic of instruction.
This search was done in order to determine if departments publish evidence
of the inclusion of ethics in plans of study or course descriptions. The
second search was conducted on schools that did not respond to the survey
instrument in an attempt to learn if these non-responding schools publish
anything about the inclusion of ethics in their programs.
Definitions of Variables
A number of variables were defined and investigated in the survey
instrument. These variables have been suggested by the Part One literature
review (Oderman, 2002) as factors that could be associated with the
initiation or adoption of effective ethics instruction programs in academic
curricula, and they are listed below:
Department head’s experience—three quantitative variables which
indicate the number of years the department head has spent as a
department head, as a faculty member before becoming department
head, and as an employee in the aviation industry (not including his
or her time in collegiate aviation education).
School size—a quantitative variable indicating the total number of
undergraduate students in the department.
Funding or Sponsorship category—a categorical variable
indicating the type of college or university of which the department is
a part by funding or sponsorship source. Three categories are used:
public, private-secular, or private-religious.
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Carnegie classification—a categorical variable determined by
reference to the Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher
Education (Carnegie Foundation, 2000).
Administrative approval—a categorical variable indicating
whether or not the department head has already supported the
inclusion of ethics in the curriculum.
Administrative disapproval—a categorical variable indicating
whether or not the department head has already disapproved
decisions to include ethics in the curriculum.
Administrative concern—a quantitative variable based on a five-
point Likert scale to indicate the importance the department head
places on including ethics as part of the curriculum.
Administrative involvement—a categorical variable indicating
whether or not the department head has actually taught ethics as a
planned part of the curriculum.
Administrative funding—a quantitative variable based on a five-
point Likert scale to indicate the willingness of the department head
to commit current departmental resources to include ethics
instruction in the curriculum.
Extra-departmental support—two categorical variables indicating
whether or not the department has received resources to include
ethics instruction in its curriculum from: (a) outside of the university
or (b) inside the university, but outside the department.
Administrative position on non-aviation professors teaching
ethics—a quantitative variable based on a five-point Likert scale to
indicate the department head’s opinion about utilizing professors
outside the aviation department to teach ethics when ethics is part of
aviation curricula.
Administrative position on aviation professors teaching ethics—a
quantitative variable based on a five-point Likert scale to indicate the
department head’s opinion about utilizing professors within the
aviation department to teach ethics when ethics is part of aviation
curricula.
Obstacles faced—a series of seven categorical variables indicating
whether the department head had faced or would expect to face the
following obstacles in establishing ethics as a part of their curricula:
(a) lack of higher-level administrative support, (b) lack of support
from outside the university, (c) lack of funding, (d) lack of course
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materials, (e) lack of trained faculty, (f) lack of time in an already-
packed curriculum, and (g) lack of faculty support for including
ethics.
Accreditation requirements—a categorical variable signifying
whether any of the school’s accrediting agencies require ethics to be a
part of an aviation department’s program. Aviation departments may
have multiple accrediting bodies to include the regional accrediting
body of the institution as a whole, an accrediting agency that deals
only with aviation programs, and/or accrediting bodies affiliated with
those institutions that are sponsored by religious organizations.
Departmental code of ethics—a categorical variable indicating
whether the aviation department or its university has a published
code of ethics.
Faculty member research—a categorical variable which indicates
whether the aviation department has any faculty members who have
conducted research in the area of ethics and aviation.
Speakers or seminars on ethics—two categorical variables
signifying whether the aviation department has hosted guest
speakers, seminars, or educational meetings to address: (a) including
ethics in departmental curricula or (b) ethical problems in the
aviation industry.
Departmental ethics committee—a categorical variable indicating
whether the aviation department has an ethics committee within the
department.
Faculty interest in teaching ethics—a categorical variable
indicating whether the aviation department has any aviation faculty
members who have demonstrated an interest in teaching ethics or
have initiated efforts to do so.
Ethics Instruction Delivery Method as a Variable
Another data set collected during the survey consisted of the methods
used by schools to bring ethics to the students in their programs. The five
general instruction delivery methods are: (a) a required ethics course taught
outside the aviation department, (b) a required ethics course taught by
aviation professors, (c) an elective ethics course taught outside the
department, (d) an elective ethics course taught by aviation professors, and
(e) an aviation course in which ethics is only a planned topic in a course
principally devoted to teaching another aviation subject.
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The Ethics Inclusion Scale
An author-developed construct called ethics inclusion was determined
using responses to several of the questions on the survey. As suggested by
the findings in Part One (Oderman, 2002), academic programs have varied
levels of commitment to teaching ethics. The Ethics Inclusion Scale (EIS)
assigns a number from one through nine to each department as a measure of
its commitment to include ethics instruction in its curriculum. The entire
scale is charted in Table 1. This scale was developed in order to identify
factors associated with schools at varied levels of the scale. By assigning
scale levels, statistical analyses could be done later to see if other variables
are associated with the spectrum of ethics inclusion, from schools that do
not include ethics in any way in their current curriculum to schools that are
currently including ethics in many facets of their curriculum.
The lowest level of the scale (Level 1—None) indicates that ethics is not
included in the curriculum at all. The top end of the scale (Level
9—Pervasive) indicates that ethics is included in the curriculum using the
pervasive method. As one goes from a lower level to a higher level, the
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Table 1. Ethics Inclusion Scale
Level of Required Required Elective Elective Aviation
Planned Ethics Ethics Ethics Ethics Courses
Ethics Course Course Course Course with
Inclusion Taught Taught Taught Taught ethics as
in the outside within outside within planned
Curriculum department department department department topic
1. None
2. Isolated X
3. Elective A X
4. Elective B X
5. Elective C X OR X X
6. Required A X X
7. Required B X X
8. Required/
Elective X OR X X OR X
9. Pervasive X OR X X OR X X
Note. An X indicates the inclusion of ethics courses in an institutions plan of study as denoted by the column
titles in the table. A blank box indicates that ethics courses indicated by the column titles above are not
included in an institutions plan of study.
scale indicates increasing commitment by department members to include
ethics in their curriculum. At Level 2 (Isolated) one or more professors in
the department is interested enough in ethics to include it as a planned topic
in one or more of their courses, but ethics does not receive department-wide
recognition. At Level 3 (Elective A) there is enough departmental
commitment to allow students to incorporate an elective course principally
devoted to teaching ethics in their plan of study as part of their graduation
requirements. In going from Level 3 to Level 4 (Elective B), the increased
commitment of the department is demonstrated in that an aviation
professor (as opposed to a professor from outside the department) is
responsible for teaching the elective ethics course. The fact that an aviation
professor rather than a professor from another department teaches the
course is important because the course will more likely be directly related
to aviation and because students will see that the subject is so important that
aviation professors actually teach it themselves rather than farming it out to
someone in another department.
At Level 5 (Elective C), departmental commitment increases again.
Such departments permit students to take an elective course principally
devoted to teaching ethics, for which they receive credit toward degree
requirements. In addition, ethics is a planned topic in one or more aviation
courses; thus, ethics is not isolated to just one ethics course. Level 6
(Required A) is the first level at which an ethics course is required of all
students in order to meet baccalaureate degree requirements; however, this
level is lower than that of Level 7 (Required B) because at Level 7 the
required course is taught by faculty members within the aviation
administration department. Level 8 (Required/Elective) is similar to Levels
6 and 7 except that elective courses principally devoted to teaching ethics
are offered in addition to the required ethics courses. Level 9 is called
pervasive because ethics is infused in the whole curriculum—as a required
ethics course, as elective ethics course options, and as a planned topic in
other applicable aviation courses. The nine levels of the EIS, as described
above, meaningfully capture the variations in a departments commitment to
teaching ethics.
There is good reason for using both instructional delivery method and
the EIS in this study. The EIS is derived from a combination of ethics
delivery methods and indicates a department’s overall commitment to
teaching ethics. However, a department that only teaches ethics using one
of the delivery methods may have many things in common with institutions
of differing levels of planned inclusion which share use of the same
delivery method. For example, suppose a school teaches ethics by
including it as a planned topic in aviation courses primarily devoted to
other subject areas, but this school does not require or offer courses
Oderman 23
principally devoted to teaching ethics. This school would have a level of 2
on the EIS. Other schools at higher EIS levels also offer aviation courses
with ethics as a planned topic. Using this delivery method (aviation courses
with ethics as a planned topic) as a variable allows comparison of all
colleges and universities that use this delivery method. In other words,
using delivery method as a variable cuts across the grain of the level of
planned inclusion and provides another valuable way to look at the data.
RESULTS
During Part Two of the study, the author sent survey instruments to the
department heads of 62 universities with four-year aviation management
programs. One department head returned his instrument with the
annotation that the school did not have an aviation administration program,
so this school was dropped from the study. Of the remaining 61 colleges
and universities, replies were received from 41 for a response rate of
67.2%.
The responses to all questions on the survey instrument are charted in
tables below, and key findings are discussed. For those questions having a
numerical answer, the mean, standard deviation, and range of the variables
are listed. For those questions having categorical responses, the distribution
of the responses is shown. For categorical responses, if department heads
left some questions unanswered on the survey response, the total responses
to individual questions may not equal the total number of responding
institutions (n = 41). Cross tabulation of data is not presented in tabular
form due to the multiple possibilities for doing so.
As noted previously, the author also conducted searches of college
catalogs of four-year institutions with an aviation management major. It is
important to note that even though catalogs may have a current date, they
may not be current due to curricular changes approved subsequent to
publishing. Furthermore, courses listed in an institution’s catalog may not
be regularly or recently taught. Therefore, catalog data may not provide a
completely accurate picture of a department’s current program. For
purposes of this study, survey responses took precedence over catalog data
whenever there was disagreement.
College or University Classifications
The 61 schools in the study were categorized using two classification
systems: (a) sources of funding or sponsorship and (b) the Carnegie
Classification. Table 2 shows the number of schools surveyed within each
category of the first classification system along with the number and
percentages of responses received by category.
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Table 3 charts the number of colleges and universities that were
surveyed in each category of the Carnegie Classification System, and it lists
the number of schools and percentages of those actually responding to the
survey instrument. Not all categories in this classification system were
represented in the database for this survey, and those categories in the
Carnegie System not represented by institutions in this study are not shown.
The overall response rate to the survey instrument was slightly higher
than two-thirds. Though less than the desired 100 percent response rate, the
responses appear to be representative of what is being done across the
board especially considering the categorization of schools used in the
survey. As can be seen in Tables 2 and 3, all major categories of the
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Table 2. Funding or Sponsorship Sources of U.S. Institutions with Aviation
Management Programs, 2000
Number of Schools Number of Schools Percent
Category Surveyed Responding Responding
Public 39 28 71.8
Private-Secular 13 7 53.8
Private-Religious 9 6 66.7
Total 61 41 67.2
Table 3. Carnegie Classification of U.S. Institutions with Aviation Management
Programs, 2000
Number of Schools Number of Schools Percent
Classification Surveyed Responding Responding
Doctoral/Research
UniversitiesExtensive 12 10 83.3
Doctoral/Research
UniversitiesIntensive 9 6 66.7
Masters (Comprehensive)
Colleges and Universities I 28 17 60.7
Masters (Comprehensive)
Colleges and Universities II 3 3 100.0
Baccalaureate Colleges General 6 4 66.7
Baccalaureate/Associates Colleges 1 0 0.0
Specialized Institutions 1 0 0.0
No Carnegie Classification 1 1 100.0
Total 61 41 67.2
institutions using both categorization methods were represented at a rate
close to the overall response rate. Indeed, chi square statistical tests were
done using both classification systems to see if there were any significant
differences between schools that responded and those that did not respond,
and no significant differences between groups were noted regardless of
classification system used. Thus, one can be confident that all types of
aviation management programs received relatively equal representation in
the overall statistical results, and that no one type of college or university
dominated the statistical data. Nonetheless, it is not known whether and
how non-respondents (and the programs they represent) differ from the
responding department heads and their programs.
Aviation Department Demographics
Table 4 indicates data related to department heads’ experience. As can
be seen, the average aviation department head has not been in his or her
position very long. The typical department head has about four and one-
half years experience as a department head and just over eight years as a
faculty member prior to that. However, the typical department head also has
over 18 years of experience in the aviation industry which means that he or
she has spent more time in the aviation industry than in academic circles.
Table 5 tabulates numerical data related to aviation department
characteristics such as the size of the aviation administration program, the
number of courses taught in the department, the expected teaching load of
the faculty, and the actual teaching load of faculty and the department head.
The number of courses taught within the department in which ethics is a
planned topic is also listed; these numbers only include the 20 institutions
that responded with the number of courses taught in this way. The typical
aviation management department has close to 100 students enrolled and
teaches about 13 to 14 courses specifically related to aviation management.
The aviation faculty members have an actual teaching load that is slightly
higher than their expected teaching load. The department head typically
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Table 4. Department Head Experience, U.S. Aviation Management Programs, 2000
Position Mean Std Dev Range
Years as Department Head 4.63 3.63 0.5 to 15.0
Years as Faculty Member prior to
being Department Head 8.19 6.72 0.0 to 30.0
Years in Aviation Industry
(excluding academic years) 18.33 11.19 0.0 to 39.0
teaches courses as well as administers, but the department head’s teaching
load is lower than that of the typical aviation professor.
Methodology for Including Ethics in the Curriculum
Within Table 6 is a tabulation of whether or not ethics is included in an
aviation departments curriculum. The three principal methods for inclusion
are: (a) as a required course for graduation, (b) an elective course for which
a student receives credit toward graduation requirements, and (c) as part of
other aviation courses in which ethics is a planned topic of discussion in a
course whose primary subject matter is something other than ethics.
Directly below the listings for departments with required ethics courses and
for those with elective ethics courses, a further breakdown appears with a
tabulation of schools which teach those courses from within the department
and those having the courses taught outside the department. Finally, for
each of the three methods of inclusion, the number of department heads
who have taught such courses is listed. Discussion about how colleges are
currently incorporating ethics into their curricula will be broken down by
method of inclusion.
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Table 5. Department Characteristics, U.S. Aviation Management Programs, 2000
Standard
Characteristic Mean Deviation Range
Number of Students in Program 97.5 89.4 2 to 350
Number of Aviation Courses
in Department 13.5 8.5 3 to 50
Number of Courses Taught by
Department Head 2.5 1.6 0 to 6
Expected Faculty Teaching Load
(Courses/Semester) 3.7 0.7 1.5 to 5
Actual Faculty Teaching Load
(Courses/Semester) 3.8 0.9 1.5 to 6
Number of Aviation Courses Having
Ethics as Planned Topic 2.9 2.3 1 to 10
A Required Ethics Course
Only twelve of the responding department heads (29 percent) reported
that their school requires students to take an ethics course to graduate, and
of those twelve, only four actually teach such a course within the
department. Considering the fact that the author could find nothing written
by professors from an aviation department on the subject of ethics during
Part One (Oderman, 2002) of this study nor was anything published about
any aviation departments teaching on this subject, it is not surprising that
the percentage of institutions that have ethics as a requirement is so low.
This is reinforced by the fact that of the twelve schools reporting that they
require an ethics course for graduation, one-half state that ethics is required
by their accreditation standards. One wonders whether the requirement for
students to take an ethics course at these schools would be eliminated if
there was no requirement for teaching ethics in the accreditation standards.
A catalog search was made of published plans of study to locate the
ethics course requirements for those schools that stated they required an
ethics course for graduation. Each of the four schools that said they taught a
required ethics course from within their aviation department had an ethics
course listed on their suggested plan of study. It is especially interesting to
note, however, that two institutions actually house their aviation
management programs within their schools’ business departments. One
school does it with a dual degree program. In this case, a local two-year
community college offers the aviation coursework while the four-year
college’s business department grants the baccalaureate degree. The
required ethics course resides in the baccalaureate college’s business
department. In the other university with aviation housed in the business
department, the aviation management faculty are actually part of the
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Table 6. Inclusion of Ethics in the Curriculum, U.S. Aviation Management
Programs, 2000
Methods for Including Ethics in Curriculum Yes No
A Required Course for Graduation 12 29
Taught within aviation department 4
Taught outside aviation department 8
Department Head has taught required course 2
An Elective Course Counting toward Graduation Credit 24 15
Taught within aviation department 1
Taught outside aviation department 23
Department Head has taught elective course 0
A Planned Topic in Other Aviation Courses 22 16
Department Head has taught such a course 17
university’s business and management department, and the required ethics
course has a business course code. Because many business administration
schools offer ethics courses, it may be that the basis for the ethics
requirement in these two aviation programs is their association with their
school’s business program.
Of the eight colleges and universities that stated that they require
students to take an ethics course that is taught by a non-aviation
department, two did not list an ethics course on their suggested plans of
study for students in their catalogs. Follow-up telephone conversations
confirmed that the institutions do require an ethics course, but the
requirement was not obvious from reading the college catalog.
Finally a catalog search was made of the 20 colleges and universities
that did not respond to the survey instrument to see if they publish a
requirement for students to take an ethics course. Only three of the 20
publish a requirement for such a course (15 percent), and two of those three
teach the course internally. Therefore, summing up the activity of all 61
schools in the country with aviation management programs shows that less
than 25 percent require an ethics course from their graduates, and only 40
percent of those teach the course internally.
An Elective Course
About 62 percent of schools responding to questions about permitting
students to take ethics courses as electives for graduation credit allow such
practices, but only one school allowing such electives actually teaches the
course within the aviation department. In responding to a series of
questions about obstacles to including ethics in the curriculum, department
heads acknowledged “lack of time in an already-packed curriculum” as the
obstacle with the highest percentage of “yes” votes (see Table 9). Nearly 72
percent of department heads stated they had faced or expect to face this
obstacle to include ethics in their curriculum. Indeed, of 28 department
heads responding to an open-ended question on what the greatest obstacle
to ethics instruction was, 16 (57 percent) listed lack of time in the program.
If lack of time is a problem, adding elective courses would probably be
perceived as only compounding the problem further.
Additionally, that only one aviation department actually teaches an
elective ethics course is not surprising given the fact that, in general, the
actual aviation course teaching load is slightly higher than the expected
course teaching load (see Table 5). Even department heads have a fairly
substantial teaching load considering their administrative responsibilities.
Only five of 40 department heads responding to a question on this subject
report that they do not teach any courses; the remaining 35 teach an average
of 2.7 courses per semester (compared to the normal faculty expected
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teaching load of 3.7). Adding optional courses to a curriculum is not
usually done under these circumstances because professors are already
fully committed with their currently scheduled teaching load.
A catalog search was made of the 20 schools that did not return their
survey instruments. Seventeen of the schools (85 percent) appear to allow
aviation students the freedom to take humanities and/or business electives,
and all of these schools have either a general ethics course taught in their
philosophy department or a business ethics course taught by business
administration faculty. It is impossible, though, to determine whether this
percentage is correct from a catalog search alone. Many catalogs simply
show the general education requirements for all students at the university.
The catalogs list such items as Humanities Elective, but some departments
within the university restrict the course choices for such electives without
stating them in the course catalog. Thus, in this present search, 17 is the
maximum number of schools in this category, but it may be fewer.
A Planned Topic in Other Aviation Courses
Department heads in the 41 departments responding to this study
reported that their departments teach a total of 552 aviation administration
courses. Ethics is a planned topic in 57 of those courses (10 percent). This
appears to be adequate; however, only 22 of 38 aviation department heads
responding to a question about offering ethics as a planned topic in other
courses (58 percent) stated that their department teaches ethics in this
manner. Although 22 departments represents a slight majority of the
responding schools, the number appears low when considering the
prevalence of ethical problems within the aviation industry. It would seem
essential that somewhere during a student’s four-year aviation course of
study that educators would plan to expose these future aviation
management professionals to the fact that they will have to deal with
difficult personal and corporate issues having an ethical component.
A catalog search was made of all schools that reported in their survey
responses that ethics is offered as a planned topic of discussion in courses
that had other subjects as the principal focus. Using the descriptor, ethics, a
comprehensive search was made of every aviation course listed in the
current catalog of the 22 schools in this category. Only three courses were
found in all of the catalogs that list ethics in the course description.
Department heads of these 22 schools reported a total of 57 courses that
have ethics as a planned topic, but in only three of them is ethics listed in
the course description. Again, ethics may be covered in every one of those
57 courses; however, it is important to note that ethics is only significant
enough to make the course description of three of them.
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A similar search was conducted of the catalogs of the 20 non-responding
institutions to see if they offered ethics as a published topic of study in any
of their aviation courses. The author found no courses at any of the 20
universities in this search. This reinforces the findings covered in the
previous paragraph. Thus, in all of the aviation courses published in the
catalogs of the 61 colleges and universities in the United States with
aviation management programs, there are only three courses with ethics
mentioned in the course description. This is markedly different than what
the author discovered in other curricular areas while doing the catalog
search of ethics in aviation curricula. Other curricular areas like business,
nursing, computer science, engineering, communication, journalism, and
education list ethics in multiple course titles and descriptions.
It should be emphasized once again that none of the written survey
response data were changed on the basis of the on-line college catalog
searches mentioned above, and the statistical data following from this point
does not include any results from the catalog search. The catalog search
will be used only to supplement some of the points made in the conclusion
of this report.
Department Head Actions and Opinions
Table 7 lists the distribution of responses to questions concerning a
department head’s support for or disapproval of actual or proposed
decisions to include ethics in the aviation administration curriculum of his
or her school. While many department heads reported having supported
decisions to include ethics in their departments’ curricula by the various
methods to do so, no department heads reported disapproving the inclusion
of ethics.
Several questions were asked in the survey instrument concerning
department heads’ opinions about ethics and the delivery of ethics
instruction. Table 8 lists the distribution of responses to those questions.
Each question had a five-point, Likert-style response. For each item,
department heads were asked if they strongly agree, agree, have no opinion,
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Table 7. Support or Disapproval of Department Heads for Ethics Courses,
U.S. Aviation Management Programs, 2000
Issue Yes No
Have supported decision to require ethics course 14 27
Have disapproved decision to require ethics course 0 41
Have supported decision to allow elective ethics course 17 22
Have disapproved decision to allow elective ethics course 0 39
Have supported decision to include ethics as planned topic 21 19
Have disapproved decision to include ethics as planned topic 0 40
disagree, or strongly disagree with the statement in the question. Two
noteworthy distributions are seen on the agreement side of the response
spectrum. Department heads generally support the ideas that ethics should
be taught in all applicable aviation courses and that aviation professors
should receive training to do this. For all other statements, department head
opinion was not as conclusive, and the average level of agreement or
disagreement was just above the no opinion response.
Department heads were asked if they had faced or expect to face various
obstacles in beginning a program to include ethics in their curricula. Table
9 tabulates their responses. Additionally, department heads were asked in
an open-ended question to list the greatest obstacle they would have to
overcome in order to include ethics instruction in their aviation curricula.
Responses follow in Table 10. It should be noted that a large number of
department heads (13) either listed the word, “None,” or left the answer
blank. The most commonly listed responses to the general questions about
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Table 8. Department Heads Opinions about Ethics and Ethics Instruction,
U.S. Aviation Management Programs, 2000
Strongly No Strongly
Issue Agree Agree Opinion Disagree Disagree
Ethics should be a required
course in aviation curricula 12 11 6 10 2
Ethics should be an elective
course in aviation curricula 6 18 9 5 3
When taught, ethics should be taught
outside the aviation department 1 14 9 15 1
When taught, ethics should be taught
within the aviation department 4 13 10 13 0
Ethics should be taught in all
applicable aviation courses 23 16 0 1 0
When taught in an aviation
department, professors should receive
training in teaching the subject 15 20 3 2 0
Willing to devote present funds to
train aviation professors to teach ethics 1 23 5 9 2
Willing to devote present funds to
initiate or enhance teaching of ethics 1 19 10 8 3
Willing to devote present funds to
develop course materials in ethics 1 20 6 11 2
obstacles were lack of time in an already-packed curriculum, lack of
funding, and lack of trained faculty, in that order. By far, the obstacle cited
as the greatest obstacle to be overcome was the lack of time in the
curriculum.
Organizational Culture
Department heads were asked a series of questions about the
organizational culture of their departments and about other issues related to
the inclusion of ethics in their departments’ programs. Authors from non-
aviation curricular fields suggested the indicators listed in Table 11 as
being characteristic of higher levels of interest and commitment to
including ethics in their programs. For example, one would expect that if a
department had taken the time to formulate its own code of ethics, it would
probably have a higher level of interest in ethics and resultantly would
include ethics instruction in their curricula. Table 11 charts the distribution
of responses concerning the indicators suggested in Part One of this study
(Oderman, 2002). Several indicators show virtually nothing to support the
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Table 9. Obstacles Faced or Expected to Face in Establishing Ethics as Part of
Curricula, U.S. Aviation Management Programs, 2000
Obstacle Yes No
Lack of higher-level university administration support 6 34
Lack of support from outside university
(industry, professional groups, etc.) 4 35
Lack of funding 18 21 Lack of good course materials 11 26
Lack of trained faculty 17 21
Lack of time in an already-packed curriculum 28 11
Lack of faculty support for teaching ethics 11 27
Table 10. Greatest Obstacle to Overcome in Including Ethics in Curricula,
U.S. Aviation Management Programs, 2000
Obstacle Number of Responses
Lack of time in an already-packed curriculum 16
Lack of faculty support 4
Lack of trained faculty 4
Lack of funding 2
Lack of higher-level administrative support 2
inclusion of ethics in the curriculum: gifts and grants from outside or within
the university, departmental ethics committees, and faculty members who
have conducted research in aviation ethics. A number of departments (or
their parent universities) publish a code of ethics, but that is the only
indicator with more “yes” than “no” responses.
Level of Planned Ethics Inclusion
As explained earlier, each responding department was classified using
the EIS (see Table 1). Departments were categorized on this scale using
survey responses to questions dealing with how ethics is or is not
incorporated in their aviation administration curriculum. Of the 41
responding departments, 39 were assigned a level of planned ethics
inclusion in the curriculum. Two colleges or universities were not included
in this listing because the responding department heads omitted data
needed to completely define their departments’ levels. Table 12 reports the
results of this classification.
As can be seen by comparing the EIS distribution with the EIS
descriptions found in Table 1, the numbers in Table 12 indicate very low
levels of ethics inclusion for 20 of the 39 responding schools (51 percent).
Their EIS scores of 3 or less indicate low levels of including ethics in the
curricula. Sixteen colleges and universities (41 percent) have levels of 1 or
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Table 11. Organizational Culture Regarding Ethics,
U.S. Aviation Management Programs, 2000
Indicator Yes No
Department has received gift or grant from outside
university to teach ethics 0 40
Department has received gift or grant from within
university to teach ethics 0 40
Ethics is required as part of curriculum for accreditation 10 31
Department has published code of ethics 30 10
Department faculty have conducted research in aviation ethics 3 38
Department has hosted guest speakers or seminars about
including ethics in curriculum 12 29
Department has hosted guest speakers or seminars about
ethics in aviation industry 18 23
Department has ethics committee 1 39
Department has faculty members who demonstrated
interest in teaching ethics 11 30
3, meaning that they either have no ethics component in their program at all
or that if ethics instruction exists, it is only an elective course wholly taught
outside the aviation department. Students at schools with an EIS of 3 could
easily go through their entire aviation curricula with no ethics instruction if
they choose a non-ethics general education elective. In contrast to the high
number of schools on the low end of the EIS, only 5 schools (13 percent)
are in the highest category, that is, they include ethics instruction as a
pervasive part of their curricula. This supports the previous discussion
about the low percentage of colleges and universities with an ethics
component in their aviation management curricula.
The obvious questions at this point are: (a) why do so few aviation
departments include ethics as part of their curricula, and (b) why do they
often leave this task to others outside the department. Statistical analyses of
data from the survey instrument provide some answers, and these tests will
be discussed in detail in Part Two B of this report.
CONCLUSION
In summary, an investigative survey instrument was distributed to
department heads of collegiate aviation management programs throughout
the U.S. to analyze the current state of ethics education within such
departments. A very representative sample of responses was received, and a
preliminary evaluation of the data was made by looking at the statistical
distribution of those responses. This preliminary evaluation supported the
initial assumption that not much is being done at the present time to
incorporate ethics education into the curricula of collegiate aviation
management programs. Before discussing any implications of this data, it
is necessary to perform more thorough and rigorous statistical tests on the
data. Those tests and their results will be reported in Part Two B of this
study.
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Table 12. Level of Planned Ethics Inclusion in the Curriculum,
U.S. Aviation Management Programs, 2001
Level of Planned Inclusion Number of Institutions Within Each Level
1. None 8
2. Isolated 4
3. Elective A 8
4. Elective B 0
5. Elective C 9
6. Required A 1
7. Required B 2
8. Required/Elective 2
9. Pervasive 5
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BLIND FLYING ON THE BEAM AERONAUTICAL
COMMUNICATION, NAVIGATION AND
SURVEILLANCE: ITS ORIGINS AND THE
POLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY: PART
ONE—FORM AND FUNCTION
Randy Johnson
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Prescott, Arizona
ABSTRACT
In this first part of a three-part series, the technological and political progress from the
earliest attempts at wireless communication to research on fog signaling, blind flying
and early Post Office attempts at surveillance are examined. During this period,
government agencies such as the War Department, Navy, Post Office and the National
Bureau of Standards pursued various projects while testing technologies and
methodologies for aerial electronic communication and navigation. Their research
relied on administrative funding that could be very substantial or non-existent,
depending on the national political climate. The second part of the series considers the
effect of Federal regulatory and administrative policy on the development of
aeronautical communication and navigation in the United States (U.S.). The third part
analyzes the effect of the continued Federal oversight during the Great Depression
and the progress of aeronautical telecommunications research and the deployment of
such technologies in support of aviation.
INTRODUCTION
For more than 33 hours nobody knew where he was or if he was even
alive. There were reports that he had been seen over St. Johns,
Newfoundland, and a second sighting positioned him some 500 miles from
the coast of Ireland. Then at 10:21 p.m. on May 21, 1927, young airmail
pilot Charles Lindbergh guided his aeroplane, the Spirit of St Louis, onto
the grassy runway of Le Bourget Aerodrome, Paris, France. He had made
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history—the first to successfully negotiate the mercurial weather of the
Atlantic Ocean, flying alone, non-stop from the U.S. to Europe (Knight,
1997; State Department, 1927).
Of the many technological challenges facing Lucky Lindy,1 pre-flight
weather information and in-flight navigation were critical to the success of
his venture. What distinguished Lindbergh’s flight was not only that it was
the first solo transatlantic crossing in an aeroplane, but that he had
completed it without any of the communication and navigation capabilities
employed in aircraft of today (Lindberg, 1953).
The Spirit of St Louis’s primary navigation instrument was a compass.
There were no electronic navigation aids (NAVAIDS) for guidance, and
communication technology was still in its infancy and considered
unreliable by Lindbergh. He preferred to take on more fuel rather than
sacrifice it to the additional weight required by an undependable radio
(Lindbergh, 1953).
His greatest challenge, navigation over open water, had to be
accomplished by computing flight time, the effects of wind velocity and
direction, and correcting for compass error. The exact location of the
aircraft was, at best, an approximation (Komons, 1978; Snyder & Bragnaw,
1986). Even though direction-finding concepts and technologies for
aircraft  were  being  developed  and  refined  by  the  National  Bureau  of
Standards, the Army and the Navy, they were not yet placed in general use
(Lindbergh, 1953).
Navigation was not the only obstacle with which Lindbergh had to
contend. He faced the challenge of unforeseen weather as well—not
knowing what weather he would encounter enroute or upon his landing in
France. Without a radio, it was impossible for anyone on the ground to
communicate the changing weather patterns he might encounter. Such
unforeseen weather did, in fact, force him to deviate from his planned flight
during the night, leaving him unsure of his position by morning. As he
continued his flight eastward, he sighted land, flew towards it and happily
discovered he was over Ireland.
A fjorded coast stands out as I approach…. Yes, there’s a place on the chart
where it all fits—line of ink on line of shore—Valentia and Dingle Bay, on the
southwestern coast of Ireland!
I can hardly believe it’s true. I’m almost exactly on my route, closer than I had
hoped to come in my wildest dreams…. What happened to all those detours of
the night around the thunderheads? Where has the swinging compass error
gone? (Lindberg, 1953, p. 463)
Lindbergh was back on course and less than five hours from Paris.
His experience in navigating from New York to Paris was not unlike
what he had encountered flying the mail in the U.S. At home, navigation
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technology consisted of a series of lights spaced ten miles apart connecting
important cities. They worked well when there was no weather or fog
obscuring their view but were of little value when the pilot encountered
obstructions to visibility (Komons, 1978). If aircraft were to be dependent
on the whims of changing weather patterns while lacking the capability to
communicate with each other or those on the ground, commercial aviation
would never be able to develop as a viable transportation mode. If air
transportation operations were limited to pilotage, navigating when the
weather allowed identification of landmarks, or dead reckoning,
calculating aircraft position by time in the air and heading, then the precise
navigation required to support high-altitude, all weather flight would be
impossible. Aviation radio expert Henry Roberts commented, “That is why
radio navigation is the mainstay of modern air transportation” (1945, p. 3).
As early as 1920, the impact electronic navigation and communication
would have on aviation was clearly understood. The Manufacturers
Aircraft Association, commenting in the Aircraft Year Book, 1921, pointed
out that the result of such aids “will be that aircraft will be navigated with a
safety and dependability far exceeding that now obtained on steamships”
(p. 87). What began as an experiment with airborne telegraphy in the early
part of the twentieth century has evolved into a sophisticated aeronautical
communication system that not only employs, but is dependant upon
aeronautical telecommunications technologies. As aviation historian
William Leary (1995) points out, the utility of the airplane is dependent
upon such technologies.
AERONAUTICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Aeronautical telecommunications are systems employed for the purpose
of transmitting navigational information, voice communication, and
aeronautical data, including aircraft surveillance, via telephony, telegraphy,
radio or cable in support of two-way air-to-ground, air-to-air and ground-
to-ground (point-to-point) communication. These technologies define the
three constituent elements of aeronautical telecommunications:
communication, navigation and surveillance (CNS).2
As used in this paper, aeronautical telecommunications is electronic
two-way, air-to-ground and point-to-point transmissions, while navigation
encompasses electronic aids enabling flight between defined points. Both
communication and navigation make possible the third element of
aeronautical telecommunications—surveillance. Surveillance communi-
cates the aircraft’s position both on the ground and in flight and end users of
such information may include air traffic controllers, pilots, company
managers and dispatchers. The acronym CNS was introduced to clarify the
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roles and function of technologies that make possible Air Traffic
Management (ATM). ICAO’s CNS rubric will be used in this and the
following papers to help frame the early development and evolution of
aeronautical telecommunications (ICAO, 1994).
Experimentation with aeronautical telecommunications in heavier-than-
air aircraft began in 1910, only seven years after the Wright brothers’ first
powered flight (Roberts, 1945). As the aeronautical telecommunications
system began to form, electronic airways would emerge; air-to-ground and
point-to-point communication systems would be created, and wire-based
telephonic and telegraphic circuits supporting weather reports, flight data
(an early form of surveillance) and administrative messages would evolve.
Radio aids to navigation and communication technologies enabled
aircraft to fly at any time and in almost any type of weather. They provided
the key elements that permitted scheduled flight with regularity and safety
(Leary, 1995). The early development of aeronautical telecommunications
is based on the work of a small group of government officials and
bureaucrats, physicists, scientists, and test pilots. Their tenacity and
creativity built a navigation and communication system that was emulated
by other nations and provided the essential infrastructure that made
possible the realization of the commercial aviation industry in the U.S.
(Leary, 1995).
One government official, Herbert Hoover, the Secretary of Commerce
during the Harding and Coolidge administrations, and later President, was
in a position to wield great influence on the development of the
aeronautical telecommunications system. As Secretary, Hoover oversaw
the operations of the National Bureau of Standards (NBS). This
organization assisted the Navy and War Department in the development of
aeronautical radio in World War I, and beginning in 1918, assisted the Post
Office in solving aircraft navigation problems. Hoover also supervised the
operations of the Bureau of Navigation, the only governmental
organization prior to 1927, charged with developing regulations for radio
broadcasting. The Department of Commerce was responsible for assigning
radio frequencies, keys to protecting aeronautical telecommunications
broadcasts. In 1926, Hoover was given another mandate. The Department
of Commerce was charged with the administrative oversight of aviation,
and a new bureaucratic structure was added: the Aeronautics Branch.
Hoover directly supervised it as well as the other organizations affecting
the development of the aeronautical telecommunications system.
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This series has two goals. The first examines the role federal
administrative policy played in the development of the aeronautical
telecommunications system. From the beginning, the government
sponsored not only the development, but also the employment of
technologies to further military and commercial aviation progress in the
U.S. What, then, was the effect administrative policy had on the
development of the aeronautical telecommunications system?
The second is to chronicle the development of technologies that became
not only the foundation of commercial aviation in the U.S., but the schema
upon which modern CNS technologies are based. What technologies were
developed and how were they employed to form the aeronautical
telecommunications system?
The two questions are interrelated. The relationship between the
scientists of the NBS and regulators, those within the Aeronautics Branch
as well as Hoover, would affect the design and deployment of the
aeronautical telecommunications system and thereby affect the aviation
industry. William P. MacCracken, an aviator, expert aviation law attorney,
and the first Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Aeronautics, observed
the existence of such a relationship and its importance in a speech in 1928
(Osborn & Riggs, 1970). He pointed out that when coordination between
the agencies, the scientists and the regulators was disrupted, it had a
profound effect on the aviation industry.
In order to achieve success in the application of aviation to civilian
activities…it is necessary to have the closest possible co-operation between
those two important agencies. Their problems and methods of dealing with
them must of necessity be quite different, though their mutual aim is to
increase the scope of air transport service. (Science, 1929)
Overall responsibility for coordination and cooperation between the
regulators in the Aeronautics Branch and the scientists at the NBS rested in
the Secretary’s office. Hoover’s policies and political agenda could either
encourage or discourage the development of aeronautical communication
and navigation technologies and thereby affect the growth of commercial
aviation in the U.S.
Prior Research
The origin and evolution of the aeronautical telecommunications system
and the interrelationship between scientists, researchers, politicians and
bureaucrats who built the system has not been widely researched. Various
aspects of the system have been discussed in other works. For instance,
development of telephony and radio work conducted by the NBS is
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documented in Cochrane’s (1976) Measures For Progress and Snyder and
Bragaw’s (1986) Achievement in Radio. Aviation telecommunications
development is but one of many activities undertaken by the NBS and an in-
depth study of aeronautical telecommunications development and its
application to aviation is not the focus of either Cochrane or Snyder and
Bragraw.
Likewise books such as Bonfires to Beacons (Komones, 1978) and
Aerial Pioneers (Leary, 1985) chronicle the historical and political
development of the Aerial Mail Service and the Aeronautics Branch but
devote little attention to the technical development of the aeronautical
communication and navigation system.
Aviation historian William Leary (1995) offers insight into the
technological advances made by the Post Office Department and research
conducted by the NBS in the development of the Instrument Landing
System (ILS) in his article “Safety in The Air,” appearing in Airships to
Airbus. His investigation of the origins of the ILS, a component of the
larger aeronautical telecommunications system, are detailed but other
communication and navigation technologies that make up the larger
telecommunications system are not considered in his work.
WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY
When Herbert Hoover entered the Department of Commerce in 1921,
wireless communication was experiencing a significant paradigmatic shift
that would define the form and function of technologies to be used in
aeronautical telecommunications. The spark transmitter that had
dominated the wireless world was giving way to a new
technology—transmitters that could produce continuous waves. These
transmitters made radiotelephony possible. Such changes also brought with
them new expressions such as radio instead of wireless. The term
broadcasting which had been defined in terms of cable and landline
telegraphy was beginning to include present-day concepts.
Wireless broadcasting in the early decades of the Twentieth century was
based on Guglielmo Marconi’s technique of wireless telegraphy. His
system was built around the spark transmitter, an instrument that could
create radio waves by producing a series of sparks between a gap built in
the transmission circuit. The transmission of Morse code was achieved by
controlling these sparks (Aitken, 1985).
Marconi began experimenting with wireless telegraphy in 1895. He
understood the benefits and utility of wireless telegraphy especially for
marine communication by successfully demonstrating its potential in
England. He later formed the Wireless Telegraphy and Signal Company.
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Marconi’s first customer was the British Government who paid his
company £3,200 for an initial order of six land-based and twenty-six
transmitting and receiving sets for use onboard ships, making Marconi its
sole supplier in 1903 (Headrick, 1991).
Marconi continued improving his system, but even with improvements,
this form of radio transmission had its limitations. The spark transmitter
was incapable of generating a true continuous sine wave. The reason was
simple. As each spark discharged, it created a wave of energy that quickly
dissipated in amplitude. The effect is best illustrated by listening to a bell
being rung. As soon as the bell is struck, the vibrations in the bell begin to
diminish, and more so if the bell is dampened. An electronic dampening
phenomenon was inherent, to a varying degree, in all spark transmitters,
and the wave produced by a spark transmitter formed a train of damped
oscillations containing numerous oscillations within each oscillation.
These individual oscillations created a number of constituent frequencies
and wavelengths (see Figure 1).
The resulting transmissions created frequency pollution since
components of individual sine waves, produced by each oscillation, could
be received throughout the frequency spectrum. Since the frequency
spectrum is finite, transmissions would only serve to create interference
among competing broadcasts. But most experimenters at the turn of the
century sought only to improve the spark transmitter. They worked within a
technological paradigm that had been proven, and one, which they
believed, they could improve (Headrick, 1991). Not all saw it that way.
There were a few who understood the limitations of spark technology—its
inability to reproduce voice, music or broadcast within a narrower
bandwidth. Some of the early experimenters recognized a different
approach was required (Headrick).
Continuous sine waves (see Figure 2) were believed to be the solution,
but how to generate them was another issue. Radio historian Hugh Aitken
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Figure 1. Damped Oscillations from a Spark Transmitter
From The continuous wave: Technology and American radio, 1990-1932 by H.G.J. Aitken, 1985, p. 5.
Copyright Princeton University Press, 1985. Reprinted with permission.
(1985) pointed out that such a transmitter, one capable of generating radio
frequencies with the required power, did not exist in 1900. “In the
circumstances to believe that continuous wave radio could and should
replace spark called for an act of faith” (p. 7).
One believer and experimenter was Reginald A. Fessenden who had
begun experimenting with voice transmissions using spark technology in
1900. Unhappy with the results, he sought a way to produce a continuous
wave transmission that could be modulated. In 1901, his work resulted in
the first wireless telephony patents. He had also invented a way of receiving
continuous wave transmissions and named it the heterodyne method. The
receiver mixed the incoming radio frequency with a different, internally
generated frequency, thereby producing a third, audible, frequency. His
methodology initially made no impression in a world of spark transmitters,
but would grow in importance as radio technology and the radio industry
developed (Snyder & Bragnaw, 1986). It was his methodology that would
become the standard for all future radio receivers.
By 1906, Fessenden had successfully demonstrated the feasibility and
utility of continuous wave broadcasting. He had done so by using a
specially designed alternator built by General Electric. The alternator
produced 500 watts at a frequency between 50 and 60 kHz. The technique
worked, but it would be years before greater power output and higher
frequencies could be attained. Fessenden’s alternators were not the only
technique for generating continuous waves. A variation of the spark
technology, the arc transmitter, had come close to producing the desired
sine wave. The Danish scientist Valdemar Poulsen had perfected a
transmitter that could utilize an arc as an oscillator (Aitken, 1985).
The most profound breakthrough in wireless technology, however, was
the vacuum tube. Lee de Forest is credited with its introduction. Lee de
Forest had added a third element in a two-element thermionic vacuum tube,
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Figure 2. Continuous Wave Transmission
or fleming valve.3 His device, known as an audion, enabled him to achieve
greater receiver sensitivity, and it shortly became the key to producing
continuous wave transmissions (Headrick, 1991; Snyder & Bragraw,
1986).
EARLY UNITED STATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
European nations such as Germany had worked more closely with their
inventors and industry to advance the art of radio. In the U.S., the Navy was
competing with the Army’s Signal Corps, the Weather Bureau and,
ultimately, the private sector. By 1904 President Theodore Roosevelt,
weary of the infighting, appointed an Interdepartmental Board of Wireless
Telegraphy. But it would be another ten years before the U.S. could achieve
a technological level equal to that of Britain or Germany (Headrick, 1991).
As radio became increasingly important to the U. S. armed forces, the
NBS, in 1908, offered both the Army and Navy space for radio research.
The relationship between the services and the scientists in the NBS’s Radio
Laboratory allowed close cooperation and an exchange of ideas and
information in the areas of radio communication. Although the NBS
became a clearinghouse for radio research, it did not have the political
stature required to set the agenda. Each service had its own funding and
parochial interests. The synergistic relationship between these
administrative bodies was clearly helpful, but without a clear national
agenda, each military service’s narrow interests would always compete
with a greater goal.
The Military
The military was the first to attempt to utilize radio communication in
aircraft. Experimenting with wireless telegraphy in November of 1912, a
young Army aviator Henry H. Arnold and radio operator Second
Lieutenant Follet Bradley successfully transmitted the first air-to-ground
messages from an airplane (Roberts, 1945).
During World War I, the NBS became the focal point for radio research.
The NBS noted the nation was lagging in the application of radio
communication in strategic and tactical warfare. In just a few short years, in
close association with the military, the NBS Radio Laboratory made
progress in the development and application of radio technologies. The
NBS reported, “the absolute necessity of radio in modern warfare is
apparent” (War, 1920). Problems requiring telecommunications solutions
had to be solved quickly, including transoceanic communications, locating
enemy units, development of radiotelephony and training the military in
their use. The NBS and military would work together to solve these
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problems and in so doing would greatly advance the art and technology of
radio (War).
Radio Laboratory projects during WWI included research and
application of vacuum tube technology and coil antennas as well as work
on radio interference and shielding. The Laboratory also produced an
important work on radio communication adopted by the Army, Navy and
numerous colleges as a radio textbook (Fishbein, 1995).
The most important work surrounded the use of the vacuum tube. In
1917, a scientific mission from France brought with it a number of
experiments and radio applications using vacuum tube technologies. The
Radio Laboratory report, “the use of electron tubes was practically
unknown in the military forces of the U.S. prior to 1917” (Fishbein, 1995,
p. 3). The vacuum tube made possible transmitters that could broadcast at
higher frequencies than those built around older damped-wave (spark)
technologies. Receivers built using the vacuum tubes were much more
sensitive and made possible signal amplification. Vacuum tubes also made
possible continuous wave transmissions that could be used to carry
multiple signals on a single pair of wires thereby increasing the efficiency
of landlines. So significant was the impact that the American military
required 25,000 tubes weekly. The Radio Laboratory pointed out, “Not
much needs to be said to convince the reader that these important
applications justify the most extensive and profound research,
development, and application” (Fishbein, 1995, p. 3). Vacuum tube
technology made possible the efficient amplification of radio signals and
would have a significant impact in the world of aviation. Such technology
meant aeronautical radios and antennas could now be smaller and
lighter—important considerations for aircraft (Cochrane, 1976; Snyder &
Bragaw, 1986; Some war-time, n.d.).
During the summer of 1917, the Army, Bell Telephone Laboratories and
Western Electric Company successfully demonstrated aeronautical
radiotelephony. Western Electric reported that “for the first time in history,
airplanes in flight were directed…from the ground…and reports and
directions were given and received in clear speech” (Some war-time, n.d.).
The tremendous technological strides made were due, in large measure, to
the installation of the vacuum tube in radios and related research conducted
by the NBS and military services (Snyder & Bragaw, 1986).
NBS involvement in aeronautical telecommunications was just
beginning. Even before the end of the war, Post Office officials expressed
an interest in radio devices that would enable a pilot to perform a blind
landing. Their work for the Air Mail Service and the Army laid the
cornerstone for form and function of the future aeronautical
telecommunications system (Snyder & Bragaw, 1986).
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The Post Office
In July 1918, the Post Office approached the NBS for assistance in
developing a type of aeronautical navigation device that would aid a pilot in
locating the airfield in conditions of fog or weather. The planning meeting
was attended by Otto Praeger, Second Assistant Postmaster, Captain
Benjamin Lipsner, Head of the Air Mail Service, and NBS Physicist
Fredrick Kolster (see Figure 3). Even though the Post Office had not yet
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Figure 3. Notes from the Airplane Radio Journal of Laurens E. Whittemore
From “Airplane Radio Journal of Laurens E. Whittemore.” Notes from August 12-17, 1918, p. 1. Dillinger,
Files, RG 167, Box 26. National Institute of Standards and Technology, National Archives, Suitland, MD.
begun night flying, it still had to contend with daytime weather conditions.
A landing system was required to guide an airmail plane to its destination
and allow the pilot to let down through the weather and land safely. Kolster
lost no time in beginning his search for an acceptable aeronautical
navigation aid. He began working on a system that marked the field for the
pilot (Leary, 1985).
Localized Signaling System for Airplane Landing
What Kolster envisioned as a localized landing system, later came to be
known as a marker beacon. It was a simple concept. As the pilot
approached the field a radio signal marked the landing area. The flight
procedure required the pilot to maneuver the airplane so the signal
remained in the headset. The signal, broadcast from an antenna buried in
the ground, circumscribed the airfield or landing area. The resultant signal
could be heard only when the aircraft was over the landing area and would
fade rapidly as the aircraft flew away from it. Kolster’s design required the
pilot to maneuver the airplane so the signal remained in the headsets while
the pilot made an instrument decent to the airfield (Airplane, 1918;
Localized Signaling, 1920).
Kolster conferred with a colleague, Dr. Fredrick Grover, choosing a
signaling system based on principles of magnetic induction offered the best
solution. Theoretically, an alternator energizing an antenna at 500 Hz
would produce a localized signal that could be received by an airplane in
close proximity to it. Kolster began experiments by constructing a 25-foot
loop using several turns of wire and powered with a 500 Hz alternator. He
was able to induce a signal in a receiver several hundred yards away
believing that it would be “practical for one mile signalling [sic] with
sufficient power at [the] transmitter” (Cochrane, 1976, p. 196; Airplane,
1918, pp. 6-7). Numerous modifications and trials continued through
November when an actual flight test was planned. The simulated airfield
was the roof of the newly constructed NBS Radio Building. Kolster coiled
six turns of copper wire around its roof and energized it with the alternator.
The aircraft, a JN-4 (Jenny) borrowed from the Post Office, had attached to
its wing a loop antenna tuned to resonate at 500 Hz. The pilot listened for
the signal, amplified by a three-stage amplifier, through a headset. The test
flight flown on Armistice Day, November 11, 1918, proved successful. The
signal marked the simulated airfield up to an altitude of 3,000 feet
(Cochrane, 1976; Airplane, 1918).
In January, work on the signaling device was moved to the airfield in
College Park, Maryland, for further experiments. Both the Navy and War
department had watched the experiments with interest. Further tests using
various configurations based on induction were not as successful and the
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project members began experimenting with higher (radio) frequencies. In
May, J. A. Willoughby, a member of the team, suggested a system
employing two antennas energized in opposite directions (see Figure 4).
The configuration produced a signal analogous to an inverted cone with the
maximum signal at 30 degrees from vertical. But unexpectedly the
localized landing system went into early oblivion (Snyder & Bragaw,
1986). The localized landing system was shelved, and work on a direction
finder took precedence. In a January 1921 report, the Radio Laboratory
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Figure 4. Notes from the Airplane Radio Journal of Laurens E. Whittemore
From “Airplane Radio Journal of Laurens E. Whittemore.” Notes from August 12-17, 1918, p. 12. Dillinger
Files, RG 167, Box 26. National Institute of Standards and Technology, National Archives, Suitland, MD.
expressed believe that the landing signal system could be improved, but
that “it seems advisable to concentrate upon the direction finder work for
the present” (Radio laboratory, 1921). The Post Office was very much
interested in a direction finding system and funding was found for its
development.
The Direction Finder—Historical Development
Wireless direction finding was the original term describing one of two
techniques for determining an aircraft’s or a ship’s position. The first is an
active system that requires radio operators on the ground to either calculate
the airplane’s location and pass the information back to the aircrew or
transmit the bearings to the airplane and let the crew do the calculations.
The second technique is passive. The crew determines its position by
receiving signals broadcast from navigational aids. The U.S. and Europe
experimented with both systems during WWI, with Europe adopting the
active direction finding methodology and the U.S. ultimately choosing the
passive.
Wireless direction-finding experiments began with Marconi in 1900. A
year later, Lee de Forest had applied for an antenna patent that facilitated
direction finding. These early experimenters discovered if an antenna, built
in the shape of an L, was inverted, the longer, horizontal portion was more
sensitive to signals being radiated in the opposite direction. In 1905,
Marconi patented a direction-finding system built on this concept. But a
more practical approach, and one upon which aeronautical navigation in
the U.S. would be built, was developed in 1906 by two Italian radio
pioneers, Ettore Belline and Alessandro Tosi. By 1907 the Belline-Tosi
(BT) antenna had become widely accepted for use in both transmitting and
receiving and their system would soon form the basis for electronic
navigation in the U.S. The BT antenna will be discussed later in greater
detail (Fishbein, 1995; Keen, 1927; 1938; Snyder & Bragaw, 1986).
German Navy Zeppelins, using a Telefunken Compass, were one of the
first to apply direction finding in aerial navigation. The approach was
passive and made use of a rotating beacon. The ground station employed a
single antenna supporting thirty-two antennas radiating from the center. An
omni-directional start signal was transmitted from the center antenna
followed by a signal from each of the antennas at one-second intervals. The
signal began and ended at true north. The radio operator on board the
airship heard the start signal and began timing with a stopwatch. When the
signal was at its greatest volume in the headset, the watch was stopped. The
stopwatch had the degrees of the compass on its face and the point where it
was stopped represented the bearing from the station. Tuning to another
station and following the same procedure, the operator could triangulate the
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airship’s position (see Figure 5; Keen, 1938; Report No. 6, 1925).
In the U.S., Kolster began direction finding experiments in 1916 by
placing a transmitter near the Navesink light station at Atlantic Highlands,
New Jersey. Installing a loop antenna aboard the lighthouse tender Tulip, he
found that the ship could determine the relative bearing to the transmitter.
His technique showed promise, but further experimentation and application
of Kolster’s procedure would have to wait until after the war (Report No. 6,
1925; Snyder & Bragaw, 1986).
The Navy initially approached the problem of direction finding by
employing active techniques. They built a series of direction-finder stations
on the Atlantic Coast. A vessel would transmit a request that a bearing be
taken by land-based stations. Two or more stations would relay the bearings
to the ship, enabling the crew to calculate the ship’s position. Unfortunately
there were serious drawbacks with this approach. First, each land-based
transmitter required 24-hour manning by trained personnel. Second, it was
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Figure 5. Notes from the Airplane Radio Journal of Laurens E. Whittemore
From “Airplane Radio Journal of Laurens E. Whittemore.” Notes from August 12-17, 1918, pp. 6-7.
Dillinger Files, RG 167, Box 26. National Institute of Standards and Technology, National Archives,
Suitland, MD.
a slow process. Only one ship could be accommodated at a time. The third
disadvantage, and most damning for the military, was the fact that while the
friendly stations were taking bearings, so was the enemy. Kolster
recognized these shortcomings early on and opted for a passive system, one
that would allow the calculation of position to be done on-board the vessel
without the need to transmit from the ship. In contrast, European nations
adopted the active system for aircraft (see Figure 6). Aircraft in flight
would transmit and wait for two or three ground stations to telephone
bearing information to a master station. The master station calculated the
aircraft’s position and transmitted the information back to the airplane. The
U.S. chose Kolster’s methodology (Memorandum in the use, 1926; Report
No. 6, 1925; Snyder & Bragaw, 1986).
The first radio direction finder built by the NBS was simply a few turns
of wire around a small four feet by four feet frame that could be rotated and
connected to a receiver. If the antenna were rotated to a position in line with
the incoming electrical wave, it would produce the strongest electrical
action in the coil. The point at which the antenna was not excited by the
signal would occur when the antenna was rotated to a position that was
perpendicular to the incoming wave. Thus, the radio direction finder was
able to determine the absolute direction of the transmitted wave and
boasted accuracy within one degree. But, the device indicated two possible
directions of the transmission. Either direction could be located along the
line of the transmitted wave. The antenna could not differentiate between a
signal originating directly behind of it from a signal originating directly in
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Figure 6. Active Direction Finding
Note: Stations A and B plot bearings (lines a and b) to an airplane that has transmitted a position request.
The position (C) is calculated by one of the stations and relayed back to the pilot.
front of it. The effect, called ambiguity, was a problem that would
eventually be solved by the radio compass, an important component in the
aeronautical communication and navigation system (Memorandum on the
use, 1926)
By war’s end, conferees representing the NBS, Navy and Bureau of
Lighthouses reached a consensus to develop a direction finding system
based on Kolster’s methodology. The advantages of Kolster’s system were
obvious. A shore station could broadcast continuously with little on-site
supervision required. The station would not require 24-hour staffing as did
Navy stations, and broadcasts from vessels would not be required to
determine, or give away, a position. Continuous improvements in the
technology gave birth to a remarkable and extremely satisfactory
navigation system for ships. Kolster’s radio direction finder, or fog
signaling, was of interest to other nations. Responding to a request from the
Second Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, Hisoru Fujii, Kolster described
the operation and supplied sketches and photographs of the system and
offered further assistance (Kolster to Fujii, 1918; Snyder & Bragaw, 1986).
Aeronautical Applications of Kolster’s Direction Finding System
In the U.S. direction finding evolved to mean flying towards a beacon or
homing. The European system was called ground-based direction finding
and this technique did find use in the U.S. as an emergency aid for lost
pilots. In order to home, pilots, using radio receivers and headsets, turn
their aircraft until the signal disappears. At this point the antenna is
perpendicular to the transmission and is at the null or minimum signal point
(see Figure 7). As previously mentioned, ambiguity is problematic. A
single-coil antenna such as the one Kolster employed offers two solutions
as does any single-loop antenna. For instance, if the signal is strongest at a
ninety-degree angle to the aircraft, the pilot does not know whether to turn
right ninety degrees or left ninety degrees. Either choice will produce the
same result as far as the antenna is concerned (Kolster to Fujii, 1918;
Snyder & Bragaw, 1986).
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Figure 7. Maximum and Null Antenna Positions
Early Post Office test flights using direction finding were done in a
borrowed Navy Curtiss R4L biplane. Two coils, A and B, were attached to
the airplane and wired to an amplifier. The A coil was wound around the
airplane’s landing gear strut parallel to the longitudinal axis of the aircraft
while the B coil was wound at a 90 degree angle. The pilot was able to
switch between each coil. The A coil, providing the strongest signal, was
used to locate the signal source and fly towards it. Once the airplane was in
close proximity to the beacon, the B coil was used for more precise
navigation. The B coil produced a null or minimum signal strength when
the aircraft was pointing directly at the station since it was perpendicular to
the incoming electrical wave.
A series of flight tests in the summer of 1920 produced mixed results.
The Post Office used radio stations at College Park, Philadelphia and
Newark to test the direction finding system. Signals were broadcast from
the three stations in five-minute intervals to avoid interference. Aerial Mail
pilot Wesley Smith described one successful flight on May 20 stating he
relied solely on the radio compass to locate the station at Philadelphia. “I
paid no attention to my magnetic compass and only watched the country
below me for available emergency landing fields,” Smith wrote in a report
to Praeger (Report of operation, 1920). Flying until he was able to receive
equal signals on both the A and B coils, he looked down and saw the radio
towers. He recommended the equipment be adopted in all Post Office
aircraft, believing that had it been installed a few weeks earlier he would
not have crashed in the Orange Mountains (Report of operation). Other
pilots liked it. Claire Vance saw its value in getting the aircraft close to the
field, but not practical for descent in instrument weather. Randolf Page
thought it was a great tool for teaching new pilots the routes—in clear
weather (Post Office survey forms, 1920).
There were problems with the equipment, and the problems would
require substantial modifications. When the airplane was flown in or
around inclement weather, the static and noise completely drowned out the
navigation signal. Additionally, the headphones were extremely
uncomfortable, prompting a comment from Harry Hucking: “Radio helmet
hard on head [with] continuous use” (Post Office survey forms, 1920).
Weather information in telegraphy code was also sent to aircraft in flight
and proved to be useful to the pilots. A far more useful application, some
pilots believed, would have been radiotelephony.
Other problems proved to be more serious. Aircraft ignition was a
source of electrical noise and attempts to shield the receiver from its effects
proved difficult. These obstacles led the NBS and Post Office to begin
experimenting with an alternative system using a rotatable coil and a
trailing wire. Although the experimental flights appeared promising, by
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1921 a political turn of events made further development of the direction
finder doubtful. Post Office support of radio navigation ended. Otto
Praeger, Second Assistant Postmaster General, became more interested in
the development of the transcontinental airway. Appropriations were soon
cut with the election of Harding, who was not a supporter of Air Mail
Service. The NBS continued to inform the Post Office of current radio
research of interest to the Air Mail Service, but as far as Post Office projects
were concerned the Bureau found it “impossible…to engage actively in the
investigation of these problems on account of the lack of funds” (Bureau,
1922; Leary, 1995, pp. 99-100; Progress Report, January 15, 1921; Smith,
1931)
CONTINUED RESEARCH
As direction-finding experiments funded by the Post Office were
ending, the Army continued to sponsor research. The following four joint
Army-NBS projects (identified by NBS project codes) describe significant
undertakings that began to shape the form of the aeronautical
telecommunications system would take (Present program, 1922).
Project E-21a—Radio Direction Finding Research
The Army and NBS had been experimenting with direction finders and
localized landing systems at McCook Field in Dayton, Ohio. Direction-
finding work would continue, but at a slower pace. The NBS, with Army
funding and collaboration, continued aeronautical telecommunications
research.
Research in direction finding not only included its use as an airborne
navigation aid, but as a terrestrially based direction finder as well. In other
words, the Army not only wanted a direction finder in its aircraft for
navigation purposes, but also had an interest in determining a bearing to an
airplane in flight from a ground station. Two types of antenna systems for
these airborne and terrestrially based methodologies were studied: a single-
coil direction finder and crossed-coil equi-signal direction finder (Present
program, 1922).
The single-coil direction finder was built on Kolster’s concept of a single
rotatable coil. The null position was used to obtain a bearing to a
transmission source, but in electrically noisy aircraft, the procedure proved
difficult to use. The antenna, however, would find use as a terrestrially
based direction finder.
The Robinson system, a form of equi-signal direction finding, employed
two antennas but crossed at a ninety-degree angle—a smaller, main coil and
a larger auxiliary coil. The placement of the antennas provided a minimum
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signal when the airplane was homing to the beacon. This differed from the
single coil, which produced a null. Having a minimum signal was
preferable to the null and helped mitigate the effects of ignition noise
(Keen, 1938).
Antenna tests conducted by the Army in the fall of 1921 produced
remarkable results, Lt. Vaughn wrote to Whittemore at the NBS. Vaughn
had concluded these preliminary tests had ruled out the use of the single
coil method of direction finding for aircraft and added, “Our radio force
was severely cut into during a recent ‘economy’ wave with the result that
we are rather short-handed at present time” (Vaughn to Whittemore, 1921).
The economy wave would affect the NBS as well and through 1925 the
NBS would continued to follow, and when funding permitted, participate in
the Army’s direction finding experiments.
In a 1924 The Radio Laboratory report, experiments with direction
finding for the Air Service reported that an equi-signal crossed coil system
did in fact reduce the effect of electrical noise produced by engine ignition.
The report included the work carried on with the single coil system and,
when applied as a terrestrially based direction finder and a nearly vertical
trailing wire antenna on the airplane, the system worked well
(Memorandum for the director, 1924).
Collaboration with the Navy and Coast Guard produced improvement in
antennas, operating frequencies and power requirements. By the summer of
1925 a high frequency direction finder had been developed with the
cooperation of the Coast Guard. Such direction finders, operating at
frequencies above 2000 kHz meant reliable direction determinations can be
made. The Army Signal Corps had also experimented with high
frequencies ranging from 3000 kHz to 7500 kHz. The Army reported that,
“Such apparatus probably has a future in aircraft work because of the great
distances covered by the high frequencies with small power and because of
the smaller antenna needed” (Notes, 1925). The Navy also participated in
direction finding research developing a cross coil equi-signal device that
was made substantially automatic in action (Memorandum on conference,
1922; Memorandum for the director, 1924; Notes, 1925; Stratton, 1922).
Project E-24—Transmission of Directed Radio Waves From the Ground
In 1921, researchers began experimenting with a terrestrially based
directive transmission navigational aid, one that produced a specific course
and from which airways could be constructed. Navigating on a specific
course, both to or from a station, eliminated the problem of drift found in
homing, and could be used to define airways between airports or specific
points on the ground. By March, Dellinger reported the results of an
experiment based on crossing two coil antennas. Based on the earlier work
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of Scheller and Bellini-Tosi, credited to NBS scientist Percival Lowell and
developed by Francis Dunmore and Francis Engel of the Radio Laboratory,
the concept was to transmit signals alternately on the same frequency from
two crossed-coil aerials set at an angle of 135 degrees. The letter “R” was
broadcast in Morse code on one antenna and the letter “L” on the other. The
bisector of the 135-degree angle produced an area of equal signal strength
and an aerial highway route (Progress Report, March 24, 1921). To remain
on course, the pilot had to balance the intensity of the “R” and “L” in the
headset. If the letter “L” became louder, the pilot would correct back to the
right, and, likewise if “R” became louder the pilot would correct to the left
(Snyder & Bragaw, 1986; Progress Report, March 24, 1921).
Tests were promising. Two, eight-foot, eight-turn, coils had been
constructed and broadcasts were made at 300 kHz (1,000 meters). “The
results when receiving at a distance of 3 miles were so encouraging as to
warrant a more extensive investigation” (Snyder & Bragaw, 1986, p. 151;
Progress Report, March 24, 1921). Results appeared in NBS’s Scientific
Papers of the Bureau of Standards (Engel & Dunmore, 1924). The report
explained aircraft using a directive beacon did not have to contend with the
effects of wind drift as when navigating towards a nondirectional radio
beacon. The Army was greatly interested and was sending its representative
Lt. R.E. Vaughan to discuss the findings (Engel & Dunmore, 1924;
McIntosh to Stratton, 1921).
The antenna system had been modeled after Scheller’s patented antenna
system. Scheller’s course-setter employed an interlocking A and N signal
to produce a course line. The resultant interlocking signal meant that not
only would the Morse code representations of the two letters be heard
equally on the course, but when heard equally, would form a continuous
tone in the pilot’s headset. This is accomplished by transmitting the letter A
on one antenna and N on the other. The Morse code for A is dot-dash while
N is represented by a dash-dot. When the two are equal in intensity they
produce continuous dashes, or an interlocked, signal (Keen, 1938; Report
No. 6, 1925).
Further tests of cross-coil antennas were conducted on board the
lighthouse tender Maple in the summer. The NBS placed a 2 kW quenched
spark transmitter and two 150 feet by 50 feet antennas crossed at an angle
of 143.5 degrees on the Bureau grounds. A receiving set was brought
aboard the Maple and observations were made as the vessel traveled from
Maryland Point to Colonial Beach Wharf. For this test the Morse code
letters A and T were used (see Figures 8 and 9). As the ship made its way
down the coast the researchers plotted a zone of equal intensity where small
changes of intensity were difficult to discriminate. At thirty-one miles the
zone had a width of one and one-fourth miles and the tests “established
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without a doubt the existence of such a line or sector of equal signals”
(Report on Equi-Signal, 1921).
Flight tests were made using a 250-foot trailing antenna and a 6-stage
amplifier on a de Haviland aircraft. As long as the aircraft was on course the
A and T broadcasts were equal, however, if the airplane tuned ninety
degrees to the course line, either the A or T would predominate. This had
not been the experience on the Maple where there was an equi-signal zone.
In flight the zone had been eliminated. The cause, the researchers believed,
was the trailing antenna. The slipstream did not allow the antenna to remain
perfectly vertical, a problem that would be mitigated by attaching a weight
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Figure 8. Crossed Coil Antenna System
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Figure 9. A Directive Type of Radio Beacon and Its Application to Navigation
From “A Directive Type of Radio Beacon and Its Application to Navigation, by F.H. Engel and F.W.
Dunmore, 1924, Scientific Papers of the Bureau of Standards 19, p. 290.
to the end of the cable. The optimal solution lay in a shorter antenna, but its
shorter length would degrade signal reception.
Some of the staff believed a cockpit indicator being investigated by the
NBS offered a better solution. A visual system was superior to aural
navigation. It eliminated the requirement for flight crews to constantly
monitor the navigational signal. A visual indicator solved another potential
problem—requiring pilots to switch between monitoring navigation
signals to receive and transmit radio messages (Progress Report, June 16,
1921; Report of present status, 1921).
An extensive ground and flight test was completed in the fall of 1921.
The transmitter, a 5 kW spark set, was placed in line with an automatic
switching unit so the two antennas could be energized alternately. A
DeHaviland 4B was modified to carry the inductively coupled tuner, VT-1
six-tube amplifier (with batteries) and the antenna reel and wire assembly.
A total of four tests were flown and confirmed the signal changes had been
due to the trailing wire antenna. Overall, the tests confirmed earlier
findings. The system performed well at different altitudes and distances
(Report on ground, 1921).
Not much progress was made during 1922. The NBS offered to help the
Army modify or build a vacuum tube transmitter for use in navigation. “We
shall be glad to assist in any way possible at the time of the Dayton tests in
assembling the apparatus or in making adjustments” (Stratton, 1922) they
wrote. Other work involved experiments in applying the visual course
indicator to the aircraft receiver (Stratton, 1922).
By 1923 the NBS ceased further cooperative research due to a lack of
funding. The Army, however, continued to study and perfect the directive
navigational aid and experiment with vacuum tube transmitters. Another
improvement, an experimental antenna and radiogoniometer, would add
greater utility to the system. This new approach added flexibility by
electronically bending the course. The original crossed-coil antenna
patterned after Scheller’s concept produced courses, the bearings of which
were dependant upon antenna placement. The ability to create an equi-
signal course spaced at selectable angles was based on the Bellini-Tosi
antenna system. The antennas could be crossed at ninety degrees and with a
radiogoniometer or goniometer (see Figures 10 and 11) placed in the
antenna circuit. This was an important breakthrough. If these NAVAIDS
were to be used to define airways, the angle of the courses formed by their
beams could not be limited to ninety degrees. Courses needed to be
electronically bent to accommodate a route system (see Figure 12). The
Army made one other improvement. They changed to the Morse code
letters A and N thereby producing an aural interlocking course (Leary,
1995).
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Figure 10. Goiniometer
Project E-22—Visual Indicator for Radio Signals
The Army had expressed an interest in devising a method for the visual
display of navigational signals in 1921. Several methods for accomplishing
it were suggested including a vibration apparatus, a galvnometer, a light
indicator and a recording device. Further research on visual indicators,
however, would wait until after the passage of the Air Commerce Act in
1926 (Memorandum for the director, 1924; Notes, 1925).
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Figure 11. Schematic of Crossed-Coil Antennas with a Radiogoiniometer
Project E-25—General Aircraft Radio Problems
The Radio Laboratory had been conducting research on many aspects of
radiotelephony since 1913. Its work included establishing radio
transmission formulas, the study of radio wave phenomena, vacuum tube
measurements, definitions and their use in amplifiers and radio
communication. They developed standards for radio, studied the
characteristics of antennas and undertook projects such as Kolster’s fog
signaling and direction finding devices. The NBS, in a confidential report
to the Bureau of Efficiency, explained that its work in radio
communications was not just investigatory or theoretical but that it had
developed “radio devices from a laboratory stage to a plane where they are
of practical service” (Radio communication, 1921).
Many applications developed from NBS research had military origins.
The radio work for other administrative departments provided a healthy
portion of their funding. Funding from these departments made up almost
half the Bureau’s income for fiscal years 1921 and 1922, with the War
Department providing the lion’s share. In fiscal year 1921 Congress had
allocated $30,000 for Bureau operations while the War Department had
allotted $25,000. While the Bureau consulted with other departments, its
radiotelephony work was closely related to the needs of the Army and the
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Figure 12. Goiniometer Effects
Signal Corps (Radio communication, 1921;Work of radio, 1920).
Work carried on by the Bureau for the Army’s Air Service in 1921
comprised mostly of the study of vacuum tubes, measurements of
insulators used in radio construction and testing procedures for radio
receivers. Consultations with Underwriters Laboratories helped define
aeronautical radiotelephony development issues and commercial aviation
requirements for radio installation and range. Aircraft antenna size was a
problem and the Bureau worked on problems that limited use on aircraft.
Additional research was done with arc transmitters and radiotelephony
(Work of radio, 1920).
The winter of 1921-1922 saw an important development. Lowell and
Dunmore developed a receiver powered by alternating current (AC). Up
until this point, receivers had to be powered by batteries because vacuum
tube filaments and plates required direct current (DC). Lowell and
Dunmore constructed a power supply that produced DC power from an AC
source. They were able to use common 60 Hz AC power to operate a five-
stage amplifier consisting of three radio frequency stages, two audio
frequency stages and a tuning circuit. Another important experiment was
transmitting using shorter wavelengths. By August 1922, a transmitter was
ready for flight tests. The frequency was 30000 kHz (100 meters) and
required a special antenna that had been developed by the Bureau. The test
flight proved successful and the frequency “was found particularly
adaptable to daylight transmission” (Snyder & Bragaw, 1986).
NBS scientist August Hund was assigned the task of employing quartz
crystals for accurate frequency control in both transmission and receiving.
“The Bureau has devoted considerable research during the past year to the
use of piezo oscillators as frequency standards” reported the NBS in 1925
(Notes, 1925). Hund and his associate’s efforts resulted in crystals that
controlled frequency deviations and whistling caused by beat frequencies
produced in heterodyne receivers (Snyder & Bragaw, 1986; Work of radio,
1920).
The Army sponsored the following projects, listed by the NBS title, until
funding became unavailable in 1924. From that point until the creation of
the Aeronautics Branch in 1926, the NBS did very little research for the
Army Air Service or the Signal Corps (Snyder & Bragaw, 1986, Work,
1920).
THE POLITICS OF EARLY AERONAUTICAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH
The lack of political interest in communication and navigation research
and the technologies required to support all weather flight, paralleled the
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plight of aviation between the end of WWI and the Air Commerce Act of
1926 (Komons, 1978). The Army, Navy and Post Office were all vying for
limited resources, as was the NBS. With the exception of the Post Office in
1925, very little research would be conducted until 1927. There had been
no aviation champion of sufficient political clout who could overcome the
parochial interests of the various administrative departments and see to it
that a well-conceived plan supported by proper funding was put in place.
Even though the NBS often functioned as a research coordinator among
various administrative departments, it also was affected by the
unpredictability of political budget process. The result was an
uncoordinated and inconsistent development of aeronautical technologies.
The on-again/off-again approach to research slowed development in the
U.S. whereas in Europe, commercial aviation was alive and well supported
by radio technologies. But European nations had taken a different
approach. Countries such as England, Germany and France had directly
supported not only the research, but also national airlines and requisite
infrastructure as well. If the U.S. were to catch up to Europe, a political
champion would have to emerge, a champion able to work within the
political framework of national politics and one who would command the
attention of the aviation industry as well. It would be necessary to bring all
the government’s research resources to bear on the challenges of
communication and instrument flight. Aviation found its champion in
Herbert Hoover. Hoover was not aviator nor was he involved in aircraft
manufacturing, the airlines or military aviation. But, as Secretary of
Commerce, he had a profound influence on the development of the
aeronautical telecommunications system.
During his tenure as Secretary of Commerce, Hoover made two critical
aeronautical telecommunications policy decisions (Johnson, 2001). The
first answered the question of funding and who would pay for the
communication and navigation infrastructure. The second answered the
question of what form the would system take. What were the technologies
to be developed? How should they be deployed? These two questions will
be considered in Part Two.
Although Hoover had been educated as an engineer, he did not directly
participate in the research and development of the system. Instead, his role
was political, and his administrative and fiscal policies would ultimately
ensure its utility and success. By the time Hoover left the Presidency in
1935, he had, as both Secretary of Commerce and President, overseen the
growth of an aviation industry supported by an aeronautical
telecommunications infrastructure that had become a model for the world.
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ENDNOTES
1. Captain Lindbergh attributed the origin of his nickname “Lucky” to the New York
papers covering his story. After landing in New York, where he made final preparations and
waited for a break in the weather, his disdain for what he termed the “tabloid” press grew
daily with each inaccuracy. See Lindbergh, 1953, pp. 150-162.
2. The term aeronautical telecommunication” is not defined formally by the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) or the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). All three organizations have
variations of the term when used in conjunction with other aspects of communication such as
the Aeronautical Telecommunication Network (ATN) or descriptives such as “aeronautical
telecommunication service.” The definition used in this paper was derived from the Oxford
English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “telecommunication,” and the American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language, 3rd ed., s.v. “telecommunications.”
3. The fleming valve is named for its inventor, John Ambrose Fleming, an Englishman
who had used it as a detector in receiving sets. He was granted a patent for his invention in
1904. See Snyder and Bragraw, 1986, p, 10.
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ABSTRACT
Written communication was examined in a large airline company that had
implemented a Maintenance Resource Management training program. Respondent
recollections of training content regarding written communication, along with trends
in archival paperwork error data, were examined throughout training periods. Data
from written work turnover documents were also collected from one site and analyzed
to explore specific written communication practices and to examine training effects
on such practices. Implications for future research geared to airline maintenance error
reduction are discussed, as well as conclusions regarding program impact on error
reduction.
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INTRODUCTION
The Role of Written Turnover in Aviation Maintenance
A concept of central importance to aviation safety that is covered in
most Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) training programs is the
practice of clear and thorough communication. A number of airline
accidents caused by human factors can be traced to erosion in either verbal
or written exchange of critical information (Taylor & Christensen, 1998).
The role communication has been shown to play in human factors error
underscores its value as a research construct. More specifically, written
work turnover and other documentation represent critical aspects of high-
risk organizational systems. Because the complexity of such high-risk
systems has been a theorized contributor to accident rates (Perrow, 1999),
the clarity and accuracy of written work turnover are critical leverage
points for maintenance error reduction. Essential components of
accountability, information flow and quality, and safety assurance hinge on
the proper and complete use of written communication.
As written communication is so vital to safety in airline maintenance, it
is no surprise that efforts have preceded the present research to increase the
quality of documentation. Hutchinson (1997) examined work cards in a
large repair station and found that over a twelve-month period, 40% of
them contained vague, ambiguous or abbreviated phrases that missed
intended standards of federal aviation regulation. A feedback system was
implemented on the hangar floor whereby work-record error rates were
posted daily for mechanics to see. Being shown error rates with such rapid
feedback had a profound impact on documentation practices, with the 40%
error rate dropping to zero in eight weeks.
Taylor and Christensen (1998) highlight the importance of written
communication in airline maintenance, calling it “the bedrock of all
communication in maintenance” (p. 94). Of all modes of communication
operating in such a system, Taylor and Christensen see the written message
at the core. They cite three critical factors in improving written
communication in airline maintenance. One factor is employee
participation. Involving employees in the improvement process has shown
to be a positive force in reducing paperwork errors (Taylor, 1994). A second
critical factor is ergonomics and forms design. Research has explored this
area to maximize the clarity and usefulness of work documents in airline
maintenance (Patel, Drury & Lofgren, 1994). Finally, measurement and
feedback on performance is important as Hutchison (1997) has shown.
Efforts to measure patterns in written communication and provide feedback
to researchers, managers and mechanics about improving this skill help
initiate a process geared toward safer airline maintenance departments.
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The present study marks an initial attempt to measure some qualities of
written communication beyond the mere absence or presence of
discrepancies. It is also an effort to examine the effects of a MRM training
program containing modules on improving written communication in
general and written turnovers in particular. That training took place in two
phases. For the large repair hangar described here (hereafter called the
subject site) Phase I training occurred from January 2000 through April
2000, the period during which all participating employees went through the
first day of training. Phase II, the second day of training, began for the
subject site in June 2000 and concluded in August of 2000. Other sites in
the same company (hereafter collectively called the subject company) had
started the training, but had not yet completed it. Their interim results are
compared with the subject site. Further comparison uses some results from
MRM programs in two other companies, whose programs did not include
modules on written communication and whose training was completed in
one phase.
A Definition of Written Turnover
We are defining turnover in organizations employing shift work as the
passing of partial or incomplete jobs from one shift to the next. More
specifically, written turnover is denoted as the documentation of work
performed and passed from at least one shift to another during aircraft
overhaul. Written turnover in the airline industry serves two crucial
purposes: (a) it leaves a paper trail of accountability for each step in a set of
maintenance procedures and (b) it provides the next work shift with
information vital to assuming the next stage of a task and ultimately
completing the entire job. Important to conclude from this description is
that the work card represents a carefully crafted centerpiece to a system of
checks, re-checks, accountability and safety nets. Written turnover
practices represent the critical human component to this system that
ultimately determines the system’s ability to reduce maintenance error.
For the subject company, written turnover was emphasized primarily in
Phase I of the training, with cursory reminders occurring during Phase II.
Specifically in Phase I, the Three Cs (clarity, completeness and correctness)
were stressed as critical to written communication. Training exercises
demonstrating the importance of such written communication included a
task that involved following a complete set of directions, the clarity (or
unclarity) of which was not apparent to participants until the very last step.
A second exercise had participants write a work document entry, striving
for enough clarity, completeness and correctness to enable a second, naïve
participant to correctly assemble a set of objects in a particular fashion
based on what was written. Additionally, considerable time was spent in
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discussing and examining company turnover documents and how to fill
them out properly.
Research Hypotheses
Based on the emphasis in Phase I training toward written
communication and turnover, our expectation was that turnover quality and
attitudes toward written communication would be most improved
immediately following this period, and that errors in written documents
would be diminished.
Hypothesis 1: Following training, the subject company'’ respondents'
intentions to write more clearly, and subsequent reports
of their having written more clearly and improved their
turnovers will be higher than other companies not using
this training.
Hypothesis 2: Following training, paperwork errors in the subject
company will show a decrease coincident with behavior
change.
Hypothesis 3: Following training, the actual written turnovers would
improve in length (completeness), in legibility (clarity)
and in content (correctness), compared with appropriate
pre-training baselines.
METHOD
Kirkpatrick (1998) identifies four levels of training evaluation criteria or
outcomes, each increasing in relevance to bottom-line organizational goals.
The four evaluation levels articulated by Kirkpatrick in order of increasing
importance are reactions, learning, behavior and results. Reactions are
simply the opinions of training participants about the training. Such data is
easily measured and collected, but has a theoretically and practically weak
relationship to ultimate organizational goals. The second level of
evaluation, learning, carries a bit more weight toward bottom-line training
objectives. An evaluator targeting this level of criteria is interested in
principles, facts, and attitudes that were gained or changed as a result of
training. Behavior is the third level of evaluation and represents more direct
connection to work practices. An evaluator at this level is looking for actual
behavior change or reports of behavior change related to job performance.
The final, deepest and most critical level of evaluation criteria, according to
Kirkpatrick, is results. At this level, training effects are related to
organizational objectives. If an evaluator can demonstrate that this level of
criteria is affected by a training initiative, then that evaluator has data that
are able to make meaningful statements about the success of the program.
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The data used in the present study was collected with the Kirkpatrick
concepts as a model, and with primary attention to the second, third and
fourth levels of evaluation criteria (learning, behavior and results).
Kirkpatrick warns that evaluation of results is generally difficult to obtain.
Former attempts have been made to link MRM training to bottom-line
organizational results (e.g., ground damage incidents and lost time injuries)
(Taylor, 2000).
The current study is an attempt to measure a behavioral process in
aviation that is very closely related to fourth level evaluation criteria. An
overriding organizational objective in the subject company, as well as the
greater aviation industry, is the minimization of incidents and accidents.
We are examining the quality of written turnover as a behavioral criterion
shown by accident investigations to have direct consequence for these
safety objectives (e.g., NTSB, 1992).
Subjects and Samples
The subjects (employees of the subject site) are aviation maintenance
repair mechanics and quality inspectors, plus their immediate supervisors
and middle managers who have completed a two phase MRM training
program in a maintenance repair site belonging to a large airline. The
subject site is unique in that all of its employees have completed both
phases of this MRM training, which emphasized improving written
turnovers. Initial field interviews at the subject site during and after the
training period revealed that many participants especially valued its
sections on written communication and turnover. Results from this subject
site are compared with other heavy maintenance facilities in the same
company (subject company) that had begun, but had not yet completed, the
same MRM training. Survey results from the subject site and the larger
subject company are compared with heavy maintenance operations in two
other airlines (comparison companies A and B) whose MRM training did
not include the topics of written communication or improving written
turnovers. Survey respondents in the comparison companies include
mechanics, inspectors, and management and support personnel in similar
proportions to the subject company.
DATA
Assessment of Written Turnover Quality
The documents from which we assessed the quality of written turnover
in the subject site consist of non-routine work cards that are included in the
document packages resulting from aircraft heavy maintenance overhaul
called maintenance checks. These maintenance checks are a set of
preplanned maintenance inspections and procedures, which are conducted
Taylor and Thomas 73
at required intervals for aircraft of a particular model. The non-routine
work results from defects or damage found during the preplanned
inspections. The overhaul process studied here is called C-check in the
industry and is a fairly extensive overhaul process. Because the set of
maintenance procedures for a C-check is so large, the subject company has
divided theirs into six parts that can each be performed usually in three to
four days of nine to twelve eight-hour shifts.
For each non-routine job card they work on, these maintenance
employees are required to sign the entries for which they accept
responsibility using their own stamp issued with their employee ID
number. The employee who stamps the repaired by section on the front of
the card accepts responsibility for his or her section, as well as any entries
on the card that have not been stamped. The checked by section of a work
card is generally stamped by an inspector, meaning this individual is
accepting responsibility that the completed job has been conducted
properly, and that any required inspection items have been properly
inspected.
Sampling Written Turnover Data
The subject site’s data sample represents turnover data entries recorded
by the mechanics, inspectors, supervisors and managers in this one heavy
maintenance station. All turnover entries were recorded by employees that
had completed both phases of the MRM training during the preceding year.
Turnover data were collected and coded from completed work documents
during visits to the company archives. A purposeful sample of document
packages was drawn. We could not review all non-routine work cards for
the subject site with the time and manpower available. We therefore
sampled the documentation of approximately 10% of all C-checks
performed at the subject site for a two-year period. Because no grounded or
theoretical reasons could be conceived to choose one phase of the C-check
over another, our sample was selected without regard for the phase of C-
check other than gaining an adequate proportion of the total checks
conducted in 1999 and 2000. The population consisted of 179 document
packages in 1999 and 169 in 2000, a total of 348. From this, a sample of 16
packages from each of 1999 and 2000 were included in the sample, a total
of 32. Phase I training began in January of 2000 and concluded in March of
2000. Phase II began in June of 2000 and concluded in August of 2000.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the 1,386 separate turnover entries
obtained from the 32-package sample. March, September, and December
were selected as appropriate periods in each year to draw samples based on
their proximity to 2000 training onset and conclusion. The sample chosen
allows examination of changes in written turnover performance at critical
points coincident with onset and termination of training. It also allows for
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comparisons to baseline from the same months in 1999, during which
training had not yet been implemented.
Coding the Turnover Data
Turnover written in response to the initial inspection and defect
description were assessed and coded by two raters. Turnover length
(completeness) was recorded by counting the number of words included in
the turnover, including reference numbers and abbreviations. Legibility
(clarity) was recorded by assigning a rating from 1 (completely illegible) to
4 (completely legible) for each turnover entry. Content (correctness) was
recorded by counting the number of times an entry included correct or
incorrect information. By industry standards, information on what was
done, or information on where the employee stopped or how he or she left
the situation is considered correct and information on what to do next is
considered incorrect. Raters were compared on turnover length, content
and legibility for each time block separately using independent samples t-
tests. Number of words (length) and content were stable across raters, with
no significant differences between raters. However, comparison of raters on
legibility yielded significant differences at almost all time blocks,
reflecting the increased subjective judgment inherent in this measure.
Measuring Paperwork Discrepancies
The subject company’s airline maintenance department, in which the
new training on written communication had been implemented, has
measured and reported total paperwork discrepancies for each station by
month between 1995 and 2001. The subject company’s monthly reports
were made available to the researchers for use in identifying improvement
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Figure 1. Total Number of Turnover Entries for Each Sampled Month
in 1999 and 2000
trends coinciding with the training. In order to compare the subject site with
others in the subject company, the raw data contained in these reports were
corrected for station size through the use of personnel headcount. Trends
for these corrected data were examined for a period prior to the onset of the
training and for the available months thereafter. Viewing these trends we
expected to find the most impact of the MRM training on the subject site in
which all employees had completed both phases; and to a lesser degree in
the other maintenance stations in the subject company where not all
employees had yet been trained.
Survey Measurement
Employee intentions to improve their written communication following
their training, and their reports of actually doing so, were collected using
post-training surveys. Survey data were collected from the subject
company and from two comparison companies using the Maintenance
Resource Management–Technical Operations Questionnaire
(MRM/TOQ), a well-tested and validated survey instrument (Taylor,
2000). Training participants completed surveys immediately after their
training. In the subject company’s sites where training occurred in two
phases, questionnaire data were collected after each phase. The
MRM/TOQ data used to explore the effect of the training on written
turnover come from responses to previously validated open-ended items
that are subsequently coded into fixed categories (Taylor, 1998; 2000).
Initial responses come from the immediate post-training questionnaire, in
which participants were asked what was memorable about the training they
had just received, and how they intended to use the training. Further
responses were collected from participants several months after their
training when these respondents received another MRM/TOQ in which
they were asked to describe what changes they had actually made as a result
of their training. Since the coding scheme included categories for both
“writing more clearly,” and “improving my turnovers,” we expected to find
such responses in greater proportion in the subject site, next most frequent
in the remainder of the subject company, and the least in maintenance
operations at the comparison companies where the MRM training
curriculum did not include written communication as a topic.
RESULTS
Comparisons of Written Turnover Before and After MRM Training
Written Turnover Completeness
Figure 2 shows the written turnover length (or completeness) for the
subject site for 1999 (the year before MRM training) and 2000 (the year in
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which training occurred). As shown in Figure 2, the distribution of mean
number of words in turnover arrayed across sampled months in each year
are roughly parallel for this measure and higher for 2000.
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted for turnover
length with time period as the factor, and it was significant (F = 8.892; df =
(7, 1,808); p < .001). Tukey HSD post hoc analysis revealed the following.
The increase in turnover length between December 1999 and the two
periods March and September 2000 are statistically significant (p < .001),
implying stepwise improvement resulting from Phase I and Phase II
training. However there is a significant decrease in turnover length from
September to December 2000 (p < .001), which suggests that the training
effect is short lived. The post hoc analysis shows also the increase in
September 2000 (the month following the completion of all training) over
the same period in 1999 is significant at p < .001. Differences in turnover
length remain non-significant when compared for the months of March and
December in 1999 and 2000.
Written Turnover Clarity
Figure 3 shows that average legibility (clarity) scores are reasonably
high. They range between a low of 3.1 and a high of 3.6 on this 4.0-point
scale. The one-way ANOVA of turnover legibility (with time period as the
independent variable) is also significant (F = 13.603, df = (7, 1,814),
p < .001). The Tukey HSD post hoc analyses reveal somewhat similar
results to those seen for turnover length. As shown in Figure 3 a sizable
increase in legibility was found from December 1999 to March and
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Figure 2. Turnover Length: Subject Site Comparison for Six Time Periods,
1999 and 2000
September 2000 (suggesting an effect of Phase I training), which are
significant at the p < .001 and p < .01 levels of confidence, respectively. The
highest level of legibility occurs in March 2000, immediately after Phase I
training and is significantly greater than its counterpart a year earlier. No
significant changes occurred across time periods in 2000, and no other
significant differences emerged for legibility.
Correctness of Turnover: Descriptive versus Prescriptive Narrative
Among the hypotheses tested in this research is the improvement in
correctness as well as the completeness and clarity of written turnover
documents. As previously mentioned, policy at the subject company and
elsewhere in the industry discourages maintenance employees from
making statements in the turnover about what the next course of action
should be for the employee receiving the turnover. This is because such
statements can limit the decision making of the turnover recipient, and
additionally the suggested comment may be against authorized procedures.
Each entry was dichotomously coded as having either included or not
included what was done, how the situation or job was left, and what needed
to be done next. From these data, we compared descriptive turnover only
(stating what was done or how the job was left), and prescriptive turnover
(adding statements about what the next mechanic should do), on turnover
length and legibility.
Legibility (clarity) was not different between descriptive and
prescriptive turnovers (t =−1.95, df = 2091, n.s.). However, for total number
of words (completeness) the prescriptive turnover entries had significantly
more words than the descriptive turnover entries. Levene’s test was
78 Journal of Air Transportation
Mean Legibility in Turnover By Time Block
3
4
March September December
L
e
g
ib
il
it
y
R
a
ti
n
g
1999 2000
p<.001
Figure 3. Turnover Legibility: Subject Site Comparison of Six Time Periods,
1999 and 2000.
significant for the t-test used for analysis (F = 32.70, p < .001), and the
group sizes were unequal, necessitating a non-parametric analysis. The
Mann-Whitney U test showed significant difference in mean ranks at
z = −6.154, p < .001. The greater number of words in the prescriptive
turnover is no surprise, as additional writing should be required to include
direction about what should be done next. This finding reinforces a point
made in the subject company’s MRM training that longer turnover is not
necessarily better turnover.
Unfortunately this advice did not have a measurable effect on
performance. Figure 4 shows the oscillating percentages of prescriptive
turnover entries across time blocks. An overall Chi Square test (X2) of the 6
time blocks by inclusion of prescriptive turnover was significant
(X2 = 37.77, df = 5, p < .001). Post hoc Chi Square tests were conducted for
adjacent time blocks, and significant differences were seen for several of
them. A significant decrease was found from September 1999 to December
1999 (X2 = 8.65, df = 1, p < .01), a significant increase was shown from
March 2000 to September 2000 (X2 = 22.04, df = 1, p < .001) and a
decrease was revealed for the period September 2000 to December 2000
(X2 = 14.20, df = 1, p < .001). Thus no clear effect of MRM training on
eliminating prescriptive turnovers can be discerned from the current
analysis.
Testing other effects on turnover correctness
Pearson’s Chi-Square statistic was conducted for each of these variables
in cross-tabulation with the three main job titles of mechanic, inspector and
manager. Overall 2 x 3 cross-tabulations yielded significant Chi-Square
statistics (X2 = 21.95, df = 2, p < .001), indicating a relationship between
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Figure 4. Turnover Content: Subject Site’s Percentage of “Prescriptive”
Responses for Six Time Periods, 1999 and 2000
turnover content and job title. In 2 x 2 Chi-Square tests, mechanics were
shown to be more likely than inspectors (X2 = 32.807, df = 1, p < .001) and
managers (X2 = 7.082, df = 1, p < .01) to write a prescriptive response.
Managers and inspectors did not differ from one another.
Paperwork Errors in the Subject Company
Figure 5 shows the total number of paperwork or document errors per
month from January 1995 to January 2001 for the subject site and the
average errors per month for all remaining base maintenance stations in the
subject company. A slight positive trend is shown in number of errors
across time (the trend line for the subject site is solid and the trend line for
the average of the remaining stations in the subject company is dashed),
with a sharp increase occurring in 2000 and 2001. Both trend lines in Figure
5 show a positive slope after 1998. This seems perplexing considering the
ongoing training program in progress designed, in large part, to reduce
these types of errors. However, a hiring freeze ended in the subject
company at the beginning of 1998, and a number of young and less
experienced mechanics began work for the subject company at the
beginning of 1999.
Head count data is shown in Figure 6. This shows a slight increase in the
number of employees from 1998 to 2001 in the subject site and a stronger
growth in new employees in the remainder of the company. Head count data
was not available prior to 1998.
We could easily expect that a population suddenly infused with new
employees would yield an error trend with an increasing slope. Any
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Figure 5. Paperwork Errors from January 1995 through April 2001
significant effects of MRM training are likely counterbalanced by the
propensity of a new hire to commit error. To assess the possible effects of
new employees hired, we adjusted errors by head count and compared the
trend line slopes before and after January 1999. Figure 7 shows the year
1998 and the different trends in paperwork errors between the subject site
and the remaining heavy maintenance stations in the subject company. The
subject site is less affected by new hires in 1998 and shows an error rate
increasing more sharply than the head count rate over time, which shows an
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Figure 7. Paperwork Errors Adjusted for Head Count for 1998
overall increase in errors per employee during this time preceding MRM
training.
For 1999 through 2001, corrected for head count, Figure 8 shows an
increasing trend for both the subject site and remaining stations. This
similar shift in trend for both groups lends support to the idea that new and
relatively inexperienced mechanics can be largely responsible for the
diminished paperwork skills and the increase in paperwork error rates in
1999-2000.
Field Interviews and Survey Data
Recollections and Intentions
In field interviews conducted in June 2000, shortly after Phase I training
was completed, a sample of 46 maintenance employees from the subject
site were asked what they remembered best about the training. “Turnover”
tied for the highest response with “case studies and videos” at a 15%
response rate. This apparent enthusiasm and remembrance for written
turnover was encouraging, since written turnover was a primary component
of Phase I training. Interviews conducted with Aviation Maintenance
Technician (AMT) and foreman at the subject site in December 2000
showed that AMTs' attempts to improve written turnover had begun, but
then ceased. Interview respondents generally agreed to a lack of
management support or encouragement for the effort.
Following both Phase I and Phase II, the MRM/TOQ included the
questions “What are good aspects of the training” and “How will you use
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Figure 8. Paperwork Errors Adjusted for Head Count for 1999, 2000 and 2001
(During Training and after New Employee Hiring)
this training on the job.” Among the general themes that are coded for each
of these, three bore some relationship to the topic of written turnover. Those
themes were “improve turnovers,” and “write more clearly,” as well as
“communication” (this last theme code was used if the respondent wrote
only the word “communication” and nothing else). Data from the subject
site were compared with the results from remaining heavy maintenance
stations in the same company; and both of those are compared with
companies A and B that are engaged in similar heavy maintenance
operations, but whose MRM training did not cover written communication.
Table 1 shows the degree to which respondents felt the three selected
communication topics were memorable (or good) in the training they
received.
The results in Table 1 reveal a difference among the six survey samples
in their mention of memorable topics that is statistically significant (Chi
Square = 41.62, df = 10, p < .001). These results show a substantial regard
for the treatment of improving turnovers in the subject site and in the
remainder of the subject company immediately following their Phase I
training. Improving turnovers was not mentioned at all in the two
comparison companies following their MRM training and this is to be
expected insofar as their training programs did not emphasize that topic.
Likewise, and for the same reason, no mention of the turnover topic was
made following the Phase II training in the subject site and the remainder of
the subject company. A smaller proportion in the subject sites mentioned
clearer writing as a memorable aspect of their Phase I training and this
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Table 1. Communication and Turnover Responses for “What were the
good aspects of the training?”
What were the good aspects “Improving “Writing more
of the training? turnovers” clearly” “Communication”
Following Phase I,
Subject Site (n = 245) 7.4% 1.6% 4.2%
Following Phase II,
Subject Site (n = 263) 0 0.5% 2.1%
Phase I, Remainder of
Subject Company (n = 837) 7.3% 3.4% 7.3%
Phase II, Remainder of
Subject Company (n = 236) 0 0.4% 1.2%
Comparison Company A
(n = 1,844) 0 0.3% 4.1%
Comparison Company B
(n = 153) 0 0.6% 3.8%
X2 = 41.62, df = 10, p < .001
appears as a very small percentage following Phase II training as well as for
the two comparison companies. There appears to be little difference in the
general “communication” topic among the six samples except that it seems
to diminish in the subject site and remainder of the subject company after
Phase II training as specific references to communication are reduced in
that training.
Table 2 shows respondents’ expectations—as a result of their
training—to improve their turnovers, to write more clearly, or to just
communicate.
Results shown in Table 2 show that participants in the subject site and in
the remaining heavy maintenance stations in the subject company more
frequently expressed intentions to improve turnover and write more clearly
than in the other two companies. The Chi Square test for difference among
the six survey samples over the three response categories is statistically
significant (Chi Square = 46.76, df = 10, p < .001). These respondents also
most frequently expressed intentions to improve turnovers and write more
clearly after Phase I than after Phase II. This reduction of intentions
following Phase II training is not a surprising finding considering these
topics were not emphasized in Phase II content. The two comparison
companies show minimal intentions to practice either improved turnovers
or clearer writing. Intentions to improve general communication show little
difference among the six samples.
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Table 2. Communication and Turnover Responses for “How will you use this
training on the job?”
How will you use this “Improving “Writing more
training on the job? turnovers” clearly” “Communication”
Following Phase I,
Subject Site (n = 245) 6.6% 8.1% 4.1%
Following Phase II
Subject Site (n = 263) 1.1% 0.6% 3.0%
Phase I, Remainder of Subject
Company (n = 837) 15.6% 8.7% 6.1%
Phase II, Remainder of Subject
Company (n = 236) 0.1% 0.8% 3.5%
Comparison Company A
(n = 1,844) 0 0.1% 7.2%
Comparison Company B
(n = 153) 1.3% 0 7.8%
X2= 46.76, df = 10, p < .001
Reports of Actual Behavior
Table 3 displays data collected from the subject company’s MRM/TOQ
following Phase II, and shows the degree to which respondents say they did
improve their turnovers, they did write more clearly, or they did
communicate better in general as a result of their training. These results are
compared, in Table 3, with data collected from respondents in the two
comparison companies in a follow-up MRM/TOQ survey administered two
months after their training.
These reports of behavioral change several months after the initial
training are suggestive, but cannot be said to statistically support the
prediction of respondents’ actual change in written turnovers resulting from
the training. Although Table 3 data do show a slight trend in the subject
company respondents’ reports of writing more clearly and improving their
turnovers, the Chi Square test does not show a significant difference among
the several samples.
DISCUSSION
MRM Training Effects on Turnover Practices
The most direct evidence we have presented here, the analyses of written
turnover length and legibility, does yield findings showing benefit of MRM
training. For our subject site, which received the maximum effect of the
training; turnover completeness (length) increased over 1999 baseline
levels in March 2000, after Phase I, and again in September 2000 following
Phase II. The second direct, but partial support for our hypotheses lies in
the clarity (legibility) results. Legibility increased over baseline after Phase
I, but returned to 1999 levels after Phase II. Possibly, legibility is a habit
quickly and readily improved, but also more likely to degenerate than
writing more complete descriptions.
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Table 3. Communication and Turnover Responses for “What changes have you made
on the job?”
Phase II,
Remainder
Phase II, Subject of Comparison Comparison
What changes have Subject Site Company Company A Company B
you made on the job? (n=180) (n=259) (n=585) (n=150)
Wrote more clearly 0.6% 2.3% 0 0
Better turnovers 1.1% 1.9% 0 1.3%
Communication 2.7% 1.9% 1.6% 6.0%
X2 = 10.66, df=6, n.s.
This failure to fully support our hypothesis might be explained by
participant reaction to the second training module, in which the written
communications skills were not sufficiently reinforced. In the second
training phase, participants get a reminder of Phase I content, and may hear
the implicit message that management is committed to the values and ideas
advocated in the training. Field observation following Phase I and again
after Phase II revealed little management support for improving written
turnover in the subject site. Our results, as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, do
show improvement in written turnover from before the training in
December 1999 to after the first phase in March 2000 and again for at least
one of the measures from March to September 2000. Making a change such
as this to improve written turnover, requires support and encouragement
from others. It is evident that encouragement was not strong or continuous
in the subject site.
The analysis of job titles and turnover content showed mechanics to be
the most thorough in their entries, being more likely than managers or
inspectors to include all three types of content recorded. These findings are
consistent with job roles. Because mechanics are performing a bulk of the
actual work, occupational demands may motivate them to write longer and
more comprehensive turnover. Consistent with this explanation are the
positive sentiment and the stronger intent to improve turnover shown after
Phase I than after Phase II revealed in the survey data (see tables 1 and 2).
Participants may have made an initial effort to write more legibly after
the first training because it was not too demanding and difficult. Probably
because little commitment at the subject site was dedicated to this change,
and little reinforcement was received by mechanics, the efforts waned in
the absence of reminders or internal incentives. Anecdotal reports from
field visits suggest that local management did little to reinforce the content
of the Phase I training and that this had dampening effects on mechanics’
motivation to apply the training further.
Paperwork errors data provided additional means by which to assess
MRM training effects, but they were not conclusive. The employment of a
substantial number of new maintenance personnel into the subject
company at the beginning of 1999 was shown to confound the data and thus
make difficult the detection of any training impact on paperwork error
rates. Under these circumstances special technical training in the proper
use of forms would be of benefit for the new hires as well as for the more
experienced mechanics who were providing them on-the-job guidance and
advice. Without such technical training the effect of this diminished basic
skill may outweigh any error-reducing effects the MRM training may have
provided. That less-experienced workforce is likely responsible for some if
not much of the increase in errors following 1998. Similar data were not
available from the comparison companies because they had not collected
similar or comparable paperwork errors.
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Myriad explanations are possible for the somewhat inconsistent results
regarding turnover entries, general paperwork errors, and participant
expectations following the training. Ultimately, we are faced with little
knowledge about the way these specific variables work in organizational
research. To our knowledge, there have been no previous studies of written
turnover or paperwork errors in airlines or any other industries to date with
the exception of the studies and cases referred to in the introduction.
Generalization of Results
Specific Communication Training Changes Attitudes and Behavior
We have found that specific training in improving written
communication included in the curriculum of the first part of a two-part
human factors training program produces measurable and favorable results.
The training program we examined was completed for 263 employees in
one maintenance site. In two other of the company’s maintenance sites over
800 AMTs and managers completed the first part of the training. Of these
latter groups little more than one-quarter had completed the second part of
the training at the time of our study. On the basis of the high sampling ratio
these two samples represent, and their consistent results following the first
part of the training the change effect can be generalized. Phase I training
did lead to improvement in measures from Kirkpatrick’s Level 2 (learning)
and Level 3 (behavior) categories. Resultant changes in written turnover
quality (the learned behavior, measured only in the subject site), were short
lived and were not sustained long enough to have an effect on subsequent
overall paperwork quality or on aircraft safety (Level 4, results).
Two-part Training Does Not Sustain Learned Behavior and Motivation If It Is
Not Designed to Do So
We found that changes in perceptions and in intentions followed Phase I,
where communication was emphasized, but diminished following Phase II
where it was not emphasized. These results are consistent for the subject
site and the rest of the subject company–especially when contrasted with
the two comparison companies. Our ability to generalize this finding is
quite good because those AMTs and managers who attended Phase II
training were all of the employees (n = 263) for the subject site, and were a
sizable number (n = 236) and proportion (28%) of base maintenance
employees for the remainder of the company. The latter proportion can be
considered a random sample of the 800 plus AMTs and managers who
attended Phase I training.
We reported that interviews from the subject site revealed only a small
amount of local management encouragement and support for improved
communication during and after the training. The data on turnover quality,
also collected at the subject site, provided evidence that the quality of the
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written turnovers improved and then diminished in the subject site
following Phase I and Phase II, respectively. We did not collect similar data
for the rest of the subject company and cannot, therefore, generalize that a
similar oscillation in turnover quality would occur everywhere two-part
training of this type is used. Lack of management support provides
explanation for the oscillation in turnover quality just noted, but
corroborating interviews were not conducted in the rest of the subject
company so generalization to the rest of the company cannot be made.
Local conditions and results in the subject site cannot be generalized to
explain causal effects for the positive change in attitude and intention
recorded in the subject company, following Phase I, and the diminution of
those changes following Phase II. However, the localized dampening effect
of poor management support for improving communication in the subject
site could help explain its lower intentions and subsequent reported
behavior changes in comparison with the total subject company.
The performance data we collected (average paperwork errors per
maintenance employee) do not show a subsequent or long term effect of the
training. If anything, the effect of adding inexperienced AMTs is seen to
increase errors. Lack of local management support for improving written
communication in the subject site, revealed in interviews with AMTs and
foremen, is also consistent with the accelerating rate of total paperwork
errors in that location from the beginning of the year 2000. That
accelerating rate of paperwork errors seems more consistent with the lack
of local management support for improving written communication than
with the simple addition of new AMTs.
CONCLUSIONS
MRM Training Works–Communication Was Improved
In this paper we have reported that a specific training curriculum, with
focus on better writing and communication skills, and on documenting
turnover, can make a positive difference in aviation maintenance. Results in
a single site were shown to generalize to the larger company. Such training
increased trainees understanding of written communication, improved
trainee attitudes toward communication, and changed their behaviors in
that direction as well. Our results also show that a non-specific MRM
curriculum will have little impact on improving targeted communication
behaviors.
Improved Communication Was Not Sustained
It is clear from these results that specific training is effective in changing
behavior, but the impact on the organizational bottom line—on error
reduction and aircraft safety—is illusive. Our results also show that there
are several obstacles to improving the bottom line of turnover documents.
88 Journal of Air Transportation
The first obstacle is that when employees are ignorant or uninformed of
paperwork details and processes, they will make paperwork errors. A
successful maintenance operation needs to provide a thorough grounding
for its new AMT employees in understanding the company’s forms and
documents. The company’s technical training department should provide
this basic and thorough grounding in use of forms and documents soon
after an employee is hired.
The second obstacle is a lack of management support and
encouragement for improved communication processes and techniques.
When such techniques are part of a larger human factors (MRM) program
to reduce human error there is the added risk of undermining AMT
confidence in the overall MRM effort. Local management may hold the
perception that encouraging AMTs to use good written communication
practices will act against meeting production demands. When those fears
become known to employees (as they surely will eventually) the latter will
quickly become cynical of such training in particular and of MRM
programs in general. Management must provide support and
encouragement for AMTs to take the time to provide written descriptive
narrative in a complete and legible form. If managers are ambiguous about
(or inconsistent in) providing AMTs the time to complete turnover forms
clearly and legibly, this inconsistency will be seen as confusion (or, worse
yet, duplicity) to those subordinates.
The third obstacle to address in successfully reducing human error is the
individualistic occupational culture of the North American aircraft
mechanic (Taylor, 1999). The strong, silent type has many virtues, but in a
complex world of modern aviation technology maintenance technicians
need to communicate more than has been formerly expected by the
industry. This normal tendency of AMTs to communicate less rather than
more is only enhanced when their managers are reluctant or hesitant to
support what MRM programs encourage.
Management Must Take A Clear and Active Role in Change
The conclusion that local management must be consistent and forceful
in its support of company MRM training programs is reinforced by
previously reported results regarding obstacles to successful organizational
change in the airline industry (Taylor, 1998; Taylor & Christensen, 1998;
Patankar & Taylor, 2000). In every instance studied over the past dozen
years the one key variable in successful MRM programs is unwavering
management support at all levels. It is time for aviation maintenance
management to take a clear and active role in promoting and supporting the
human factors and error reduction programs they impose on their
employees.
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ABSTRACT
The primary purpose of this paper is to compare efficiency of privatized and
government owned airports. Although in the U.S. almost all of the airports used by
commercial air carriers are owned and operated by the public sector, the trend towards
airport privatization, especially in Western Europe, Asia, and Latin America, has
stimulated new thinking in this regard both from the U.S. government, as well as
businesses. As the privatization trend in the airport industry continues, airport
managers are facing an increased pressure to find more cost-efficient ways of running
their airports. Implementing improvement standards will become a necessity.
Moreover, there is an increasing economic pressure on local governments to privatize
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airports. One important finding of this study is that government owned airports had
better operating efficiency in terms of passengers per runway area, movements per
gate, and movements per runway. On the other hand, privatized airports have higher
financial efficiencies (revenue per passenger and revenue per landing).
HISTORY, TRENDS, AND ANALYSIS
Airport privatization means the infusion of capital by private sectors to
gain partial or total control over an airport’s activities and facilities. Many
airports have been privatized worldwide since the trend of privatization was
introduced. In 1987, the British government initiated the sale of its
commercial airports under the Thatcher government. The government-
owned British Airport Authority (BAA) was offered to the public for $2.5
billion. Currently, the BAA operates seven major airports in the UK and has
generated profits ever since it was privatized. The company is listed on the
London Stock Exchange and has a market capitalization exceeding $8
billion (Biederman, 1999).
Attracted by the positive results from the UK model, the trend of airport
privatization occurred in other countries. Austrias Vienna Airport was
listed on the Vienna Stock Exchange in 1992. Also, two Danish Airports
were incorporated as Copenhagen Airports Ltd. and listed on the
Copenhagen Stock Exchange in 1994. The private sector holds slightly less
than 50 percent of the shares in either example (Poole, 2000a). However,
the privatization of BAA has not been without its critics. These critics
charge that the government converted a public asset into a regulated private
monopoly that requires regular review and negotiation over the airport’s
charges to the airline. Privatization will not necessarily ensure that citizens
get better service at lower cost than from the government (Vasigh, 2001).
Service and cost are the result of the relationship between the regulatory
controls, choice of markets to serve, market power, and productivity.
Another European airport being publicly traded is Italy’s Aeroporti di
Roma. Recently, the Italian Leonardo consortium won the bidding process
to become the major shareholder of the airport (Airports International,
2000).
The Amsterdam Schipol Airport is preparing for an initial public
offering of shares at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. The Dutch
government, the majority shareholder, is expected to decide shortly on this
matter while the other shareholders, the cities of Amsterdam and
Rotterdam, already agreed to sell their respective stakes (Airport World
News, 2000). Schipol’s strategic alliance with the German Flughafen
Frankfurt/Main AG (FAG) is another example of an incorporated entity.
Currently, all shares are still owned by the state and federal government.
However, a share offer at the stock exchange is planned until the end of the
decade (see Table A1). The FAG will be part of the consortium operating
the new Berlin-Brandenburg Airport in Germany’s capital, which will be
92 Journal of Air Transportation
the first fully privatized airport in Germany after its expected completion in
2007.
In Toronto, Pearson’s Third International Terminal, Trilliorn, was built
by a private contractor. This is the first example of a privatized airport
facility in North America. Canada’s commercial airports are leased to non-
private groups that operate independent of government in setting rates and
financing expansion programs. In the U.S., while airline service itself has
been freed of economic regulation and allowed to become a dynamic
industry in 1978, the majority of U.S. airports have remained under
government control. The first airport available for private investment was
the Indianapolis International Airport, the nation’s 44th largest airport in
terms of total enplaned passengers (FAA, 1996). In October of 1995, the
BAA took over the management of Indianapolis International Airport
(Schwartz, 2000) promising to raise non-airline revenues by $32 million
within the ten-year period of the contract. The goal was to achieve a 25
percent reduction on landing fees by increasing revenues and lowering
costs while at the same time improving service quality. The contract was
renegotiated in 1998 and extended until 2008, the longest term allowable
under Indiana law. Costs per passenger were reduced from $6.70 to $3.70
and have increased very little since then. In spite of the rather moderate
passenger growth rate of 3.5 percent, non-airline revenue income per
passenger, minus expenses, more than doubled between 1994 and the end
of 1999. Table A2 lists private participation in operation and management
of North American commercial airports.
In contrast to Europe, Australia and a few Latin American countries
privatization efforts of U.S. commercial airports had been limited to
contract management. This approach avoids more aggressive forms of
privatization such as long-term lease agreements or the selling of shares to
private investors. Westchester Airport in New York State is another
example of the use of a management contract as privatization method. After
the airport was facing severe losses, the county government decided in
1977 to bid on a basis of five-year contracts. Under contract management,
the airport has become solidly profitable showing net incomes of up to $3
million per year. Also, the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority
bid its management contract to Airport Group International (AGI) who has
operated the airport since 1978.
In the Pacific Region, Australia has privatized the three busiest
airports—Brisbane, Perth and Melbourne. The scheme was originally
announced  in  1994  and  initiated  in  July  1997  as  the  Federal  Airport
Cooperation offered the sale of long-term leases (For, 1997). Each of these
airports has considerable monopoly power and was subject to price
regulation. These airports were sold for AU $3.337 billion (Cook, 1997).
The majority of ownership of bidding companies had to be Australian. The
Australia Pacific Airport Cooperation (APAC) won the bid for Melbourne
in which the BAA holds a 25.1 percent stake. Brisbane, the fastest growing
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airport, went to Brisbane Airport Corporation Ltd., in which Amsterdam
Schipol Airport owns a 15 percent stake. Recently, the FAG has acquired an
equity investment. Brisbane is the first overseas airport where FAG and its
alliance partner, Schipol Group, work actively together (Going down under,
2000). The Airstralia Development Group, in which AGI, successor of the
Lockheed Air Terminal Group, owns 16 percent, acquired Perth Airport.
The Sydney Kingsford Smith International Airport was expected to be the
most interesting target for privatization. Its privatization has been delayed
due to a political dispute arising over an issue of noise problems. A further
fifteen airports are to follow the privatization process once the process of
privatizing the first three airports is completed successfully.
On the Asian continent, Malaysia was the first country to begin the
process of airport privatization. Its Malaysian Airports Bhd (MAB) was
offered to retail investors emitting 88 million shares at a price of RM 2.5.
The second offering, directed to institutional investors, raised RM 275
million (Deals of the Year, 2000). The Airport Company operating all of
Malaysias 37 airports plans to sell down further shares in the near future.
Other privatization efforts are under way in various Asian countries. In
Korea, the government-owned airport authority is in charge of privatization
of the newly constructed Inchon Airport (Biederman, 1999). In addition,
the Omani government is evaluating the privatization of two major airports.
The Credit Swisse First Boston (CSFB) has been appointed as its financial
advisor to manage the process and determine the best methodology to
implement this process (Omani Government, 1999).
Latin America is no exception. The Mexican government plans to sell its
fast growing Cancun Airport on the New York Stock Exchange. It is
expected to general over $400 million in revenue. Grupo Aeroportuario del
Sureste SA (Asur), who has been operating the airport as well as eight
smaller Mexican airports since early 1998, is expected to retain 15 percent
of the 85 percent being offered to the public, as well as operating control.
The Asur consortium itself is composed of Copenhagen Airport A/S of
Denmark, Groupe GTM SA of France, Spains Grupo Ferrovial and the
construction concern Grupo Tribasa SA (Investors, 2000). In Chile, the
Santiago International Arturio Benitez Airport was privatized by a 15-year
management concession. Management was handed over as of January 1999
to an international consortium composed of Vancouver Airport Services, a
construction group from Spain, and two Chilean companies. Argentina
awarded a 30-year operating license to a consortium led by U.S. based
Ogden Aviation Group for 33 of Argentines airports (Ogden Corporation
News, 1999). The consortium pays about $5.13 billion over the contracts
life and assumed responsibilities in February 1998. The contract mandated
necessary investments in the renovation of the airports. However, the take-
over was delayed by three months. The new consortium, as well as the prior
airport operator, the Argentine Air Force, which is still in charge of Air
Traffic Control (ATC), increased user charges as part of a cross
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subsidization policy of the 28 airports that remain unprofitable. The airlines
estimate a raise in their operating cost by 271 percent (Turbulent Dialog,
1999). In Table A3, we present a summary of recent airport privatization
transaction statistics.
Airport Privatization Techniques
Five methods of privatization are contracting out, contract management,
long-term lease, build-operate-transfer and full divesture and sale of shares.
Contracting Out. This method is the traditional tool to privatize state
owned enterprises (SOEs) and to relinquish public control. It involves
contracting out for the provision of selected services such as restaurants,
parking, security services, cargo, baggage handling, and fueling services.
Under this scheme governments retain the right to establish business
policies and manage the airport.
Contract Management
The second tool for airport privatization involves the private sector in
management contracts. The state retains the ownership and investment
responsibilities. Only management and operations are handed over to the
private sector. This privatization technique has been applied at the airports
managed by the American division of the BAA, which are Indianapolis
International Airport and Pittsburgh International Airport.
Long-term Lease
Under this method, the state can turn over operations and management,
as well as investment responsibilities, to the private sector. Recent
examples of this are the three Australian airports of Brisbane, Melbourne
and Perth, Steward International Airport in the U.S., and airports in
Argentina. This sector may also be in charge of financing the construction
of the airport but has to return the object after the end of an agreed amount
of time. The main objective for a government is to increase funding while at
the same time transferring operational responsibilities.
Build-Operate-Transfer
BOT; or its variation of Build-Own-Operate-Transfer BOOT are
commonly used technique for this option. This facilitates large new
investments but still maintains government ownership and control. BOT
projects to develop new airports have been underway in a few countries, the
largest of which is Athens $2 billion project. BOT transactions are
relatively complex and various financial and technical specifications are
needed in order to be successful. The lack of private ownership might
impose difficulties in raising and investing large amounts of capital from
the private sector.
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Full Divestiture and Sale of Shares
The fourth option is transferring the ownership of the airport along with
management and investment responsibilities. A common model for this
type of privatization is Build-Own-Operate (BOO), where the private
sector is responsible for current investments and financing the instruction
of the airport. This can be achieved by permitting full or partial divestiture.
Commonly used means for implementing this option are buyouts, public
offering of shares, and flotation of stock via capital markets. This approach
sanctions the government to generate additional revenues for itself while
transferring operational responsibilities to the private sector. The sale of
ownership limits possibilities of future state or government intervention.
The most known example of this privatization option is selling BAA shares
to the private sector. Also, the privatization of Vienna International Airport,
Copenhagen, and Vancouver’s Pearson International Airport all illustrate
the use of this technique. However, this technique requires the existence of
well-developed capital markets. Needless to say, in most developing
countries this tool may not be used because of their thin capital market.
The FAA Airport Privatization Pilot Program
U.S. Congress enacted legislation creating the Airport Privatization
Pilot Program in October of 1996. The Pilot Program provides an
opportunity to test the potential benefits of privatization to increase funding
for airports, lower operating costs and improve airport management and
customer service. This program was established to experiment with the
effects of privatization among U.S. airports by exempting five airports from
the anti-diversion provisions implemented in the Airport and Airway
Improvement Act of 1982 (Utt, 1999). The program eliminates the no-
profit rule for the new owner or lessee, and it eliminates the grant-payback
requirement. The application process must be initiated by either submitting
a preliminary or a final application. In the former application process, the
public sponsors should identify objectives of the privatization, a
description of the process, a timetable for finding a private operator, and
financial statements. In the application, airports anticipating privatization
under the pilot program have to specify terms and conditions of the lease or
sale agreement with a private entity (FAA News, 2000).
A major barrier for the participation in the FAA Pilot Program is the
requirement that a city or state must obtain the approval of airlines
representing 65 percent of the landed weight at the airport. In the case of
many major hub airports, 65 percent of the landed weight represents a
single airline. Thus, the dominant carrier is awarded veto power over
privatization efforts. The difficulty in finding necessary majority consensus
among airlines serving an airport under the FAA Pilot Program is a likely
reason why so few airports have so far applied for participation (Utt, 1999).
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On March 22, 2000, the FAA approved the privatization of Stewart
International Airport (SIA). Stewart’s application process had to overcome
a number of obstacles. Its major airlines could not reach an agreement with
New York State on the use of lease-revenue proceeds for general
governmental purposes and rejected an application proposal already made
in 1998. The airport currently has scheduled passenger service, but has
experienced up to 25 percent decline in passengers (Airport World News,
2000). National Express PLC, a UK-based company that owns two regional
airports in England, was awarded a 99-year lease contract from the
Department of Transportation (DOT). Thus, SIA became the first U.S.
airport to be fully privatized and the first participant in the FAA project
(Reason Public Policy Institute, 2002). National Express, a formerly public
company privatized under the Thatcher government, is planning to launch a
redesign in conjunction with a local real estate development company in
order to market the airport to airlines and related businesses. To date,
Stewart Airport is the only privatization to be finalized.
The second airport to apply for participation in the Pilot Project was
Niagara Falls International Airport (NFIA). Its final application to
participate in the program was submitted to the FAA in June 2000. On
January 30, 2001, Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority (NFTA),
which has been operating the airport under a joint agreement with the U.S.
military, reached a 99-year, longterm, lease agreement with Cintra
Concesiones de Infraestructuras de Transporte, S.A. (NFTA, 2001). In
2001, Niagara International operated at a loss of $1 million a year.
However, the FAA ultimately rejected the privatization of NFIA as a
result of the projected economic impacts of the events of September 11,
2001. Revised projections completed by the investors indicated that the
airport would not have been profitable for many years. As a result, funds
available for improvements to the airport were substantially reduced or
eliminated. As such, one of the goals of airport privatization could not have
been met thereby necessitating the FAA’s decision (Rimmer, 2002).
According to the NFTA, Cintra Niagara would have been responsible for
covering all operating costs and had agreed to invest a minimum guaranteed
commitment of $10.1 million in the NFIA, which could only have been
spent on marketing, promotion, master planning and capital improvements.
Additional amounts were expected to be spent over the term of the contract
(NFTA, 2001).
A further applicant to fill a slot among the five pilot airports is Brown
Field Airport in California, located about 25 miles south of San Diego. The
airport had formerly been a World War II training site and handles a small
amount of general aviation air traffic (Schwarz, 2000). Under the pilot
privatization program, Brown Airfield is supposed to be developed into a
world-class cargo port named San Diego Air Commerce Center
(SANDACC). SANDACC, together with a local developer and the
Diversified Asset Management Group (DAMG), which was founded in
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1994, will focus on worldwide airport investment opportunities. Over a 10-
year horizon, New York-based DAMG plans to invest $1 billion into the
project. According to estimates of the company, the all cargo airport is
supposed to employ nearly 12,000 people and generate more than $750
million in economic benefits to the San Diego area (Gersten, 1999). In a
memorandum of understanding with the City of San Diego, members of the
Brown Field Aviation Park project team (such as DAMG) agreed to operate
the airport under a 50-year lease contract with full payments due upon the
sale of bonds to finance the project (World Trade, 1999).
The fourth airport to apply for privatization under the pilot program is
Rafael Hernandez Airport in Puerto Rico. A preliminary application was
filed on December 20, 1999 (Airport Privatization, 2000). The Puerto Rico
Port Authority has recently selected a team including Frankfurt Airport,
Raytheon, and a local firm to win the bid for a long-term lease agreement.
FAA approval is still pending and expected to be granted by the end of the
year (Poole, 2000b).
New Orleans Lakefront Airport captured the last of the five available
slots to apply for participation in the FAA Pilot Privatization Program.
About 93 percent of the air traffic at Lakefront Airport is general aviation,
yet the facility is also able to accommodate aircraft up to a size of a
Boeing 757. The privatization effort was initiated in February 2000 as the
Orleans Levee Board, owner and operator of the airport, retained the
services of Infrastructure Management Group (IMG) to manage the
privatization process. For 2001, the airport expects to face a current deficit
of $340,000 and operating costs exceeding two million dollars. By
privatizing the airport, the board hopes to turn the airport into profitability
(Stuart, 2001). Currently, the proposals of two companies—TBI Airport
Management and American Airports Corporation—have been under
review by the FAA. TBIs parent company (TBI PLC) acquired Airport
Group International in 1999 and operates airports in various countries.
American Airport Corporation, a subsidiary of American Golf
Corporation, manages and operates several general aviation airports in the
U.S. The lease contract would run for 50 years and is assumed to generate
revenues of between $3 million and $10 million over the first 10 years.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We compiled detailed information on fifteen airports, both public and
private, published in several different reports. These specific airports were
chosen based upon their similarity in hub size. Financial data for BAA
airports are obtained from the financial report published by the airport.
These particular airports were chosen because they reflect the most
prominent privatized airports in England. They are Heathrow (LHR),
Gatwick (LGW), Stanstead (STN), Glasgow (GLA), Edinburgh (EDI),
Aberdeen (ABZ) and Southampton (SOU). Similar data for the U.S. was
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taken from the Compliance Activity Tracking System (CATS), which are
provided by the FAA. These particular airports were chosen because they
represent the top eight of the top thirty largest airports in the U.S. They are
Atlanta Hartsfield (ATL), Chicago O’Hare International (ORD),
Dallas/Fort Worth International (DFW), Denver International (DEN),
Detroit Metro Wayne (DTW), Los Angeles International (LAX), Newark
International (EWR) and San Francisco International (SFO).
In addition, operational data for BAA are provided by Civil Aviation
Authority (CAA) of the United Kingdom and data for the U.S. were
obtained from the Aviation and Aerospace Almanac of the corresponding
year. Financial data include operating costs, profits, and revenues.
Operational data consists of a number of annual movements and passenger
and cargo statistics. Data used in this analysis include: airport gates (G;
American Association of Airport Executives, 1994-2000), number of
annual enplaned passengers (PAX), Purchase price of airport (PP),
purchase price per enplaned passenger per year (PPAX), runway capacity
(RWY; AirNav, 2002). The results of assessing airport operations are an
important benchmarking tool, which can be applied for many different
purposes such as external and internal comparison and airport valuation
modeling.
There are several methods for measuring airport performance; however,
four common methods are ratio analysis, regression analysis, data
envelopment analysis (DEA) and total factor productivity (TFP). The
empirical study for this research is based on the first two.
Ratio Analysis
This technique is one of the first mechanisms that can be used in the
airport industry for measuring airport performance.
Regression Analysis
This approach basically measures the relationship between several
exogenous variables and their impacts on airport productivity, efficiency,
and profitability. One of the problems associated with regression analysis is
that several factors, such as capital assets, are hard to measure.
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
An alternative method available for situations in which outputs are not
easily defined is the DEA. This procedure applies linear programming in
which multiple inputs and multiple outputs are converted into a scalar
measure of relative productive efficiency. In a DEA analysis we assume
there are a finite number of airports to be evaluated. In the production
process, an airport uses several different inputs to produce its outputs
(Martine & Roman, 2001). Additional advantages of DEA are its ability to
benchmark members of the efficient set used to effect these evaluations and
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identify these sources of inefficiency, and its ability to identify sources of
inefficiency in each input and output (Cooper, Seiford & Tone, 2002).
Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
This method measures productivity of all inputs involved in the
production process, which allows for measuring cost-efficiency and cost-
effectiveness (difference being in the selection of the measure of output). It
is also possible to examine economies of scale and density as well as
investigate the impact of variations of input and output prices on an
airport’s performance (Gillen & Lall, 1997). TFP allows us to distinguish
productivity differences in airports that arise from economies of scale as
opposed to those differences resulting from managerial performance.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The achievement of efficiency depends on the framework of competition
and regulation in which the privatized airport operates. Privatization
enhances economic efficiency if it sharpens corporate incentive to cut costs
and improve productivity (Vasigh & Haririan, 1996). This research
investigates if there is any superiority of private ownership over public
airports.
The purpose of this study is to compare efficiency of privatized and
government owned airports. The British airports, owned by BAA, are used
as a sample of the privatized airports. The sample includes three London
airports: LHR, LGW, and STN, as well as GLA, EDI, ABZ, and SOU. The
sample of the non-privatized airports consist of the U.S. airports ATL,
ORD, DFW, DEN, DTW, LAX, EWR, and SFO. The sample airports are
compared in two areas of efficiency—operating and financial. Some of the
limitations of this comparison are economics of scope, pricing strategy,
framework of regulation, and business objectives which all vary
considerably among private and state-owned airports. Monopoly power
could create economies or diseconomies of scope (Bailey & Friedlaen,
1982).
Operating efficiency is assessed with ratios that reflect combinations of
inputs and outputs. The number of gates and the area of runways (in square
meters) at each airport are used as measures of input. The number of gates
for the BAA airports was estimated using the number of aircraft stands in
each airport. Number of passenger throughput and number of the aircraft
movements are used as measures of output. Operating efficiency ratios, that
is, passengers per gate, passengers per runway area, movements per gate
and movements per runway area, are presented in Table 1. Table 1 presents
the means of the ratios for all airports in each sampleprivatized and non-
privatized. The last column provides t-statistics of the difference. Mean
ratios for two types of ownership are tested to see whether there is any
difference in operating efficiency. In this comparison t-test is used. T-
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statistics of the difference for the means with critical value are compared at
98 percent confidence interval. For all ratios in question, except passengers
per gate, there is a statistically significant difference in ratios for
government and privately owned airports. Hence, government owned
airports had better operating efficiency in passengers per runway area (see
Figure 3), movements per gate, and movements per runway (see Figure 2).
Financial efficiency is studied through the comparison of the mean
ratios of revenue per gate, revenue per runway (figure 4), cost per runway
(figure 6), and cost per gate. This comparison is for two independent and
unrelated samples of state owned enterprise airports and private ones. The
t-statistics for the first three ratios suggest that there is a statistically
significant difference between two types of enterprises at the 98 percent
confidence interval. For these three ratios, public enterprises had better
financial efficiency than their private counterparts (see Table 2).
Another method to assess efficiency used in the research is the
multivariable regression. There are four regression functions derivedone
for operational and three for financial efficiency. The operations efficiency
function considers passengers per runway ratio as a dependent variable and
operational revenue, cost and ownership as independent variables.
Ownership is a dummy variable, which indicates if the airport is private or
state owned. The first financial efficiency function uses a revenue/cost ratio
(see Figure 1) as the dependent variable. Number of passengers, aircraft
movements (operations), gates, area of runways, and ownership are used as
independent variables. The second function for financial efficiency
includes revenue per passenger ratio (see Figure 5) as a dependent variable
and number of aircraft movements, gates, runways, and ownership as
independent variables. In the third financial efficiency function, cost per
runway is the dependent variable, and operating revenue, number of
passengers, and ownership are independent variables. For privatized
airports, cost per runway is lower than that for public airports. The number
of passengers per runway is also higher for public airports as compared to
privatized airports (based on our samples). The results of the multivariable
regression are shown in Table 3. The last column provides adjusted R2.
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Table 1. Univariate Test of Operational Efficiency of Government versus
Private Airports
Ratio Government Owned Privately Owned T-Statistics
Airports Airports of Difference
Number of annual enplaned
passengers/ Airport Gates 218,869 163,776 -1.68
Number of annual enplaned
passengers/Runway Capacity 36.22 16.88 -3.39
Movements/Gate 6,053 3,538 -75.91
Movements/Runway 0.985976057 0.254008829 -6.95
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Table 2. Univariate Test of Financial Efficiency of Government versus Private
Airports
Ratio Government Owned Privately Owned T-Statistics
Airports Airports of Difference
Revenue/Gate 2,955,101 2,006,063 -3.60
Revenue/Runway 462 189 -11.30
Cost/Gate 1,473,646 1,242,548 -1.51
Cost/Runway 233 117 -5.74
Figure 1: Revenue-Cost Ratios: U.S. , U.K. Airports
Comparison
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Figure 2: Landing per Runway: U.S. , U.K. Airports
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Figure 4: Revenue Per Landing: U.S. , U.K. Airports
Comparison
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Figure 5: Revenue Per Passenger: U.S. , U.K. Airports
Comparison
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Figure 3: Passenger per Runway: U.S. , U.K. Airports
Comparison
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CONCLUSION
Our study demonstrates that cost per landing and cost per passengers of
BAA airports are higher than the sample of U.S. airports. The empirical
results regarding operational efficiency reflect the statistically different
ratios for government versus privatized airports. Countries that have
privatized airports generally impose some form of price regulation or
landing fees. The UK has allowed a form of market-based pricing by
permitting airports to charge airlines higher landing fees during peak traffic
times. Hence, privatization is not successful for insuring that citizens get
the services they require from government at lower cost. Revenue per
passenger and revenue per landing for privatized airports of UK is higher
than the sample of non-privatized airports. The Reason Foundation, a
privatization advocate, points to labor productivity growth at airports in the
UK as evidence of private airports ability to operate more efficiently.
However, private airports’ monopoly power could also be a source of
increase in revenue and profit. Profitability is the result of the relationship
between the regulatory controls, choice of market to serve, market power,
and productivity.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Airport Privatization Transactions Anticipated in 2001
Airport Purchaser Percentage Date
Amsterdam Schipol Airport Public Flotation 75.8% Oct 2001
Frankfurt Airport (Fraport AG) Public Flotation Pending Mid 2001
Airport Authority of Thailand Pending Pending End 2001
Sources:
Fraport, A.G., (2000, November 9). Frankfort Airport Company Completes DM26.5 Million Procurement
Project for Uzbekistan. Press release.
Available: www.fraport.com/en/press/pressindex.html
Fraport, A.G. (2001, February 14). Lima Partners Take Over Perus Main Airport. Press release. Available:
www.fraport.com/en/press/pressindex.html
The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1289. (2001). Airport World Privatization News 5(6), 6.
Hochtief buy of Hamburg airport approved by Hamburg City Council (2000, October 13). Financial
Times.
Stewart International Airport. (1999, January 8). Final Application under the Airport Privatization Pilot
Program to the NYSDOT.
Available: http://www.stewartairport.com/links.html
Thailand to Delay Privatization of Some State Enterprises. (2002, August 1). Xinua News Agency.
Retrieved from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/index.htm
Utt, R.D. (1999, June 4). FAA reauthorization: Time to Chart a course for privatizing airports.
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Table A2. Private Involvement in Airport Management
Contract Type Company Management Contract Lease Contract/Ownership
Lockheed Air Terminal/
Airport Group
International/ TBI Plc.1
Albany, NY
Burbank, CA
Atlanta (International
Concourse)
Toronto (Terminal 3)
(Canada)
Belfast (Ireland)
Cardiff (UK)
Stockholm-Skavsta (Sweden)
Orlando Sanford (USA)
Santa Cruz (Bolivia)
Cochabamba (Bolivia)
La Paz (Bolivia)
Minority Holdings:
Perth (Australia) 16%
Northern Territory 20%
Hobart 30%
London-Luton (25%)
American Port Services2 White
Plains/Westchester, NY
Branson Airport, MI
Republic, NY Tweed
New Haven Regional, CN
Teterboro, NJ Atlantic
City, NJ
National Express3 Stewart Intl., NY East
Midlands Airport (UK)
Bournemouth (UK)
Indianapolis Intl., IN London Heathrow (UK)
BAA, Plc.4 Harrisburg, PA Mauritius,
Partly (retail/catering)
Boston Logan, MA
Newark NJ Pittsburgh,
PA (also consulting)5
London Gatwick (UK)
Stanstead (UK) Glasgow (UK)
Edinburgh (UK) Aberdeen
(UK) South Hampton (UK)
Melbourne (Australia)
Launceston Airport (Australia)
(as part of the APAC
consortium, 15.1% share).
Naples, Italy
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Table A3. Airport Privatization Transactions, Cost and Activities (1997-2001)
Number
of annual
enplaned Purchase
Percentage Sales passengers Price
Country Airport Purchaser Purchased Date (in millions) (million US$)
Australia Adelaide Manchester 100 March 1998 1.8 238
Brisbane Schipol 100 July 1997 5.1 1,100
Canberra Local Consortium 100 March 1998 0.9 44
Coolangata Manchester 100 March 1998 1.0 70
Hobart AGI (TGI PLC) 100 March 1998 0.5 24
Launceston BAA 100 March 1998 0.3 11
Melbourne BAA 100 July 1997 6.7 1,100
Perth AGI (TGI PLC) 100 Juy 1997 2.2 495
Argentina6 Ogden/SEA 100 February 1998 7.8 1,400
Milan
Bolivia7 La Paz AGI (TGI PLC) N/A March 1997 1.2 N/A
Santa Cruz
Cochabamba
Germany Dusseldorf Hochteif/ 50 January 1998 7.5 208
Aer Rianta
Hamburg Hochteif/ 36 October 2000 9.5 256
International Aer Rianta
Greece8 Athens Intl. Hochteif/ 45 March 2001 N/A 1,833
Airport S.A. Aer R. /Fraport
Italy Naples BAA 70 August 1997 1.5 32
Rome Public Flotation 45 July 1997 11.9 344
Mexico9 Copenhagen 15 November 1998 4.7 116
Malaysia Public Offering 28 November 1999 32.7 130
Airports
Holdings10
New Zealand Auckland Public Flotation 52 July 1998 3.4 232
Wellington Infratil 66 August 1998 1.6 49
Peru Lima Jorge Fraport/Bechtel/ 43 February 2001 2.2 6.4
Chavez Intl. Cosapi
South Africa Aeroporti 20 March 1998 8.1 165
di Roma
UK Birmingham Aer Rianta 40 March 1997 2.7 58
USA11 Stewart National Express 100 September 2000 0.3 35
International
Vasigh and Haririan 109
1 TBI Plc. acquired Airport Group International (AGI) in September 1999 for a price of L190 million.
2 In March 1997, American Port Services (APS) bought the majority of Johnson Controls airport and fleet
maintenance. In 1998, Associated British Ports, Plc., purchased ASP.
3 Information provided on company homepage (www.nationalexpressgroup.co.uk) as of Dec 6, 2000.
4 Based on information publicly provided on BAA homepage (www.BAA.co.uk) as of December 6, 2000.
5 BAA has been awarded a contract for Pittsburgh Airport, to review the current cargo business and
international passenger routes and to develop strategic plans to maximize the full potential of the airport.
6 30-year concession for 33 airports. The purchase price is based upon the present value of guaranteed
annual rent payments of $171.1 million.
7 La Paz, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba were offered for a 25-year concession with annual payments to be
made. AGI bid 20.8% of gross revenues.
8 30 year concession under a BOT scheme.
9 50-year concession for nine airports in the southeast. (including Cancun).
10 MAHB has a 30 year management contract for 36 of Malaysia’s airports, as well as a 50-year lease
agreement for Kuala Lumpur International Airport.
11 99-year lease contract under the FAA pilot privatization program.
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WHO SOARS IN OPEN SKIES?
A REVIEW OF THE IMPACTS OF ANTI-TRUST
IMMUNITY, AND INTERNATIONAL MARKET
DEREGULATION ON GLOBAL ALLIANCES,
CONSUMERS, AND POLICY MAKERS
Andrew Stober
Center for Global Development
Washington DC
ABSTRACT
The past decade has seen a proliferation of global airline alliances. A significant shift
in two government economic policies, international market deregulation (open skies)
and the granting of anti-trust immunity to alliances has made these unions a reality.
These policy shifts have affected the tripartite relationship between government,
airlines, and consumers. This article reviews the analysis by the U.S. Department of
Transportation (2000a), Brueckner (2001) and Oum (2001), and builds a link between
open skies policy and findings of lower fares, higher revenues, higher profits, and
service improvements. The article suggests that U.S. policy makers advanced the
open skies agenda through foreign coalition building and multilateral agreements.
INTRODUCTION
The intersection of public policy and business is, arguably, nowhere
greater than in international air transport. Since the late 1970s, it has been
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) policy to pursue increasingly
liberal agreements with foreign aviation partners. Such agreements are
typified by open skies accords, which allow for the economically
liberalized transport of passengers and cargo between the U.S., its partner
countries and beyond. These agreements extricate traditional restrictions
on frequency, capacity and gateways for airlines of the participating
nations. The U.S. has signed 56 such agreements, constituting more than
half of all U.S. bilateral aviation agreements (DOT, 2001). In the DOT’s
1995 Statement of United States International Air Transportation Policy
the commitment to open skies was reiterated and international alliances
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were endorsed as a means to achieve the goal of expanded international
aviation. The DOT’s Office of Aviation and International Affairs has
recognized that modern airlines require “…a higher quality and quantity of
supporting route authority than they have sought in the past” (DOT, 1995).
The past decade has seen a proliferation of global airline alliances, largely
motivated by increasing demand for worldwide service (GAO, 1995).
Alliances take a variety of forms. The most common are isolated codeshare
agreements and broad-based strategic alliances. The former have existed
for many years and involve the creation of on-line travel by partner airlines
selling a single ticket over a route where both airlines’ aircraft are used.
Each airline sets it own fares and, depending on the institutional
arrangement, the carriers may share costs. Broad-based strategic alliances
have experienced a recent surge in popularity. These alliances offer on-line
service from and to many or all of their member airlines’ destinations. For
the carriers involved, these relationships may include schedule planning,
revenue and cost sharing, and joint marketing efforts. The schedule and fare
planning features of strategic alliances are available only to those alliances
that receive immunity from antitrust laws. This immunity is granted by the
DOT.
A convergence of two DOT policies, international market deregulation
and the granting of antitrust immunity to strategic alliances, has made these
unions a reality. The first section of this document provides a historical
context for current policy. The second section provides an explanation of
why airlines have formed alliances. Assessments of the impact of policy on
airlines, consumers and public policy are offered in the third, fourth and
fifth sections.
The implications of current trends on these constituents are important to
understanding the holistic impact of current policy. For consumers,
improved service and lower fares are of top priority. Shareholders covet
improved earnings and higher share prices. U.S. public policy makers are
committed to fostering a competitive marketplace where consumers receive
good value and business thrives.
THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORTATION REGULATION
Introduction
Not long after the Wright brothers took flight in 1903, it became
apparent that the world community would need parameters to guide this
new mode of transport. The first multinational meeting on international air
transport regulation convened under the aegis of French government in
Paris in 1910. Scheduled international service between Paris and London
commenced in 1919, and it became increasingly apparent that government
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regulation of international air transport would be a complex mix of foreign
and economic policies.
Chicago: Open Skies Round One and the Agreements
The interceding two decades saw significant advances in aviation
technology and production. These developments made aviation an
increasingly relevant component of foreign and economic relations. On
November 1, 1944, representatives of 53 allied or neutral states gathered in
Chicago to explore, as the U.S. government described it, “The principle to
be followed in setting up a permanent international aeronautical body and a
multilateral convention dealing with the field of air transport, air
navigation, and aviation technical subjects.” (De Murias, 1989, p. 45 )
The U.S. called for the adoption of multilateral open skies. Free
competition in civil international air transport was to be the hallmark of
such an agreement. The chief American representative, Adolf Berle, called
for what he coined an open sky charter (Sochor, 1991). Berle feared that any
quota or limitations on civil aviation would lead to cartels that could
oppress the rights of passengers and shippers to purchase service in a
competitive marketplace.
Most nations believed Berle’s proposal would allow Americans to
command international aviation because of their dominant position. In
response to this criticism, Berle offered to supply thousands of surplus
warplanes to nations struggling to develop civil aviation (De Murias, 1989).
The Times newspaper of London accused Berle and the U.S. of using a big
stick in an effort to force acceptance of its position.
The Rise and Fall of the International Air Transport Association
Nine months after the close of the Chicago Convention, an act of
Canadian Parliament incorporated the International Air Transport
Association (IATA). The Association existed as a unique trade association
in that it was established and supported by governments to accomplish a
task, which under bilateral agreements was the function of governments.
Taneja (1988) cites three reasons why the U.S. initially approved of IATA’s
activities. Since the U.S. had minimal power to establish international rates,
it would not be in that country’s interests to have foreign nations
unilaterally establish rates for U.S. carriers. The organization offered a high
degree of transparency and the right of refusal, so it could not be deemed a
price fixing cartel. Finally, it allowed European carriers to keep fares at a
level that guaranteed the development of their flag carriers.
In 1955, IATA received permanent antitrust immunity from the U.S.
government. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the organization authority
continued to be recognized by a variety of foreign governments and
commissions. On June 9, 1978, as domestic deregulation was taking hold,
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the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) issued a show cause order as to why
IATA should continue to receive antitrust immunity. As a result of the order
immunity was continued for tariff coordination and conferences, but under
a set of significantly more liberal conditions. At this point IATA was
reorganized into a tiered organization, one tier acting as a trade association,
the other tier in charge of tariff coordination. As explained later in this
article, tariff coordination has played a significantly smaller role in the
organization over the past two decades.
Postwar Bilateral Agreements and the American Upper Hand
In 1946, the U.S. and U.K met in Bermuda to sign a bilateral aviation
agreement. The gravity of the Bermuda Agreement, as it was known, was
not to be underestimated, for it served as the model for all other bilateral
agreements until its renegotiation in 1976. The Bermuda Agreement’s
provisions specifically outlined which routes and cities airlines could
operate over and between. The British favored fare and tariff determination
by nations, but as a conciliation to the Americans, the British allowed for
the determination of fares and tariffs by IATA and to allow carriers to
determine the frequency and capacity of their flights. The Bermuda
Agreement also granted fifth freedom rights to both nations, allowing them
to carry passengers from the U.K. or the U.S. to a third nation.
Bermuda II and Open Skies Round Two
In 1976, Great Britain announced the termination of the Bermuda
Agreement. Britain’s primary objection to the agreement was that U.S.
carriers were able to transport a disproportionate share of traffic across the
North Atlantic. The possibility of U.S.-U.K. routes being paralyzed
pressured the U.S. to adopt the Bermuda II Agreement in 1977. Under
Bermuda II, multiple carrier designations were virtually eliminated,
capacity controls were put in place, and U.S. fifth freedom rights were
sacrificed.
The Carter administration, frustrated by Bermuda II and commencing
deregulation of the domestic market, returned to Berle’s goal of an open
skies policy. In early 1978, the DOT released “Policy for the Conduct of
International Air Transport.” The document was all but a renunciation of
Bermuda II, declaring, “[America will seek] trade competitive
opportunities, rather than restrictions and pursue our interest in expanded
air transportation and reduced prices” (Toh, 1998). By the middle of the
year CAB took the provocative step of issuing a show cause order to IATA.
The order required IATA to defend the premise that its structure of
international tariffs remained in the public interest and should continue to
receive antitrust immunity. Congress passed and Carter signed the
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International Air Transportation Competition Act (IATCA) the following
year (Public Law 96-192).
The act was a far-reaching policy declaration. As shown in the Goals for
International Aviation Policy section, the act calls for a “negotiating policy
which emphasizes the greatest degree of competition that is compatible
with a well-functioning international air transport system” (Public Law 96-
192[s>1300], 1979). The act goes on specifically to direct the State and
Transportation Departments to negotiate agreements and consult to the
maximum extent practicable with the Commerce and Defense departments,
as well as all other key players in the formulation of both broad policy goals
and individual negotiations.
The Carter Administration witnessed limited reform during its single
term. In 1977, when Carter took office, Pan Am and TWA were the only
U.S. airlines to operate transatlantic service. Upon its departure in January
1981, Delta and Northwest had initiated passenger service on the North
Atlantic route.
CURRENT REGULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
The Open Skies Era: Open Skies Round Three
Since 1980, the DOT has aggressively pursued open skies agreements.
The first such agreement was with the Netherlands in 1992. Today, the U.S.
is engaged in 56 bilateral open skies agreements. At the 2000 Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit a one-of-a-kind multilateral open
skies accord was signed by the U.S., Chile, Singapore, New Zealand, and
Brunei (Office of the Press Secretary, 2000). Not all negotiations have met
open skies objectives. Negotiations with the U.S.’s largest international
aviation partner, the U.K., have failed to bring about open skies, as have
negotiations with the largest Pacific partner, Japan. Other major trading
partners with which the DOT has yet to reach open skies accords include
China, Australia, Brazil, and Russia. DOT takes a carrot-and-stick
approach to encouraging agreement. Incentives (carrots) are offered to
countries willing to sign open skies agreements, particularly antitrust
immunity of international alliances. At the same time, as a punishment
(sticks), antitrust immunity for international alliances has been conditional
on the signing of an open skies agreement. In the case of the
Northwest/KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (NW/KLM) alliance, open skies
originated prior to the development of the alliance. The 1996 agreement
with Germany made clear to German authorities that if Lufthansa desired
antitrust immunity for its existing alliance with United, an open skies
accord was a prerequisite. Grants of antitrust immunity are phenomenally
valuable to carriers, because it is not only a guarantee an absence of
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government interference, but immunity also prevents private antitrust
actions.
The Granting of Antitrust Immunity
Immunity is not granted simply for abiding by antitrust laws. To pursue
and maintain the public interest, immunity is approved only after a
competitive analysis is conducted and caveats to the immunity are
prescribed.
Approval is granted based on an alliance’s enhancing or negligible effect
on competition and public benefits it could provide. To determine public
benefits, the DOT performs an analysis of a proposed alliance’s
competitive effect. For instance, the competitive analysis of a proposed
1999 alliance between NW and Malaysian Airlines (MH) examined three
markets: a) U.S., b) Far East-U.S. city pairs and c) Malaysia and direct U.S-
Malaysia city pairs. The proposed alliance was not found to diminish
competition in the U.S.-Far East market. The proposed alliance would
control about a 19% market share, 4% less than the STAR Alliance’s1 share
of this market (DOT, 2000b). The alliance partners are currently the only
airlines of each nation to serve the U.S.-Malaysia market; despite this, the
DOT found that their alliance would not enable either partner to engage in
supra-competitive pricing. Since neither carrier provides non-stop service,
it was felt that third-country airlines offering on-line connections would
provide sufficient competition. The DOT is required by law to determine
the effect on the public interest of all coordination agreements. The DOT
perceives the public interest to promote open skies agreements and greater
competition.
The most significant restrictions require that both carriers withdraw
from any IATA tariff conference activities that affect or discuss any
proposed through fares, rates or charges applicable between the U.S. and
any country designating a carrier that has been or is subsequently granted
antitrust immunity to participate in similar alliances (DOT, 2000b). This
means a foreign carrier can no longer (if it already does) participate in IATA
pricing agreements between the U.S. and any international points. The
requirement is mandated to assure that the competition immunity it is
expected to create is not undermined by price coordination. This policy
serves to further weaken IATA’s rate and tariff role worldwide.
An examination of airline competition studies ownership interests in
computer reservations systems (CRS). When an alliance agreement
includes carriers that own shares in competing CRS, immunity is not
afforded to this sphere of marketing, as it is likely to reduce competition.
Consistent with other immunity agreements, foreign carriers are required to
provide extensive origin and destination (O/D) data for all passenger
itineraries that contain a U.S. point on an ongoing basis. U.S. carriers
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already provide this data to DOT; all O/D information is treated in
confidence by DOT. This information allows department officials to track
the effects of alliances on market share and competition.
EVOLUTION OF ALLIANCES
As a mature industry with heavy capital investments and slim profit
margins, both the domestic and international airline industries are ripe for
consolidation. The spate of mergers, acquisitions and bankruptcies that
followed domestic deregulation has evolved into a period of rationalization
where the remaining large U.S. carriers have sought to strengthen their
position by attempting to acquire (in full or part) competing firms, the most
recent being the ill-fated United-US Airways partnership and the purchase
of TWA by American Airlines. However, with regulators reluctant to
approve mergers or acquisitions among domestic carriers, alliances have
proven an attractive alternative for carriers like Continental, Northwest and
America West. The alliances allow the carriers to please customers, satisfy
stockholders and keep government regulators at bay.
Internationally, the airline industry is perhaps the only global industry to
remain with exclusively national companies. Regulators do not even have
the option to approve international mergers, because national ownership
requirements prevent foreigners or foreign corporations from owning
airlines based in another country. Current U.S. law is typical of most
industrialized nations, limiting foreign ownership of airlines to a 25%
stake. The tremendous international consolidation of pharmaceutical,
telecommunication and maritime firms could serve as a model for airlines
in the absence of such ownership requirements. However, since the removal
of such restrictions is unlikely, airlines opt for alliances as a means of
partially realizing the potential mergers offer.
The attraction for major U.S. airlines to enter such relationships is to
access markets they could not afford to serve alone. Motivated by
increasing international tourism and the globalization of business, the
principle growth opportunity for U.S. airlines is in the international sector.
Total passenger traffic between the U.S. and foreign destinations increased
by 248% from 1980 through 2000; and from 39.5 million in 1980 to 137.3
million in 2000. IATA predicts 226 million passengers will fly in 2010.
U.S. airlines have enjoyed a growing share of the international market.
In 1980, U.S. carriers carried 49% of the traffic between the U.S. and
foreign destinations; by 1993 the figure had grown to 53%. Since 1993 the
percentage of passengers carried by U.S. carriers has decreased slightly to
51%, likely precipitated by the carriage of passengers on codeshare flights.
In the year 2000, only 8 of the top 50 U.S.-foreign markets experienced a
reduction in passengers. Total growth in the top 50 markets was 7% from
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1999 to 2000 (DOT, n.d.). Revenue share information is not available, but
the U.S. share of revenues may actually be higher than the passenger
carried share. It is important to note that domestic market growth pales in
comparison to the growth possibilities in the international sector. The major
U.S. carriers have aggressively pursued these international opportunities by
founding alliance networks. Generally, such alliances do not create overlap
and simply serve to extend a carrier’s reach without negatively affecting
competition.
Types of Alliances
The international alliance movement has evolved in the past decade to
more than codesharing on a few flights with limited airlines to broad-based
strategic alliances. Codesharing simply allows partner airlines to list flights
operated by the other as its own. Strategic alliances allow partners to
maximize their geographic scope, level of operating and marketing
integration, and revenues. The first strategic global alliance was between
NW and KLM . This broad-based alliance involved the full integration of
each carrier’s networks, market planning/pricing, promotion,
administrative activities and other activities. The alliance touches such a
variety of corporate functions that some industry experts have labeled it a
de facto merger. For instance, KLM no longer has reservation offices in the
U.S.; all reservation services are handled by NW, and vice versa in Europe.
Oum (2001) finds that strategic alliances led to productivity gains on the
average of 5%. The carriers almost immediately saw the fruits of their
arrangement. In the first three years of their agreement, they experienced a
3.5% point jump in market share from 7.0% to 11.5% (GAO, 1995). By
1999, their market share of Atlantic flights has decreased to 9.0%; however,
with their newest partners Alitalia and Continental, they control
approximately 17.0% of the market. The increase in market share led to
significant increases in revenues for both carriers, $100 million for KLM
and between $125 and $175 million for NW (GAO, 1995). The revenue
sharing formula is based on an agreed prorated formula accounting for the
miles each airline flies on alliance routes. The alliance’s effect on profits is
unclear; that said, Oum found that strategic alliances improved partner
airlines profitability by 1.4%.
Since the creation of the NW/KLM alliance, others have followed suit.
Today, the top three U.S. carriers—United, Delta, and American—are all
involved in global strategic alliances. In 1997, United was a founding
member of the world’s largest airline alliance, the STAR alliance. The
OneWorld alliance was founded in 1998, with American Airlines as a
charter member. Delta left the Atlantic Excellence alliance with Swiss Air
and Sabena in early 1999 to create a global alliance called SkyTeam with
Air France, Korean Air, and Aeromexico later that same year. These three
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carriers have taken a relatively uniform approach to alliance development,
with each alliance being founded by an American, European and Asian
carrier. Each has grown since it founding and summary statistics for each
carrier are shown in table 1.
A Non-Global Approach
For carriers not participating in strategic alliances, there are a number of
alliance alternatives. After the demise of its equity alliance with British
Airways, US Airways has chosen a regional alliance approach. Essentially,
US Airways applies the commuter model to its international service. The
carrier operates all transatlantic service on its own aircraft and connects to
Deutche BA flights in Frankfurt and Munich. These Deutche BA flights
serve regional centers in Germany on behalf of US Airways.
TWA adopted a hybrid approach in its alliances with Royal Jordanian
and Kuwait Airways, offering service across the Atlantic to Amsterdam,
Amman and Kuwait City with onward connections to regional business and
cultural centers. TWA was traditionally the leading U.S. carrier to the
Middle East and these alliances affirmed their position in the region.
Alliance Membership: A Means to an End
Alliances serve as a strategic means to achieve increased profitability
(Oum & Yu, 1998). The dynamic nature of international air transportation
means that in the absence of significant equity sharing membership may
shift as fluidly as contracts allow. The 1990s were a period of frequent
formation and dilution of alliances. This trend appears to have moderated
with the turn of the millennium, but the growing pressure of a slowing
global economy may spur a close examination of the bottom line benefits of
alliances. With the understanding established in this section, the effects of
alliance membership are discussed in the following sections. A detailed
examination and summary of current research on the effects on consumers
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Table 1. 1999 Major Alliance Statistics
Group Global
Launch # of Passengers Revenues Market Share
Alliance Date Members (ml) (bn) (pax)
Wings 1989 2 71.6 $16.8 4.6%
STAR 1997 13 292.7 $69.6 18.8%
oneworld 1998 8 199.3 $50.0 12.8%
SkyTeam 1999 4 175 $5.4 11.2%
Source: O’Toole, Kevin. (2000, July) The Global Groupings. Airline Business. 50-51
immediately follows this section. Finally, a discussion of implications for
public policy is presented.
THE EFFECT ON CONSUMERS
The proliferation of immunized alliances and expansion of open skies
agreements has important implications for consumers. The implications are
best divided into two categories: service and fares. Service considers
markets offered (city pairs), flight frequency and the host of difficult-to-
quantify conveniences that alliances provide. Fares are understood in the
simpler context of changes in fares as a result of these trends.
Literature Review
In June 2000 (revised March 2001), University of Illinois professor Jan
K. Brueckner published an assessment focusing on the effect codesharing,
alliance formation and antitrust immunity has on fares. The assessment was
titled “International Airfares in the Age of Alliances: The Effects of
Codesharing and Antitrust Immunity.” Brueckner’s report used DOT data
to show successively increasing decreases in fares with implementation of
codesharing, alliance creation and antitrust immunity. A report by the
DOT’s Office of Aviation and International affairs, issued in October 2000,
takes a more holistic look at the effect of alliances and open skies
agreements on U.S.-European travel. The report found significant
improvements in service and reductions in fares.
Among other formal assessments are three published by the DOT (1995,
2000b, 2001), one by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1995) , a half
dozen or so academic articles, and a Canadian Transport Act Review report
by Oum (2001) that summarizes the results of an extensive econometric
study performed in 1999. The reports issued by DOT concern the Canadian
open skies agreement and developments in the transatlantic market. All of
the DOT reports praise the advances made in open skies agreements and
antitrust immunity and find benefits for industry and consumers. The GAO
report was released in 1995, and, though generally supportive, expresses
concerns about the anticompetitive effects international alliances may have
on the domestic industry. The academic articles approach the issue from a
variety of economic and legal perspectives and, in general, are supportive
of current trends.
Fares
Before a discussion of specific assessments, it is important to
understand how international fares are constructed. The simplest fares are
those on a single carrier; as discussed in the regulation section, in most
circumstances the carrier is free to establish a fare it believes to be
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economically viable. Fares for interline travel (travel involving multiple
carriers) are heavily dependent on cooperation between the carriers. The
level of cooperation is, of course, limited by antitrust laws. The traditional
pricing structure relies on fares generated by IATA’s fare conferences. The
carriers meet under the auspices of IATA and establish interline fares for a
multiplicity of international city-pairs. Total revenue is divided by the
airlines providing the service on a distance-based prorate basis. With the
decreasing importance and relevance of IATA’s fare making authority,
airlines have developed their own interline pricing scheme, called a special
prorate agreement. The agreements have each carrier specify the revenue it
requires to carry a passenger on its portion of the route; the ticketing carrier
then charges the combined fare and divides the revenues accordingly. This
arrangement serves as the foundation for most codesharing agreements.
The final pricing option, cooperative pricing, is open exclusively to carriers
that have been granted antitrust immunity. Cooperative pricing, as the name
indicates, allows the carriers to share proprietary information and establish
a joint fare for given city pairs. Alliances implementing cooperative pricing
negotiate revenue and cost-sharing policies to meet the needs of the
participating carriers.
Implications of Fare Structures
Each fare structure arrangement carries certain micro-economic
implications; non-cooperative pricing does not maximize joint profit and
leads to higher fares. By contrast, cooperative arrangements internalize
negative externalities of a two-carrier trip and lead to lower fares
(Brueckner, 2001). The IATA multilateral fare conference structure
accentuates the diseconomies of the non-cooperative models. IATA
unanimity rules allow each carrier a right of refusal on proposed fares, so
fares are driven up to accommodate the costs of inefficient firms. The
bilateral structure of special prorate agreements leads to fares lower than
those formulated by IATA, but still possesses the negative externalities of
non-cooperative arrangements. The establishment of joint fares, protected
by immunity from antitrust prosecution, allows carriers to maximize joint
profits, ultimately providing the lowest possible fare to consumers. While
immunity arrangements could lead to collusive practices, they are granted
because it is believed such activity will not occur.
Brueckner’s Assessment
Brueckner’s (2001) analysis concentrates on the effect codesharing and
antitrust immunity have on international interline passenger fares. Utilizing
DOT passenger O/T data, the paper discretely measures the effect of
codesharing and antitrust immunity and then reconciles the effect when the
policies are implemented in conjunction. The study’s data is taken from the
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third quarter of the 1999 Passenger Origin and Destination Survey. The
survey represents a 10% sample of all airline tickets where at least one
route segment is flown on a U.S. carrier. The data includes O/T airport,
fares and number of passengers observed paying a given fare. Most
importantly, the data shows both the ticketing and operating carrier,
allowing for examination of codeshared operations. The original data set
contained in excess of 750,000 records with at least one non-U.S. airport;
however, after controlling for relevant data, the final analysis set contained
54,687 observations of itineraries in 17,518 city-pair markets. Brueckner
studied a carrier variable, examining the 74 most frequently appearing
carriers, the effect of alliances (using the four predominate alliances in
19992) and the effect of immunity (among the carriers who enjoyed
immunity in the third quarter of 19993).
Findings. The study provides a number of interesting findings in regards
to the behavior of alliance and immunized carriers. The percentage of
codeshare operations among non-alliance, alliance, and alliance with
immunity carriers is predictable. Only 23% of non-alliance itineraries
involved codesharing. Codeshare itineraries for alliance carries without
immunity were not substantially higher (28%). Immunized alliances
carried the majority of their itineraries on codeshare operations (63%). The
empirical fare findings are of particular interest to consumers. Brueckner
finds that: a) fares are 8-17% lower on codeshare itineraries versus non-
codeshare itineraries; b) fares are 13-21% lower on carriers with antitrust
immunity versus those without; c) fares are 17-30% lower on immunized
codeshare itineraries (codesharing and immunity are substitutes, in that the
combined effect is less then the sum of the parts); and d) fares are 4% lower
on alliance carriers versus non-alliance carriers.
Oum’s Assessment
Oum (2001) analyzes the effect of alliances on productivity, price and
profitability. He uses data from 1986 to 1995 from a panel of 22
international airlines. He does not delineate between immunized and non-
immunized alliances and the data set draws largely on figures prior to
widespread international deregulation of the industry. The econometric
analysis distinguishes between strategic and tactical alliances. The
differences in alliance scope drive three major findings:
1. Strategic alliances enable partner airlines to achieve an average of
5.0% gain in total factor productivity and 1.4% increase in
profitability while being able to lower their prices to consumers an
average of 5.5%.
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2. Improved productivity during the post-alliance period is an important
source of increased profitability for partner airlines as well as a
means to enhancing a carrier’ ability to reduce prices.
3. Tactical alliances do not have statistically significant effects on
partner airlines’ productivity, pricing or profitability.
The Open Skies Connection
Codesharing and antitrust immunity are the most significant reducers of
international airline passengers’ fares. Table 2 illustrates the connection
between the existence of open skies agreements, the granting of antitrust
immunity to alliances, and levels of codesharing between alliance carriers.
The top six alliances in terms of itineraries traveled are all immunized and
involve foreign carriers whose nations have signed open skies agreements
with the U.S. Discounting the Continental-Alitalia and United-Ansett
pairings, the top six alliances in terms of percentage of codeshare
itineraries comprise the same characteristics as the alliances with
corresponding volume data.
DOT’s (2000a) study, “International Aviation Developments (Second
Report): Transatlantic Deregulation: The Alliance Network Effect”
confirms this connection. The study found fare reductions in excess of 20%
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Table 2. Compiled by Author using DOT Data
OSA Foreign
Carriers Flag Nation Immunity #Intineraries Codeshare Itin.
Northwest-KLM Yes Yes 7,671 60.3%
United-Lufthansa Yes Yes 4,771 37.7%
United-Air Canada Yes Yes 3,575 67.0%
American-Canadian Yes Yes 2,591 93.4%
Delta-Swissair Yes Yes 1,683 77.2%
Delta-Sabena Yes Yes 1,511 86.9%
American-British Air NO NO 1,412 0.0%
United-SAS Yes Yes 642 34.9%
American-Qantas NO NO 458 57.4%
United-Air New Zealand Yes NO 390 36.2%
Delta-Austrian Yes Yes 379 81.8%
Continental-Alitalia NO NO 369 74.0%
United-Ansett Australia NO NO 334 73.1%
United-Varig NO NO 253 28.5%
American-Cathay Pacific NO NO 203 0.0%
United-Thai NO NO 151 6.0%
between countries with which the U.S. shares open skies agreements. The
most dramatic fare reductions are for service from interior U.S. points to
airports beyond European hubs and from U.S. gateways to points beyond
European hubs, 24% and 25%, respectively.
Figure 1 demonstrates that open skies agreements have also affected
nations not participating in the schemes, as open skies alliance traffic
competes via hubs onto non-open skies states. As can be expected, the
influence is least in the gateway-to-gateway market, as consumers are
accustomed to non-stop service. Brueckner’s (2001) findings combined
with this information, present a strong case for the pursuit of open skies
agreements and the granting of antitrust immunity to global alliances.
Service
DOT’s report also illuminates the positive effects on service open skies
agreements and international alliances are having in North-Atlantic travel
(DOT, 2000a). The proliferation of open skies bilateral agreements with
European partners has created a more service-competitive transatlantic
structure. These agreements, in combination with grants of antitrust
immunity to alliances, have provided carriers the operating flexibility
necessary to improve and expand services. Improved services have
included both coordinating schedules for connecting flights from behind
and beyond points and an increase in capacity from gateway-to-gateway
markets. This growth has not been limited to alliance carriers. The open
skies agreements have allowed U.S. carriers, particularly Continental
Airlines, to provide head-to-head competition to the larger alliance carriers.
In the past five years, Continental has developed its Newark, New Jersey,
hub to serve 17 European destinations, challenging alliance hubs in four
European cities.
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Case Study: The North-Atlantic Market
Passenger growth in the North-Atlantic market has been significant,
nearly doubling between 1992 and 1999. In 1992, the U.S. signed its first
open skies agreement with the Netherlands. Between 1992 and 1999, 15
agreements were signed with European trading partners (DOT, 2000a).
While the strong economic conditions of the period undoubtedly claim
some credit for passenger growth, the deregulated environment created by
open skies and the increased frequencies provided by alliance carriers are
primarily responsible for the growth. The good economy fails to explain the
incongruent growth experienced in interior markets; Figure 2 details that
this growth is indisputably attributable to the introduction of alliances,
behind-beyond and gateway-beyond growth are overwhelmingly driven by
alliances.
Figure 3 demonstrates the dramatic increases in transatlantic traffic.
Figure 4 illustrates how the increase in passenger volume can largely be
attributed to the creation of alliances under the open skies and immunity
policies. Further, Figure 4 exhibits that growth is promoted by alliances.
The consummation of alliance agreements by United and Delta in 1995
marked the first considerable uptick in growth. The growth accelerated
rapidly with the granting of antitrust immunity in 1996. The non-alliance
traffic growth post-1996 is particularly significant; because it affirms that
alliance growth is not caused by travel diverted from non-alliance airlines,
but in fact represents new traffic. The growth in traffic by non-alliance
carriers post-1996 is largely related to Continental’s expansion and
testimony to the competitive vigor deregulation has brought to the market
place.
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Source: Reproduction of U.S. DOT Chart from International Aviation Developments.
The Impact of Service Expansion
The service expansions promoted by alliances have been of tremendous
benefit to historically underserved cities. The power of linking large
multinational networks, such as those of NW and KLM or United and
Lufthansa, allows convenient affordably priced service to be available
between interior points in North America and interior points in Europe. The
predominance of alliances has created competitive service from many
interior cities. For instance, all four major alliances publish fares and offer
double-connection service between Austin, Texas, and Prague, Czech
Republic. While the number of passengers carried on such a route may be
few, the collective effect of thousands of new city pair markets should not
be underestimated. The DOT found the greatest percentage growth in
traffic has occurred in such markets. One study (DOT, 2000a) found that
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Birmingham, Alabama, experienced a 39% increase in traffic to major
European cities; to smaller European cities, traffic more than doubled.
Figure 5 illustrates that most expansive growth has occurred in these non-
gateway markets.
International aviation policy can have discernable effects on local
economies. Alabama is in a better position than ever to compete with
surrounding states with major international gateways, such as Georgia, for
the U.S. operations of multi-national corporations. The local effects expand
beyond the U.S. to our partners in open skies agreements. The growth in
traffic to interior European destinations has encouraged the development of
European hubs, largely as result of U.S. generated traffic. The growth is
both in terms of destinations served from hubs, as well as new banks of
flights to existing destinations. This growth here and abroad creates jobs
and strengthens local economies.
THE EFFECT ON PUBLIC POLICY
Introduction
In the past year the government’s attention to the airline industry has
focused on security. Prior to the attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon in September 2001, the domestic airline industry was under
scrutiny from a variety of U.S. public policy makers. The government
agencies and bodies involved in oversight included the DOT, the Federal
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Aviation Administration (FAA), the DOT’s Office of the Inspector General,
the Justice Department’s Anti-Trust Division, Congress, and the State
Attorneys General. All of these organizations express a commitment to
fostering a competitive marketplace, where consumers receive good value
and business thrives. As the industry recovers and reorganizes it is likely
this attention will return.
The priorities of public policy makers are meaningfully different from
those of consumers or shareholders. The focus of public policy is to ensure
that a functioning pro-competitive market exists. The government provides
the infrastructure required for the industry to operate (e.g., airports and Air
Traffic Control) and safety regulations and oversight to inspire consumer
confidence. In the past, economic regulation was also a responsibility.
Domestic and international deregulations have largely eliminated this task.
However, public policy leaders remain accountable for the concrete and
steel essentials, as well as, the maintenance of economic components of a
competitive market.
The important international successes, addressed in earlier sections,
occurred while the public’s attention focused on domestic customer service
failures and anticompetitive threats. Today, the mass media’s attention
focuses on security and the sustainability of the industry. The consumer and
business benefits of open skies and immunized alliances require that the
momentum of past success in these areas must continue to be cultivated.
Rodney Slater, former secretary of transportation in the Clinton
administration told the WINGS Club weeks before his departure from the
post, “I strongly believe that in the 21st century, aviation will be the engine
of growth for the world that the Eisenhower Interstate Highway system was
for America during the latter half of the 20th century” (Slater, 2001).
A collection of important international markets with which the U.S.
does not share an open skies agreement exists; the list includes Japan, U.K.,
Spain, China, Brazil, and Russia. The work of the Bush administration in
the early 1990s to develop open skies agreements, and the efforts of the
Clinton administration in spreading the policy to nearly every corner of the
globe, left the present administration with the task of signing these final
deals and moving the nations airline industry and international aviation
relationships into the era of globalization.
Each of the remaining nations presents special challenges. The U.K. and
Japan as the U.S.’s largest aviation trading partners cannot be ignored,
despite the unique challenges they bring to the negotiating table. I propose
a two-pronged approach to building pressure for these and other nations to
sign open skies agreements: internal pressure and noninvolvement in
multilateral agreements. Internal pressure must be developed by working
with business and political interest within each nation to convince them to
sign these agreements, in collaboration with the perceived and quantifiable
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effects of noninvolvement in surrounding multilateral agreements. The
remainder of the section explores how this policy can be implemented.
Foreign Coalition Building
Pressure from the airline of a foreign nation is typically crucial to
winning open skies concessions from a restrictive government. This proved
true in reaching an accord with Germany, where Lufthansa’s desire for
antitrust immunity led the German authorities to agree to open skies. This
approach may be taken a step further by not only convincing carriers to
place pressure on their government’s regulators, but by building energy
from the entire business community for open skies. The State Department’s
role as lead negotiator on aviation agreements will be of benefit in the
pursuit of such a strategy. A convincing case must be presented to opinion
leaders in nations with whom we do not have agreements by U.S.
embassies, the DOT Office of Aviation and International Affairs, the
Department of Commerce and business associations.
Implementation
The DOT, in conjunction with the State Department and the Commerce
Department, should organize an effort to persuade the business
communities of foreign partners to influence their governments to agree to
open skies. Secretary Slater provided significant leadership in this arena,
touring Europe, Africa and Asia to secure agreements. Including the
foreign trade expertise of the Commerce Department to the overall
negotiating strategy is crucial to the success of this approach. Media
efforts, trade missions and commercial links will be the tools used to build
interior pressure for open skies. Media efforts, such as opinion pieces
placed in the national business press of target nations, can play a key role in
influencing target audiences. In addition to media efforts, multi-national
corporations with offices in target countries may be called upon to join
efforts to persuade foreign partners. The role of these companies will be to
lobby other businesses to support open skies. Multinational business
leaders may not feel comfortable lobbying foreign governments on such a
tangential issue; however, building support in the wider business
community is a realistic task for multinationals. The Commerce
Department will be a good resource in developing contacts with these
companies, considering the department’s current support of U.S. business
overseas. U.S. embassies overseas will organize lobbying efforts targeted at
local political leaders. The support of local and regional airports and
aviation authorities will bring authority and legitimacy to the cause.
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Who Will Implement?
The DOT and the State Department, in consultation with the Commerce
Department, will handle target nation selection. After a nation is selected,
the Commerce and State Departments will take the lead in initiating and
developing support within the business and political communities. DOT
will focus on lobbying the aviation community, namely the transport
ministry, as well as, airline and airport executives. These efforts, more than
the multilateral strategy, are likely to require a commitment of additional
resources to DOT and the Commerce Department.
Opposition
The airlines that oppose these agreements are typically government-
owned inefficient operations that fear they can not compete with the highly
efficient American carriers. The recent movement toward broad-based
strategic alliances and the desire to attain antitrust immunity for such
alliances is certainly a source of leverage. The U.S. has not yet pro-actively
marketed anti-trust immunity to the international community. Bringing in
the holdout nations may require taking a proactive stance.
Multilateral Approach
In November 2000, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
summit, then Secretary Slater signed the first-ever multilateral aviation
agreement. The agreement between the U.S., Brunei, Singapore, New
Zealand and Chile should serve as the launch of a new global strategy. The
ability of multilateral agreements to place pressure on regional neighbors
should not be underestimated. The APEC negotiations were observed by
Australia and Japan, an occurrence that does not typically take place in
bilateral negotiations.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. attempted to persuade recalcitrant
nations to adopt its position through what, at the time, was labeled by
industry observers as divide and conquer (De Murias, 1989). In this
strategy, liberal agreements were negotiated with neighboring nations to
advance U.S. goals with third countries. Overall, the strategy found limited
success. However, with nearly global acceptance of the principles of open
skies, the pressure provided by multilaterals may make the difference in
negotiations with nations reluctant to ratify open skies accords.
Implementation
We have successfully reached bilateral open skies agreements with
nearly every country in Europe, and the European Union has adopted
internal deregulation. The multilateral signed in Brunei is open to signage
by any other nation. The nations the U.S. currently has open skies
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agreements with, particularly European nations, should be encouraged to
join this agreement. Another option is to pursue a single multilateral
agreement between our existing European open skies partners and us. This
single agreement could be joined by non-signatory European nations as
they decide to participate.
As with the APEC agreement, a key feature of any new multilateral
agreement should be expanded access to equity financing. The agreement
liberalizes the traditional ownership requirement, thus enhancing foreign
carriers’ access to outside investment. The greatest success of this policy
will probably not be found in the UK, as the issues preventing an agreement
there are so complex. A main point of contention would no doubt continue
to be landing rights at London’s Heathrow airport. However, negotiating as
a single multilateral unit, the U.S. position may be strengthened. A
multilateral agreement could, however, successfully encourage Spain to
fully liberalize their agreements with the U.S.
Domestic Resistance
The flight attendants’ unions provide the strongest domestic resistance
to multilateral agreements. They are concerned with the equity provisions
in the agreement that could allow U.S. airlines to purchase foreign carriers
and operate them on the international routes to the U.S., replacing flights
worked by U.S. flight attendants. This issue could be difficult, as the flight
attendants are likely to receive the full support of the U.S. labor community.
The equity provisions are critical to the success of multilaterals, but
labor resistance could derail signatures. To respond to these concerns, the
DOT could monitor the U.S. ownership of foreign carriers and could
require them to report ownership in excess of 25%. The percentage is based
on the maximum allowed percentage of foreign ownership of a U.S. carrier.
Unions have expressed the desire for such monitoring (Coleman, 2000).
Further, it should be stressed to the labor community that the airline
industry, unlike the shipping industry, is not likely to adopt a flag of
convenience strategy.
International Resistance
This approach may prove a difficult sell to the international community.
The European Union appears to be the perfect body to participate in a
multilateral agreement. In fact, the U.K. and Ireland are the only E.U.
members to publicly oppose the creation of a Transatlantic Common
Aviation Area. However, for the foreseeable future, the opposition of the
U.K. and Ireland precludes the development of such a multilateral. The
Scandinavian nations may be good start for a U.S.-Europe multilateral, as
we have open skies agreements with each nation and they represent a
combination of E.U. and non-E.U. member states.
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The role of unions is important in European politics. The typically
contentious airline labor unions support our initiatives as they create union
jobs. The International Association of Airline Pilots, to which most pilots
unions belong, supports deregulation and open skies. The concerns of U.S.
flight attendants’ unions should be less with a European multilateral, as
carriers of each nation do not stand to benefit from moving operations
between the two continents.
CONCLUSION
Open Skies, At Last? Immunity, Forever?
Nearly a century ago, when Adolf Berle first mused of open skies, it
seemed that there might never be an international political climate to
support his philosophy. In a number of important ways, it appears that just
such a climate has formed and the clouds of regulation are drifting away.
Though aviation clauses are conspicuously absent from the World Trade
Organization and open skies among the North American Free Trade
Agreement partners remains limited by ownership and cabotage
restrictions, the past two decades have seen a steady movement toward
international deregulation.
Airline industry globalization within this deregulated paradigm has
created positive synergies for industry and the flying public. Industry
benefits from greater passengers volumes and higher yields. The creation
of competing global networks expands service and drives down prices for
consumers.
Foreign ownership restrictions are the principal obstacle to truly open
skies. For now, it appears the world is absent the political will to make
international mergers a reality. Potential mergers between E.U.-based
carriers can be likened more to the consolidation of the U.S. market than to
true international mergers. The political reality makes the role of antitrust
immunity in the new international regulatory environment important.
Given existing ownership limits, immunity from civil and criminal antitrust
regulation provides the most competitive industry paradigm.
ENDNOTES
1. The STAR Alliance is a partnership of U.S. and Asian airlines, including United
Airlines, All Nippon (ANA), Singapore Airlines, and Thai Airlines.
2. The four alliances at the time were: a) WINGS consisting of Northwest, KLM, Alitalia
and Continental; b) STAR consisting of United, Lufthansa, SAS, Air Canada, Varig, Thai
Airways, Ansett Australia and Air New Zealand; c) ONEWORLD consisting of American,
British Airways, Canadian, Qantas and Cathay Pacific; and ATLANTIC EXCELLENCE
consisting of Delta, Swiss Air, Sabena and Austrian Airlines. Atlantic Excellence dissolved
in late 1999.
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3. The partnerships with immunity are Northwest/KLM, United Airlines/Lufthansa,
United Airlines/SAS, United Airlines/Air Canada, American Airlines/Canadian Airlines,
and all Atlantic Excellence partnerships.
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readership. These subjects include topics related to 
aviation and/or space transportation, both technical and 
non-technical. An article should be written in a concise 
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both aeronautics generalists and to specialists in other 
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personal impression
analysis of objective
presentation interpretative capability
a generalization of main statements
subject orientation
overall valuation
Articles accepted for publication will not undergo the standard JAT blind review 
process, but will be reviewed by the editorial staff for relevance and compliance with 
the following criteria:
Does the book present a topic of interest to readers of JAT?
Does the review portray a clear idea of the contents of the book?
Does the review depict a fair and accurate presentation of the book?
Does the review maintain a balance between content and critique?
Does the submission fit within the specified format and length requirement?
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diskette and must be in a standard word-processing format such as WordPerfect or 
Microsoft Word. 
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Reviews should include a brief description of the author’s institutional affiliation, 
highest degree earned, and areas of research/teaching interest. 
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Every review article should begin by citing the book(s) to be reviewed with full bibliographic 
information including author(s), copyright date, full title, place of publication, publisher, number 
of pages, ISBN number, and price if available in U.S. dollars.
The following are examples of bibliographic citation:
Kern, T. (1997). Redefining airmanship. New York: Mc-Graw-Hill. Pp. xi + 463. ISBN 0- 07-
034284-9. U.S. $29.95 hard cover.
Findlay, C., Sien, C.L., & Singh, K (Eds.). (1997). Asia Pacific air transport: Challenges
and policy reforms. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Pp. xix + 208. ISBN
981-230-002-3. U.S. $39.90 soft cover.
Horonjeff, R., & McKelvey, F.X. (1994). Planning and design of airports (4th Ed.). New
York: McGraw-Hill. Pp. x + 829. ISBN 0-07-045345-4. U.S. $54.95 hard cover.
Length
Review articles should be between 750-1500 words. Reviews outside these limits may be
considered at the Editor’s discretion. Comparative reviews of two books may be somewhat 
longer, but should not exceed 3000 words. Comparative reviews of more than two books are 
discouraged.
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Reviews appearing in the JAT represent the opinions of the reviewer and are not necessarily 
those of the editorial staff. Reviewers should have some authority or experience in the subject 
area. Reviews may contain positive or negative evaluations of the book. Negative remarks 
should be objective, precise, and expressed in a constructive, respectful manner. Vague or 
unsubstantiated criticism may be offensive to an author and generally fails to persuade a 
reader. Inflammatory remarks will not be accepted.
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The maximum time allowed for completing a solicited review will be four weeks. If a reviewer 
is unable to meet this deadline, please inform the editor of a new date for completion or return 
the book so another reviewer can be contacted. For reviewers living outside the U.S.A., reviews 
may be returned via e-mail. 
Conflict of Interest
Reviews written by the book’s author(s), publisher, distributor, or by colleagues at the same 
institution or organization will not be considered. Also, duplicate reviews (previously 
published) will not be accepted. All authors of book reviews are required to include with their 
submission the following statement signed and dated. I, author’s name, do not have any 
commercial interest in the main topic of the book under review, nor am I associated with a 
company or other organization with commercial interest in the main topic of the book.
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All papers must be written in the English language. Use a 12 point font and allow for a 1"
margin on all sides. Double-space all material including quotations, the abstract, notes, and
references. All figures and tables should be on a separate page at the end of the text. Include the
figure name and filename on the bottom of the page. Please proofread all article submissions for
punctuation, spelling, and format errors.
The cover page should include the title of the manuscript, the author's name(s), shipping and email
addresses, telephone number, and a short biographical statement summarizing the author's
education and current affiliation. Please note the primary contact person. The second page should
contain an abstract of the manuscript. The abstract should include a concise description of the
contents of the paper, the research method used, and the results. Abstracts should generally be
kept to about 100 words.
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Figures and tables should appear at the end of the paper with each item on a separate page. Indicate 
in the text the approximate location where each figure and table should be placed. Figures, tables, 
and the text should each be saved as separate files. Do not embed tables and figures in the text files. 
Include the appropriate file name at the bottom of the page for each figure and table. Figures and 
tables must be camera-ready, printed in black ink only and must fit with in a 4 inch by 7 inch area.
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Due to the international participation, rigid referencing style criteria are not mandated. 
Acceptable reference styles of the author's country will apply. For the U.S.A., the most
recent edition of the American Psychological Association (APA) Manual of Style is preferred.
Ensure all references are cited and all citations are referenced.
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A rigorous double-blind review will be conducted by the JAT  Panel of Reviewers. 
Additionally, a member of the Editorial board will conduct a third review. If revisions
are necessary, the editor will determine when a revised manuscript is in compliance with reviewer
recommendations. Authors must make revisions to original documents and resubmit them to
JAT on disk in Word or Word Perfect format. All revisions must be completed within two
weeks after return to the author. Manuscripts must be original, not previously published, nor under
consideration for another journal while undergoing review by the JAT.
Copyrights: Copyrights are retained by the authors and the JAT. Permission to duplicate and
distribute for educational purposes at no charge is granted.
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Additional information is available on the JAT web site at
http://jat.unomaha.edu or by contacting the JAT directly at 402-554-3424 or
journal@unomaha.edu
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